Robust Systems of Cooperation by Aceves, Cassandra
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust Systems of Cooperation 
by 
Cassandra Aceves  
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
(Business Administration) 
University of Michigan  
2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee:  
 Professor Wayne E. Baker, Co-Chair  
 Associate Professor Maxim Sytch, Co-Chair  
Professor Gerald F. Davis  
Professor Scott E. Page  
Professor James P. Walsh  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cassandra R. Chambers  
caceves@umich.edu 
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6222-0920 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Pete Aceves.  
Your brilliantly creative mind, pain-staking attention to detail, and intellectual breadth inspire me 
on a daily basis. I am so fortunate to walk through this career, and this life, with you.  
  
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 This dissertation is principally concerned with designing robust systems of cooperation. 
While writing this dissertation it occurred to me that I myself have benefited from a robust 
system of cooperation comprised of supporters, teachers, collaborators, and mentors, whose 
contributions to my development and well-being propelled me through this PhD program. I 
would like to take this space to formally acknowledge and thank several of these contributors, 
but recognize that this is invariably an incomplete list. As with all systems of cooperation, single 
acts of help and kindness may go unrecognized, but undoubtedly make a long-lasting impact. I 
am grateful to all who have contributed to my development as a scholar.  
 I would like to begin by thanking my two amazing co-chairs Wayne Baker and Maxim 
Sytch, who immediately recognized and validated the potential of the ideas found in this 
dissertation even when they were in their malformed, nascent stages. I have benefited immensely 
from my independent relationships with both of them, but this dissertation benefited greatly from 
the complementary nature of their joint mentorship. I only experienced the extreme upside of 
having co-chairs. Their suggestions for structuring the dissertation, tackling problems that arose 
along the way, and their general approaches to scholarship continually built off one another. As a 
result, I experienced double the care, creativity, and encouragement.   
 Before starting the PhD program, I had formed an image of what an adviser would be 
like; someone who had exacting standards, but was also inspiring and encouraging, someone 
who held high acclaim in the field, but who was really in it for the love of research, and someone
 iv 
 
who would be as invested in my success as I was. Wayne Baker is all these things and more. 
Wayne was the first to get truly excited about the ideas found in this dissertation. In my second 
year I had written a course paper that built off one of his papers. I remember being so nervous 
after sending him this paper and asking if he wanted to be on the project with me. He read it right 
away and responded back with excitement, saying we should get started immediately. Despite 
being incredibly busy, he always had time to talk through new ideas, comment on drafts, and 
listen to my worries—there were a lot of these conversations. Ultimately, I feel as though in 
Wayne I not only have a great mentor, but also a great friend. I am grateful for this friendship 
and look forward to working together for many years to come.  
Maxim Sytch’s mentorship has seen me through the entire PhD program. It has been a 
singular privilege to learn the craft of research from him. Among other things, Maxim gave me 
the opportunity and confidence to continually strive for higher and higher levels of scholarship. I 
would often reach a bar only to find that it had moved a little higher and for that I am truly 
grateful. He saw in me capabilities that I myself didn’t know I possessed and encouraged me to 
work on my weaknesses until I could consider these areas sources of strength. While he urged 
me to develop skills as an independent researcher, I never felt as though I was on these 
dissertation and job market journeys alone. I am deeply grateful for his feedback on multiple 
drafts of dissertation ideas and job-market packet components, as well as last minute interview-
prepping sessions and his openness to 9am calls on a Sunday morning to strategize the critical 
wording of an email. I hope that I can be as impactful an adviser for my future students.  
 The remaining members of my committee were also critical for the completion of this 
dissertation. Jerry Davis emphasized the phenomenological importance of this dissertation and 
helped me flesh out real-world examples of it in action. At a foundational level he is also the 
 v 
 
reason why I had the confidence to work with the “big data” I use in Chapter 4. I benefited from 
his vision of a data camp that would make programing more accessible to social scientists. Scott 
Page’s work and mentorship inspired and encouraged this dissertation’s ties to complexity 
theory. I always left conversations with Scott buzzing with excitement about the possibilities for 
my data and line of theorizing. Last, by alphabetical order only, I would like to thank Jim Walsh. 
Jim’s feedback was not only central to the completion of this dissertation—particularly in the 
shaping of its original direction and the refinement of my thinking on foundational constructs, 
but also for my progression through this program as a whole. He spent countless hours sitting 
with me at Amer’s and Baba Dari listening to my ideas, providing feedback, and offering 
encouragement.  
 The completion of this dissertation and my PhD program also greatly benefited from a 
wider academic community. In particular, Sue Ashford made a lasting impact on my thinking as 
a scholar. Her organizational behavior class provided the rigorous theoretical training and 
enriching feedback mechanisms that helped me find the idea that would ultimately lead to this 
dissertation. Dave Mayer, Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, Leigh Toast, Ned Wellman, and Lillian Chen 
provided multiple sessions of feedback on my experimental designs. Gautam Ahuja, Michael 
Jensen, and Derek Harmon provided support by looking in on the students in our office on a 
frequent basis. Their “war stories,” advice, and humor were always greatly appreciated. Michael 
Payne and Aurora Turek made a year and a half worth of data collection both feasible and fun. 
Shelly Whitmer, Barb Kirby-Bloch, and Adriana Morariu were the go-to-people when I needed 
resources and logistical support. Brian Jones facilitated a supportive doctoral studies 
environment that was especially welcoming for a somewhat non-traditional student like me. Last, 
I am deeply grateful to my original academic mentors Bob Thomas, Gwen Lee, and Jason 
 vi 
 
Colquitt who told me that a career in academia might be a fit for me. I would especially like to 
thank Bob Thomas who gave me my start in research and encouraged me to keep going with my 
doctoral plans even after I learned that the twins were on their way.   
 It has been said that you are only as good as the people who surround you. In this 
program, I have been fortunate enough to be surrounded by an incredibly awesome group of 
family and friends, without whom this dissertation and a career in academia would not be 
possible. Above all, I am grateful for my husband Pete Aceves’s support. Pete is not only an 
incredibly supportive spouse, but is also my most tireless colleague and friend. From countless 
hours commuting back and forth to Chicago to repeatedly taking on the sole care of our children 
over weekends so that I could work, Pete contributed a great deal to make sure that I could be 
successful in my program. He has always been my go-to-person for my research ruminations, my 
most dedicated manuscript reviewer, and the person I rely on most for emotional support. I am 
deeply grateful for our partnership, which has only strengthened as a result of graduate school. 
On every dimension, we did this together. Thank you, Pete.  
I thank my sons Isaac and Nico, who at the young age of seven are already sources of 
intellectual inspiration and enthusiastic supporters of my academic career. Throughout the 
writing of this manuscript they checked in on my daily progress and cheered me on. They are 
both great observers of human behavior and already think deeply about many critical issues of 
our time. I feel incredibly privileged to be your mother and look forward to engaging with you in 
scientific inquiry throughout the years to come.  
I am grateful to my parents, Terry and Steve Chambers. I credit my mother with inspiring 
my love for reading. Some of my earliest memories of my mother are of her reading to me. She 
also served as my first female academic role-model, who after staying home for several years to 
 vii 
 
raise children, re-entered the workforce when I was thirteen. I now more than ever appreciate 
how she accomplished this feat and deeply admire how she did so without me perceiving a 
reduction in her availability and support. Her example showed me that it is always possible to 
reinvent oneself and that women can be both excellent mothers and professionals. My father has 
always been an incredible supporter of my academic inclinations. I think the magnitude of this 
support is best exemplified by the time he flew from California to Michigan—on the heels of a 
long work week—to spend days taking care of his two-year-old grandsons. He did this so that I 
could still attend classes while their daycare was closed. From immigration logistics to 
strategizing how to be an advocate for myself and my children, I am always at ease when my dad 
is on the case.  
I am also incredibly fortunate to have an equally supportive set of in-laws, Kimberly 
Breeden and Pedro Aceves. I recognize the rarity and specialness of my relationship with my 
mother-in-law, whom I consider to be one of my closest friends. I especially admire her intellect 
and how she is such a keen observer of human behavior. Her insights into the underlying 
psychological states of individuals continually cause me to reexamine what it is that I think I 
know about the phenomena I research. In my opinion, the depths of these insights exceed those 
that are exhibited by many who hold a PhD. My father-in-law is also a huge supporter of mine. 
His notes of encouragement make me feel as though I walk on water. His support for my career 
knows no bounds, which was confirmed when he took a sabbatical from his medical practice to 
help us get settled abroad. Suegrito, we are moving to Italy! 
 My progression through this program was spurred on by several important friendships. 
With my cohort mate Ashley Hardin, I shared all the ups and downs that come with being an 
early PhD student. She was always quick to check in on me, meet me with a cup of coffee after I 
 viii 
 
stayed up all night with sick kids, and most importantly told me to keep going when it felt 
impossible to do so. Even from afar Ashley has continued to check in and offer support. With my 
officemate Casidhe Troyer, I shared a great deal of my coursework and the final stages of this 
doctoral experience. I envy all Casidhe’s future colleagues. She is incredibly giving of her 
time—both for work and non-work-related support. Even though we could have technically been 
competing for some of the same jobs, I felt nothing but warmth, joy, and validation from her. 
With my officemate Teddy Dewitt, I shared all the experiences of being a “macro” MO student. I 
am extremely grateful for his friendship and support. Whether it was taking notes during my 
proposal, editing drafts, loading heavy book boxes on a moving truck, or reasoning through 
reviews, he always had my back. It has been fun getting to know the most recent addition to our 
office, Sarah Gordon. I wish that I could have spent more of my program with her. Laura Sonday 
is a great friend who read through drafts of job market materials, offering stellar feedback and 
support. Chen Zhang and I weathered the job market journey together, cheering each other on. 
Gareth Keeves always was a source of levity and fun, both in and outside of the classroom. 
Shawna Smith was my first and best statistics professor and has since become a dear friend. Last, 
to all the past and current MO students who were not mentioned above, but have offered me 
advice, sat through my presentations, and cheered me on, I express my heart-felt thanks: Natalie 
Cotton-Nessler, Jeff Bednar, Chuck Fu Lam, Samir Nurmohamed, Laura Rees, Kristina 
Workman, Suntae Kim, Johan Chu, Chris Myers, Matt Karlesky, Yong Hyun Kim, Maddy Ong, 
Lyndon Garrett, Lindsey Cameron, Eun Woo Kim, Mrudula Nujella, Mijeong Kim, Eun Bit 
Hwang, Hilary Hendricks, and Katherine Bae. For each of you, I can think of a special memory 
that has brightened my experience in this program.   
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................................ ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................... iii 
 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................................... x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................. xii 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................. xiv 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Robust Systems of Cooperation, Rankings, & the Changing Nature of Work ..................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 
Achieving Robust Cooperation after the Introduction of Rankings ..................................... 14 
CHAPTER 3 
With Cheaters We all Prosper?: Micro-Movements through Rankings and their 
Implications for System Robustness ......................................................................................... 61 
CHAPTER 4 
Understanding How Rankings Affect Systems of Cooperation .......................................... 112 
APPENDIX 
Supplemental Tables and Figures ........................................................................................... 120 
 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 132 
  
 x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Description of Constructs and Variables in Chapter 2 .................................................35 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Chapter 2 .................................................................................36 
 
Table 2.3: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: The Likelihood of Transferring in Stage 2 .........45 
 
Table 2.4: Interrupted Time Series Analysis of Post-Interruption Effects on Transfer Rates .......48 
 
Table 2.5: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: The Likelihood of Transferring in Stage 2  
(Reputation and Rank Condition Only) .............................................................................50 
 
Table 3.1: Stack Overflow Privileges Based on Reputation Level ................................................78 
 
Table 3.2: Description of Stack Overflow’s Reputation System ...................................................79 
 
Table 3.3: Number of Observations in Each Milestone .................................................................85 
 
Table 3.4: Number of Observations of Suspensions in Each Milestone........................................85 
 
Table 3.5: Number of Observations with High Risk of Proximity Gain (10%) in Each Milestone 
Rank ...................................................................................................................................85 
 
Table 3.6: Number of Observations with High Risk of Proximity Loss (10%) in Each Milestone 
Rank ...................................................................................................................................85 
 
Table 3.7: Number of Observations with Reputation Changes (From Week to Week) ................86 
 
Table 3.8: Description of Constructs and Variables in Chapter 3 .................................................91 
 
Table 3.9: Summary Statistics for Chapter 3 .................................................................................93 
 
Table 3.10: Likelihood of Behavior by Percent of Milestone Rank Achieved  .............................98 
 
Table 3.11: Effects of High Proximity to Gaining or Losing Milestone Ranks ..........................100 
 
Table 3.12: Comparing Rates of Cooperation Pre and Post Suspension .....................................101 
 
 xi 
 
Table A.1: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: (Reputation Condition Only) ...........................120 
 
Table A.2: Chp. 2 Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: Table 2 with Rank as the Omitted 
Category for Comparison (All Conditions represented as Odds Ratios)  ........................121 
 
Table A.3: Chp. 3 Effects of High Proximity to Gaining the Next Milestone Rank (20% Away 
from change in rank) ........................................................................................................122 
 
Table A.4: Chp. 3 Effects of High Proximity to Gaining the Next Milestone Rank (30% Away 
from change in rank) ........................................................................................................123 
 
Table A.5: Ch.3 Effects of Reputation Value (logged) on Cooperative Behavior ......................125 
 
Table A.6: Ch.3 Models Showing Effect of Interaction Between Ranking Milestone Category 
and Percent of Milestone Rank Achieved on Cooperative Behavior ..............................126 
 
Table A.7: Ch.3 Models Showing Effect on Cooperative Behavior............................................127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Two-Stage Experimental Design ....................................................30 
 
Figure 2.2: Empirical Comparison of Group-Level Transfer Rates Before and After an 
Interruption ........................................................................................................................40 
 
Figure 2.3: Predicted Probability of a Transfer in Stage 2 by Condition and Group’s Level of 
Generosity in Stage 1 .........................................................................................................43 
 
Figure 2.4: Percent Transfers for Conditions at Each Round, Pre- and Post-Interruption ............46 
  
Figure 2.5: Illustration of Interrupted Time Series Analysis Comparing Rank Information and 
Reputation and Rank Information Conditions before and after an Interruption ................48 
 
Figure 2.6: Predicted Probability of a Transfer in Stage 2 by Salience of Inequity & Alter’s 
Reputation .................................................................................................................................... 51 
 
Figure 3.1: Frequency of Observations at Percent of the Way to the Next Milestone on Original 
Sample................................................................................................................................84 
 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of Observations at Percent of the Way to the Next Milestone after 
Removing Bottom and Top Milestones Categories ...........................................................84 
 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Reasons for Suspension ......................................................................87 
 
Figure 3.4: Number of Suspension Events by Quarter-Year (Q1-2009-Q2-2017) ........................88 
 
Figure 3.5: Visualization of Measures that Calculate Proximity to Rank Gains and Losses ........89 
 
Figure 3.6: Frequency of Cooperative Behaviors by the Percent of Next Milestone Rank 
 Achieved ...........................................................................................................................94 
 
Figure 3.7: Marginal Effects of Category Membership and the Effect of Percent of Next 
Milestone Achieved on Rates of Cooperative Behavior ....................................................95 
 
 xiii 
 
Figure 3.8: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Logged Reputation Points for All Milestone 
Ranks..................................................................................................................................96 
 
Figure A.1: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 
2........................................................................................................................................128 
 
Figure A.2: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 
3........................................................................................................................................129 
 
Figure A.3: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 
4........................................................................................................................................130 
 
Figure A.4: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 
5........................................................................................................................................131 
 
 
  
 xiv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the robustness of systems of cooperation—the ability to 
maintain levels of cooperation in the presence of a potentially disruptive force. I examine 
rankings as a potentially disruptive force that is commonplace in organizations. A ranking is the 
ordering of individuals according to their performance on a specific dimension. Systems of 
cooperation often operate in contexts that feature rankings (e.g., the ride-sharing company Uber 
uses a “rank and yank” performance evaluation system, yet still expects cooperation on complex 
cooperative coding tasks) and some explicitly use rankings to motivate cooperative contributions 
toward a collective goal (e.g., the character improvement App “Peeple” consists of members’ 
public evaluations of each other’s character and uses a public “positivity rating” to motivate 
members to maintain a more collegial environment). Yet, a growing body of research is 
highlighting potential downsides to rankings that could undermine the maintenance of systems of 
cooperation. This research suggests that rankings may unexpectedly introduce new dynamics into 
a system of cooperation that drive actors toward uncooperative behaviors and undermine the 
system as a whole. This dissertation aims to address this tension by exploring how systems of 
cooperation interact with rankings. Specifically, it explores how rankings can both enrich and 
perturb a system of cooperation and how systems can achieve robust cooperation in the presence 
of rankings.   
Chapter 1 introduces the dual role of rankings for systems of cooperation, reflects on the 
importance of identifying characteristics that make these systems robust, and discusses how the 
 xv 
 
changing nature of work creates a new urgency for understanding how rankings affect 
cooperation. This introductory chapter is followed by two empirical chapters that examine 
distinct pieces of the puzzle for how rankings affect the maintenance of cooperation over time. 
Chapter 2 examines how the introduction of a performance ranking affects established systems 
of cooperation. Using a between-groups, no-deception experimental design that includes 74 
groups, 594 participants, and over 11,000 cooperation decisions, it examines 1) whether the self-
sustaining properties of systems of cooperation are naturally able to overcome the potentially 
disruptive effects of rankings, and 2) in the case of disruption how managers may be able to 
restore cooperation in the presence of rankings—making these systems of cooperation more 
robust. Chapter 3 examines an online community that explicitly uses a ranking to promote 
cooperation. Using over 1.2 million observations of members’ weekly behaviors, this chapter 
examines how potential losses and gains in rank inspire individuals to perform both cooperative 
and uncooperative behaviors and explores how the system-level implications of these behaviors 
may affect the robustness of systems of cooperation. Chapter 4 concludes the dissertation by 
synthesizing findings from the empirical chapters, discussing their joint implications for building 
robust systems of cooperation, and detailing areas of future research.  
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CHAPTER I 
Robust Systems of Cooperation, Rankings, & the Changing Nature of Work 
 
Traditional organizational forms are becoming increasingly less relevant. Contrary to the 
heyday of organizations in the late 70s to early 90s, traditional forms of public corporations are 
disappearing form the social landscape at a rapid rate (Davis 2016). Simultaneously, we have 
observed both a rise in non-traditional forms of employment such as increases in temporary 
assignments and independent contracting (Cappelli and Keller 2013) and a dramatic increase in 
alternative forms of organizing such as business models built around shared assets, online 
communities for the creation and dispersal of knowledge, virtual teams, and work cooperatives 
(Puranam, Alexy, and Reitzig, 2014). This dramatic shift toward more collectively oriented 
business ventures and the decentralized control of assets and decision making suggests that a 
period of reflection surrounding our traditional management structures and theories of collective 
cooperation could be useful (Barley, Bechky, and Milliken 2017; Walsh, Meyer, and 
Schoonhoven 2006). With the absence of traditional organizational forms, maintaining 
cooperation may become more difficult. For example, lower rates of in-person interaction, more 
atomized task allocations, and lower barriers to exit the organization are common characteristics 
of non-traditional organizational forms. These characteristics may encourage higher rates of 
freeriding and reduce individuals’ commitment to organizations’ ongoing status and collective 
goals. Increases in geographic distance make monitoring and enforcing cooperation more 
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difficult and lower barriers of exit could lead individuals to have less at stake in their 
membership.   
Rankings as a mechanism to maintain cooperation may be particularly well-suited to this 
changing nature of work. Rankings are a form of social hierarchy—the explicit or implicit 
ordinal ordering of individuals on a valued social dimension (Magee and Galinsky 2008)
1
. Social 
hierarchies compare community members’ past performance of cooperative behaviors and 
therefore serve two functions: 1) deterring uncooperative behavior by holding members 
accountable to standards of behavior and 2) incentivizing future cooperation by offering relative 
rewards to those who contribute the most. Rankings create cognitive shortcuts that provide 
access to these rewards. As such, rankings are often enlisted as mechanisms to maintain social 
order and create cooperation in communities (Thibault and Kelley, 1959; Blau, 1968; Simpson 
and Willer, 2015). Unlike other mechanisms utilized to elicit cooperation, which become more 
difficult to use with higher population sizes (e.g., norms and regulations), rankings may be more 
amenable to the changing nature of work. Advances in technology allow for better monitoring of 
members’ activities and allow organizations to display more transparent data about these 
activities (Bernstein and Li 2017). Consequently, rankings have the potential to be more accurate 
and transparent than ever before, which suggests that they could be the mechanism that best 
facilitates cooperation in the new world of work.    
However, extant research presents conflicting evidence about the outcomes that may arise 
in the presence of rankings; casting doubt on whether they would be appropriate for this role. On 
the one hand, rankings and other forms of social hierarchy have been lauded as a key facilitator 
of cooperative behavior in groups and organizations (Thibault and Kelley 1959; Blau 1968; 
                                                          
1 Rankings can take many forms (e.g., partial, complete, cardinal, ordinal, etc.). I examine rankings as ordinal social structures. 
Ordinal rankings imply that each position has a unique meaning that comes from its position relative to others in the ranking.  
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Magee and Galinsky 2008; Willer 2009; Anderson and Brown 2010). Rankings incentivize and 
reward cooperative behavior and facilitate the punishment of uncooperative behavior. Attaining 
higher ranks is typically associated with higher material, social, and psychological rewards 
(Tannenbaum et al. 1974; Magee and Galinsky 2008). Rankings incentivize cooperative behavior 
when the ascension to higher ranks is coupled with performing cooperative behaviors (e.g., 
Pfeffer and Cohen 1984; Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby 1986). These rewards need not 
translate into some form of material gain or competitive advantage—simple levels of public 
recognition often spur cooperative behaviors. For example, in a field experiment of Wikipedia 
users Restivo and van de Rijt (2012) found that symbolic recognition from peers for good 
contributions (in the form reputation “badges” that hold no material value) increased future 
contributions (e.g., posts and editing activities) to the online encyclopedia of Wikipedia. Further, 
these rankings systems need not be formal to be effective at ensuring cooperation. Prior research 
shows that groups will gather information about members’ relative rates of cooperation to form 
informal rankings and reward and sanction members according to these informal rankings 
(Willer 2009). For example, Feinberg, Willer, and Schultz (2014) document how groups use 
gossip to collect information about members’ relative contributions to collective goals.  
On the other hand, recent research is beginning to document a link between rankings and 
higher rates of uncooperative behaviors such as cheating, dishonesty, and the sabotage of other 
group members (Edelman and Larkin 2014; Pettit et al. 2016; Vriend et al. 2016). This research 
finds that individuals’ drive to obtain higher positions in rankings can lead to increases in 
competitive behaviors (Barclay and Willer, 2007) and interpersonal conflicts (Bendersky and 
Hays 2012). For example, researchers of tournaments—contests in which members compete for 
prizes awarded based on relative rank (Lazear 1999; Connelly et al. 2014)—show that 
 4 
 
tournaments may foster aggressive behavior (Siegel and Hambrick 2005) and undermine 
organizational goals (Henderson and Frederickson 2001). Overall, this research suggests that 
rankings may unintentionally introduce new dynamics into a system that drive actors toward 
uncooperative behaviors. Accordingly, while rankings have been traditionally thought of as 
mechanisms that shore up cooperation and social order to create stable groups and organizations, 
they may simultaneously sow seeds of disruption that threaten future rates of cooperation.  
This dissertation engages with this puzzle by examining whether and how organizations 
can achieve robust cooperation in the presence of rankings. Embedded within this focus is the 
assumption that rankings are an unavoidable element of social life. This assumption is well 
supported by prior research that documents the seemingly ubiquitous presence of hierarchy in 
society (Anderson and Brown 2010). Given this near ubiquity, I argue that explanations of the 
maintenance of cooperation necessitate an explicit consideration of how mechanisms that 
maintain cooperation interact with rankings. With this focus, this dissertation departs from extant 
research on the maintenance of cooperation in three ways. First, it examines cooperation as a 
social system. Social systems are patterned networks of actions (Parsons 1991). Past actions 
impart social forces on actors that inspire future actions (e.g., one actor helps another and this 
triggers the receiver to “pay this help forward” to another actor) (e.g., Baker and Bulkley 2014). 
Prior research tends to address the maintenance of cooperation by identifying intrapersonal 
mechanisms of maintenance (e.g., individual characteristics, prosocial emotions, and personality) 
or interpersonal mechanisms (e.g., norms, networks, and hierarchy) (Simpson et al. 2015). 
Examining cooperation as a system combines insights from both perspectives. Second, it applies 
a dynamic perspective of social hierarchy (e.g., Pettit et al. 2013) to investigate how movements 
through rankings alter actors’ experiences in these rankings. Static views of rankings assume 
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stable psychological experiences of rankings. Dynamic views of rankings expose how actors’ 
movements through rankings alter their experiences of rankings. Accordingly, a dynamic 
perspective of rankings may help illuminate why and when rankings create negative externalities 
that may undermine cooperation. Third, it imports a robustness lens (Jen 2005) from complexity 
theory in the natural and engineering sciences. Through this lens, it explicitly examines how 
cooperation is maintained in the presence of potentially disruptive forces. Such an approach has 
the power to identify mechanisms that can lead to longer-lasting cooperation despite the 
occurrence of failure, environmental uncertainty, rapid change, and increasing complexity. 
Systems of Cooperation  
Cooperation occurs when an individual enacts a behavior that benefits a group at a 
personal cost (Nowak 2006; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). A system of cooperation occurs when 
behaviors related to cooperation (e.g., cooperative and uncooperative acts) become interlinked 
overtime through ongoing, regular interactions. In systems, actors’ past behaviors catalyze 
behaviors in others. For instance, teams of developers repeatedly exchanging ideas for a project 
(e.g., Barghouti 1992) and sales representatives regularly passing leads amongst each other (e.g., 
Bailey 2008) can both be examined as systems of cooperation. Systems of cooperation also occur 
outside of formal organizational settings such as is the case with open-source projects (e.g., 
Smith and Kollock 1999; Anthony et al., 2009), online markets and communities (e.g., Restivo 
and van de Rijt 2012), and even across villages as seen in the ceremonial exchange system the 
Kula Ring (e.g., Malinowski 1922). What is common to these examples, but not cooperation in 
general, is the linked, ongoing, regular nature of cooperative interactions and the 
interdependence that ensues from these linkages. 
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Inspired by the biological and physical sciences, Parsons (1951) first described the 
concept of a social system as a patterned network of actions. The “networked” element of this 
definition is important as it highlights the interdependence among actions. Past actions trigger 
future actions among a set of actors over time. As such, social systems can be described as 
autopoietic in nature (Luhmann 1995). They tend to be self-reproducing. Over time, the 
occurrence and non-occurrence of actions strengthen or weaken social forces that regularly 
inspire similar actions, thereby reproducing a pattern of networked actions. While social systems 
can occur among the same set of individuals, they are not dependent on the continued presence 
of specific individuals. Instead, the focus is on the interlocking nature of actions. As Asch 
(1959:252) states, a social system “does not reside in the individuals, taken separately, though 
each individual contributes to it, nor does it reside outside them; it is present in the interrelations 
between the activities of individuals.”  
Interrelations between activities are governed by actors’ mental representations of the 
system as a whole and their impressions of the reasons behind other actors’ actions. In 
considering how to act in a social system, actors reflect on the past behaviors of others in the 
system and consider how their own actions may fit in with these behaviors (Asch 1959). During 
this process an actor’s own motivations for acting, personal values, and impression of others’ 
reasons for acting all factor into how they interpret the global structure of the system. Ultimately 
the system as a whole is a composite structure that reflects the aggregation of these interrelating 
activities and the micro-motivations that are embedded within them. Consequently, a social 
systems perspective adds to research on the maintenance of cooperation because it bridges 
intrapersonal and interpersonal explanations of cooperation to form a more nuanced 
understanding of how social forces affect rates of cooperation.   
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Dynamic Views of Rankings  
Up until the last decade, research on actors’ psychological experiences of rankings tended 
to assume that actors occupied stable hierarchical positions and therefore experienced stable 
preferences stemming from these positions. For example, Phillips and Zuckerman’s (2001) 
theory of conformity explicitly assumed that hierarchies are stable (e.g., there is little movement 
of actors between qualitatively meaningful categories such as high, medium, and low); leading 
the lower strata to dis-identify with the hierarchical structure.
2
 It is easy to see why this 
assumption held. At more macro-levels of analysis, social hierarchies tend to remain stable over 
time and confer different levels of benefits to actors within these systems, which help preserve 
actors’ positions within the structure. Higher ranked actors tend to stay near the top and lower 
ranked actors tend to stay near the bottom (Merton, 1968; Podolny and Phillips, 1996). Hence, it 
was fair to expect that actors within these systems would experience relatively stable levels of 
social psychological pressures associated with one consistent position within a ranking.  
In contrast, recent research is beginning to apply a dynamic perspective to actors’ 
experiences within social hierarchies (e.g., Pettit et al. 2010; Pettit et al. 2016). Instead of 
assuming stable positions in a ranking, dynamic perspectives focus on how movements through a 
ranking create different psychological experiences for actors. For example, Pettit et al. (2016) 
show that potential status losses, more than potential status gains, are associated with higher 
performance comparison pressures and ultimately with higher levels of cheating. Similarly, 
Krishnan and Kozhikode (2015) note that increases in firms’ ranking positions are associated 
with higher rates of illegality, citing concerns about status loss as the underlying mechanism. On 
                                                          
2 Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) acknowledge that while conformity pressures would seem to imply a static social order, there 
must be some threat of downward mobility for the inverted U-shaped relationship between status and conformity to play out. 
Consequently, prior research on status hierarchy’s structural effects and its related social psychological pressures includes an 
underlying assumption of dynamism, but until recently did not explicitly theorize around it.    
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this front there is still much to learn about 1) how the type of movement through a hierarchy 
(e.g., up, down, frequent, net, relative, etc.) affects actors’ psychological experiences and 
subsequent behaviors, 2) how these behaviors feedback into and shape the hierarchy, and 3) how 
the aggregation of these shifting behaviors ultimately affects the organization’s ability to 
maintain cooperation over time.  
Robustness 
Robustness is the featured persistence of one aspect, or the entirety, of a system in the 
face of perturbations (Jen 2005). Perturbations are the factors that create a system-wide change 
in a system’s composition, core relational dynamics, or fundamental assumptions about the 
environment in which the system operates (Jen 2003). Perturbations can be external to the 
system (e.g., a new legal standard that changes “the rules of the game” for patenting), or internal 
to the system (e.g., shifting employee motivations resulting from their experiences in an 
incentive system).  
It is not sufficient to simply say that a social system is “robust.” One must define the 
aspect of the social system that exhibits featured persistence (e.g., maintaining levels of 
cooperation) and the source of perturbations that could disrupt it (e.g., rankings). Robustness is 
related to, but distinct from, the concept of stability. In complexity theory (stemming from 
control theory and stability theory in engineering fields) a system is said to be stable when it can 
remain at an “equilibrium state” over time (Jen 2003). This includes returning to this equilibrium 
state after experiencing small changes in the environment such as a change in levels of external 
inputs. Hence, stability and robustness both feature the common element of featured persistence 
over time, but robustness differs in two key ways: 1) Robustness explicitly examines featured 
persistence in the face of perturbations, whereas stability can exist without considering 
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perturbations, and 2) Robustness can be achieved without returning to an equilibrium state—the 
social system can change in fundamental ways, so long as the performance of a social system is 
maintained. As an example, consider Jen’s (2003) illustration of the flow of a river to further 
differentiate the concepts of stability and robustness: “Assuming that the flow depends on an 
external parameter, such as wind speed, and ignoring other factors, the flow is structurally stable 
if small changes in wind speed do not qualitatively change the dynamics of the flow; for 
example, do not produce a new structure such as an eddy” (i.e., a reverse current). This is not to 
say that robustness requires the presence of change. Rather, this statement illustrates the point 
that stability cannot occur with fundamental changes to a social system’s core dynamics. Hence, 
robustness is a wider construct than stability. 
While perturbations have the potential to completely disrupt and even destroy a system, 
this is not the only outcome they can produce. Perturbations can lead to momentary setbacks for 
a system that it later recovers from. Systems may remain unaffected by perturbations. In some 
cases, systems can even thrive as a result of perturbations. All three of the latter outcomes would 
typify a robust system because performance levels are maintained or enhanced after encountering 
perturbations.   
The concept of robustness is similar to the concepts of organizational resilience (e.g., 
Gittell et al. 2006; Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003) and high reliability organizing (e.g., Weick, 
Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2008; Weick 1987). Organizational resilience can refer to an 
organization’s ability to recover from an adverse event or an organization’s ability to thrive as a 
result of encountering stress (Lengnick-Hall 2011). High reliability organizing focuses on 
organizations that portray a “broad vigilance for and high responsiveness to potential accidents” 
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(LaPorte and Consolini 1991; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2008:33). Robustness engages with 
similar themes—maintaining performance after disruptions, but robustness is a wider construct. 
There are two main differences between robustness and these constructs. First, high 
reliability theorizing (HRT) and resilience research typically focus on unexpected exogenous 
events (e.g., crises). HRT examines preparation for the avoidance of, or the rebounding from, 
catastrophic events (e.g., a nuclear meltdown). The term organizational resilience tends to be 
invoked after an unexpected, exogenous event. Conversely, robustness examines potentially 
disruptive forces that may arise from both exogenous and endogenous sources and these 
perturbations do not need to be “shocks.” They can be everyday externalities that create 
potentially disruptive forces. Similar to engineers that focus on de-bugging a system, a 
robustness lens can pick up on everyday perturbations that result from seemingly normal 
organizational activities; recognizing that at the aggregate these small perturbations could 
produce dramatic consequences for a system.  
Second, organizational resilience and HRT tend to describe agentic, intentional responses 
by actors (e.g., the strategic prioritization of safety or active limitation of trial-and-error learning) 
(e.g., LaPorte 1994). While robustness can include human actions, it is principally concerned 
with the qualities and dynamics of a system. In examining an organization’s ability to maintain 
cooperation over time, a robustness lens may be concerned with understanding how the 
accumulation of cooperative events produces externalities that change actors’ motivations to 
cooperate in the future. For example, Stewart and Plotkin (2014) show that over time high rates 
of continued cooperation increase the benefits associated with freeriding, which in turn shifts the 
motivations of actors away from cooperation to freeriding and ultimately disrupts future rates of 
cooperation. In summary, a robustness lens enhances the study of cooperation by explicitly 
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focusing on the maintenance of cooperation in the presence of potentially disruptive forces—
both endogenous and exogenous forms—which can ultimately help explain the maintenance of 
longer lasting cooperation.  
Overview of Chapters  
The remaining sections of this dissertation are outlined below. In Chapter 2 rankings are 
thought of as an exogenous perturbation to a system of cooperation. Chapter 2 examines whether 
rankings are inherently disruptive forces that undercut cooperation, or if they can be managed to 
help maintain cooperation over time. Maintaining cooperation in the face of strong self-interest is 
a subject of longstanding inquiry in the social sciences. Much of this work has focused on 
understanding the antecedents and outcomes associated with cooperation, assuming that the 
inertial properties of a system will sustain cooperation over time. This chapter shifts the focus 
toward examining how cooperation is maintained in the face of potentially disruptive forces. To 
advance theory, research, and practice on how to maintain cooperation over time, it examines 
how systems of cooperation interact with, withstand, or succumb to a potentially disruptive force 
that is commonplace in organizational contexts: rankings. Using a longitudinal, no-deception, 
between-groups experimental design, it assesses how systems of cooperation respond to the 
introduction of performance rankings. Examining data from more than 11,000 rounds of 
decision-making from 592 participants clustered in 74 teams, this study finds that cooperation 
plummets when performance rank information is introduced. However, the addition of reputation 
information—other individuals’ histories of prosocial contributions—enables a system of 
cooperation to recover from the disruptive effects of performance rankings. Actors use reputation 
information to make decisions that reduce perceived inequity. Reputation serves as a source of 
system robustness that restores cooperation, enabling a system of cooperation to withstand forces 
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that would otherwise destroy it. This study contributes to theories of cooperation, performance 
feedback, macro-level prosocial behavior, and management practice.  
Chapter 3 examines the online community Stack Overflow as a system of cooperation. 
Stack Overflow is a question and answer site for programmers. Stack Overflow solely exists 
because of the voluntary contributions and needs of its members and explicitly uses a ranking to 
motivate its members to make these contributions. This context enables a more dynamic 
examination of rankings by documenting the shifting pressures associated with individuals’ 
movements through a ranking. In Chapter 3, rankings are thought of as an endogenous 
perturbation to a system of cooperation. Chapter 3 departs from prior studies that recognize the 
duality found in rankings’ effects on cooperative and uncooperative behavior by relaxing the 
assumption that these behaviors are mutually exclusive. As such, actors have the opportunity to 
exhibit both cooperative and uncooperative behaviors as they approach a meaningful standard of 
achievement. Using over 1.2 million observations of 16,200 individuals’ weekly activities on the 
Stack Overflow site, this chapter explores 1) whether opportunities for gains and threats of losses 
in the rankings equally motivate both cooperative and uncooperative behaviors, 2) whether 
actors that eventually exhibit uncooperative behaviors have higher rates of cooperation near 
ranking thresholds than actors that never exhibit uncooperative behaviors, and 3) whether actors 
are more likely to exhibit cooperative behaviors after being punished for uncooperative 
behaviors. I find that a proximity to a loss in rank discourages uncooperative behavior and is 
generally more effective at incentivizing cooperative behavior than a proximity to a gain in rank. 
Further, I find that incremental movements forward in a ranking are associated with increases in 
uncooperative behavior.  
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Jointly, these finding suggest that gains in rank come with potential costs to the system—
they may lead to higher rates of uncooperative behavior. However, I find evidence that actors 
that eventually exhibit uncooperative behaviors tend to exhibit slightly higher levels of 
cooperative behaviors when approaching these ranking thresholds than those who never exhibit 
uncooperative behaviors. This finding implies that systems may be able to tolerate the negative 
externalities of rankings (i.e., uncooperative behaviors), because the actors that perform them are 
on average more cooperative. Their cooperative actions may offset their uncooperative actions. 
This study contributes to theories of cooperation, dynamic perspectives of social hierarchy, and 
research on licensing behaviors. Chapter 4 concludes the dissertation by summarizing what I 
have learned about achieving robust systems of cooperation and discusses avenues for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Achieving Robust Cooperation after the Introduction of Rankings 
Coauthored with Professor Wayne E. Baker 
 
Cooperation is essential for nearly every organizational endeavor. From complex 
international agreements to address global climate change (Barrett 2016, Ostrom 2010, Ostrom et 
al. 1999, Wijen and Ansari 2007) to daily teamwork and the pursuit of organizational goals 
(Barnard 1938, Jones and George 1998, Tjosvold 1984), organizations and communities depend 
on the maintenance of cooperation. However, to maintain cooperation, at least some members 
must limit self-interest in favor of collective interest (Hardin 1982, Cook and Rice 2003, Kollock 
1993, 1998). This classic social dilemma has inspired a large, interdisciplinary body of work that 
seeks to understand how cooperation is sustained over time (Fehr and Gintis 2007, Salvato et al. 
2017). 
 One well-known type of cooperation is generalized reciprocity. Colloquially known as 
“paying it forward,” generalized reciprocity exists when "an individual feels obliged to 
reciprocate another's actions, not by directly rewarding his benefactor, but by benefiting another 
actor " (Ekeh 1974, p. 48).  Systems of generalized reciprocity are a type of social system (Asch 
1959, Weick and Roberts 1993) where helping behaviors are linked over time through ongoing, 
regular interactions. Actors’ past cooperative behaviors trigger future cooperative behaviors in 
others. These systems help resolve the social dilemma of self-interest versus group-interest by 
relaxing the need for immediate reciprocity (Molm 1997, Molm et al. 2006, 2007, Nowak 2006). 
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As Putnam (2000, p. 134) put it, “I’ll do this for you now, without expecting anything 
immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident down the road that you 
or someone else will return the favor.” Once established, a system of generalized reciprocity is 
assumed to be self-sustaining—the inertial properties of the system should maintain it over time 
by continually drawing actors in to the interlocking chain of cooperative behaviors (Lévi-Strauss 
1969, Molm 1997). Due to this assumed inertial property, research on generalized reciprocity 
tends to focus on the antecedents and outcomes of cooperation. However, even established 
systems of cooperation may be vulnerable to disruptions, since actors in these systems are highly 
interconnected and a few initial refusals to cooperate can trigger a cascade of defections by 
others (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Consequently, the goal of understanding how cooperation is 
sustained over time may be best advanced by explicitly examining how cooperation is achieved 
in the face of potentially disruptive forces.  
Performance rank is one potentially disruptive force that may undermine systems of 
generalized reciprocity. A performance ranking is a form of social hierarchy—a rank ordering of 
individuals along a valued social dimension (Magee and Galinsky 2008)—that confers 
differential benefits. Performance rankings are commonplace in organizational contexts 
(Greenberg 1987) and have been associated with many benefits (Anderson and Brown 2010). For 
example, rankings can help attract and retain top talent, reduce biases in performance 
evaluations, and streamline decision-making (Moon et al. 2016). However, the presence of 
performance rankings may be detrimental to the maintenance of cooperation if it heightens 
performance comparison concerns—how one is performing relative to others (Garcia et al. 
2006). These comparison concerns can sometimes trigger negative behaviors inside 
organizations. For example, comparison concerns have been linked to decreases in members’ 
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desires to maximize joint gains (Armstrong and Collopy 1996), unhealthy levels of competition 
(Garcia et al. 2006), elevated levels of cheating (Pettit et al. 2016, Vriend et al. 2016), and the 
sabotage of others (Poortvliet 2013, Tesser and Smith 1980)—all of which could be detrimental 
to the maintenance of cooperation.  
An established system of generalized reciprocity may nonetheless be able to withstand or 
recover from such disruptions. For example, at the industrial design firm IDEO, strong norms of 
generalized reciprocity supported by organizational routines and practices, maintain cooperation 
among product designers despite a compensation system based on performance rankings 
(Hargadon 2003, Hargadon and Sutton 1997, Amabile et al. 2014). The ability of IDEO to 
maintain a system of cooperation in the presence of performance rankings suggests that system-
level properties exist to withstand or recover from everyday pressures that arise with 
performance rankings. However, despite broad interest in the study of cooperation and the 
recommendation of these systems to managers (Cross and Parker 2004), social scientists have 
not examined how systems of generalized reciprocity interact with, withstand, or succumb to 
potentially disruptive forces such as performance rankings. Hence, we explore the research 
question: How do systems of cooperation (generalized reciprocity) perform in the presence of 
social hierarchy (performance rankings) and withstand potentially disruptive forces? We 
examine whether they are naturally able to withstand the pressures that performance rankings 
create or if they are vulnerable to disruption, and in the case of disruption, which mechanisms 
may make systems more robust to potentially disruptive pressures. Of the mechanisms that are 
known to promote cooperation in these systems (see Baker and Bulkley 2014), we pay particular 
attention to the role that rewarding the reputations of cooperative actors may play in allowing 
systems of generalized reciprocity to withstand or recover from the potentially detrimental 
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effects of rankings.  
Using a longitudinal, between-groups, no-deception experimental design that includes 74 
groups, 592 participants, and more than 11,000 costly decisions to give or not give, we examine 
how systems of generalized reciprocity fare in the presence of performance rankings. We first 
establish a group norm of cooperation through 40+ rounds of decision making (the first stage). 
Then, in one experimental condition we interrupt the system by introducing information about 
performance rank after the first stage, providing participants with information about their relative 
standing in the group (top, middle, or bottom third) and informing them that the top third will 
receive a higher bonus at the end of the experiment. We then run the experiment for another 40+ 
rounds of decision-making (the second stage). As hypothesized, cooperation plummeted in the 
second stage (look ahead to Figure 4). In another condition, at the end of the first stage we 
introduce reputational information in addition to performance rankings. Reputation refers to a 
potential receiver’s history of giving (or not giving) to others during the first stage. We find that 
reputation enables a system of cooperation to recover from the disruptive effects of performance 
rank. Despite an initial decline in cooperation, systems that receive information about 
performance rankings and reputation information over time return to levels of cooperation that 
were established prior to the disruption.   
Previous studies have assumed that established systems of generalized reciprocity are 
self-sustaining. We take this assumption as problematic. By examining the operation of these 
systems in the face of potentially disruptive forces, we document both the disruptive effects of 
performance rankings on systems of generalized reciprocity and provide an explanation for why 
some systems can be robust. Without displaying prosocial contributions (reputation), 
performance rankings are detrimental, causing an established system of cooperation to collapse. 
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Displaying reputation is a remedy. Prior research shows that reputation helps to explain the 
emergence and maintenance of generalized reciprocity (Alexander 1987, Nowak and Sigmund 
1998a,b); here, we show that reputation also makes a system of cooperation robust in the face of 
disruptive forces.   
This study makes several contributions. First, we make a general contribution to theories 
of cooperation by introducing a theoretical robustness lens (Jen 2003, 2005) to the study of 
cooperation (Baker and Bulkley 2014, Smith et al. 1995, Tjosvold et al. 2014). A robustness lens 
explicitly focuses on the maintenance of a system’s performance (e.g., cooperation levels) in the 
face of perturbations (e.g., performance rankings) that could disrupt a social system.
3
 By 
identifying what creates robust systems of cooperation, we can help shape capable of achieving 
long-term cooperation despite the occurrence of system-wide failure, environmental uncertainty, 
and increasing complexity. Second, we contribute to research that examines rankings as tools for 
performance feedback (Moon et al. 2016), showing that they can adversely affect cooperation, 
which may undercut their purported performance-enhancing effects. Third, we contribute to 
macro-level theories of prosocial behavior, which focus on the benefits of systems of generalized 
reciprocity for groups and organizations (Baker and Dutton 2007, Penner et al. 2005). Our 
research shows that due to performance rankings, which are commonplace in organizations, 
these systems may be more difficult to maintain than previously thought. However, we show and 
explain how introducing reputation information can reduce and even reverse the negative 
consequences of performance rankings permitting organizations to continue extracting benefits 
from these systems despite the presence of potentially disruptive pressures. Finally, we 
                                                          
3 The concept of robustness is related to the concept of stability. Both feature the common element of persistence over time, but 
robustness explicitly examines persistence in the face of perturbations, and can be achieved without returning to an equilibrium 
state—the social system can change in fundamental ways, so long as the functionality of a social system is maintained—whereas 
stability can exist without considering perturbations, and tends to emphasize a return to equilibrium (Jen 2003). 
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contribute to management practice with the implications of our findings: (1) leaders who desire a 
prosocial culture must pay careful attention to the disruptive effects of performance rankings, 
and (2) it may be possible to sustain or restore cooperation without changing competitive 
performance appraisal systems by displaying employees’ prosocial contributions and offering 
recognition for prosocial activities. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Cooperation occurs when actors make expected contributions to jointly held goals (Gulati 
et al. 2012). These social conditions often arise in contexts that have a mixture of conflicting and 
complementary interests (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, p. 2226). Generalized reciprocity is one 
well-known form of cooperation with competing individual and collective interests. In contrast 
to direct reciprocity between two actors (A helps B and B helps A) (Gouldner 1960), generalized 
reciprocity involves at least three actors, where a recipient of a benefit “pays it forward” to a 
third party, rather than returning the favor to the original benefactor (A helps B who then helps 
C) (Ekeh 1974). Systems of generalized reciprocity consist of helping behaviors that become 
interlocked over time through ongoing, regular interactions. This regularity delays expectations 
for immediate reciprocity, which helps to resolve the dilemma of self-interest versus group-
interest (Molm 1997, Molm et al. 2007). Actors forgo immediate opportunities to maximize self-
interest in favor of contributing to group-interest, expecting to receive benefits in the future. 
Hence, a system of generalized reciprocity is considered a stable form of cooperation that can 
balance collective and individual interests (Blau 1968, Nowak 2006).  
 Prior research on generalized reciprocity has mainly focused on its antecedents or its 
outcomes. Antecedents include, for example, group size (Pfeiffer et al. 2005), the spatial 
structure of relationships (Nowak and Roch 2007), similarity among actors (Axelrod et al. 2004, 
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Queller 1985, Santos et al. 2006), and the frequency and diversity of actors’ interactions (Rankin 
and Taborsky 2009). Outcomes include social solidarity (Molm et al. 2007), social capital (Baker 
and Dutton 2007, Putnam 2000), organizational commitment (Adler and Kwon 2002), prosocial 
organizational cultures (Penner et al. 2005), and organizational performance (Cross and Parker 
2004). Our research fits between antecedents and outcomes. We focus on the mechanisms that 
sustain generalized reciprocity and the extent to which they may enable a system of generalized 
reciprocity to recover from disruptions. 
Mechanisms of Generalized Reciprocity  
Reputation is widely recognized as a key mechanism that drives cooperation in systems 
of generalized reciprocity (Alexander 1987, Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b, Nowak and Sigmund 
2005, Seinen and Schram 2006, Wedekind and Milinski 2000). For example, evolutionary 
theorists consider reputation to be the reason why generalized reciprocity evolved in the human 
species (Alexander 1987). Reputations are actors’ personal histories of actions to others within a 
social system. Evolutionary theorists refer to reputations as “image scores” (Nowak and 
Sigmund 1998b) and argue that they are essential for fostering cooperative behavior among self-
interested actors (Sigmund et al. 2001). Rewarding reputation occurs when actors provide help to 
those who have been cooperative in the past.  Multiple economic experiments document actors’ 
tendencies to reward positive image scores—actors preferentially help those who are perceived 
as being cooperative members of the social system (Milinski et al. 2002, Seinen and Schram 
2006, Wedekind and Milinski 2000)—even at the expense of their own personal resources 
(Rabin 1993). For instance, in a laboratory experiment modeling generalized reciprocity, 
Wedekind and Melinski (2000) found that donations were more frequent to receivers who had 
been generous in earlier rounds of the experiment; even those who rarely gave were more likely 
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to transfer when paired with a participant with a high image score. Actors, aware of this 
contingent access to future benefits, may strategically construct their reputations. Cooperation 
implies that actors are “good citizens,” though they may only be “good actors” engaging in 
impression management (Bolino 1999).  Either way, those with positive images (i.e., reputations) 
are more likely to be rewarded in the future than those with negative images. 
Alternatively, systems of generalized reciprocity can be maintained by actors paying 
received help forward (Baker and Bulkley 2014). Paying-it-forward occurs when an actor 
receives help, but rather than repaying the benefactor, the actor helps a third person. Paying-it-
forward could be driven by feelings of obligation (Ekeh 1974), but may also be driven by 
positive emotions such as gratitude (Bartlett and DeSteno 2006, DeSteno et al. 2010, 
McCullough et al. 2008). In general, gratitude motivates future prosocial behaviors. For 
example, Emmons and McCullough (2003) found that individuals who wrote daily about things 
they were grateful for were more likely to report that they provided tangible help to others in a 
future period. Economic experiments document the cooperation-enhancing effects of paying-it-
forward behaviors (Greiner and Vittoria Levati 2005, Dufwenberg et al. 2001, Pfeiffer et al. 
2005). By paying-it-forward, actors may help maintain generalized reciprocity, while 
disregarding any strategic effects from their actions.  
Prior research documents the cooperation-enhancing effects of both mechanisms 
(reputation and positive emotions), but debate exists about their relative strengths. Some research 
suggests that paying help forward should be less effective than rewarding reputation for the 
maintenance of generalized reciprocity. For example, Nowak and Roch (2007) find that the pay-
it-forward mechanism only produces cooperation when it is linked to other information such as 
direct or spatial reciprocity. Other research suggests that the mechanism of rewarding reputation 
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may have limitations. For example, punishing an uncooperative person by denying help harms 
one’s own reputation for generosity (Leimar and Hammerstein 2001). Experiments that 
demonstrate the effects of reputation typically run for short periods of time (Seinen and Schram 
2006, Wedekind and Milinski 2000), whereas reputations are formed over long periods of time 
(Zinko et al. 2012).  In a critical test of these two mechanisms in an organizational setting over 
three months, Baker and Bulkley (2014) find that both mechanisms help sustain systems of 
generalized reciprocity, but that paying-it-forward resulted in stronger, longer-lasting effects than 
rewarding reputation. Further, there is evidence that these mechanisms may jointly enhance 
cooperation. Using laboratory and online experiments, Simpson et al. (2017) find that systems 
with both mechanisms outperform systems with just one mechanism present. 
  A system of generalized reciprocity may be supported by the self-generating nature of 
such systems (Lévi-Strauss 1969, Molm 1997, Molm et al. 2007). For example, using computer 
simulations, evolutionary theorists propose that systems of generalized reciprocity should be 
stable over time (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b). However, scholars also recognize that systems 
of generalized reciprocity feature a well-known vulnerability that could threaten their continued 
maintenance (Lévi-Strauss 1969, Molm 1997). Each member does not depend on a specific actor 
(as with direct reciprocity), but rather on multiple, often unspecified, others to maintain the 
system (Molm et al. 2007). Benefactors are not guaranteed repayment. Imbalances may occur 
(e.g., helpers do not receive help when it is needed), triggering a cascade of defections that 
undermine the system. 
The Disruption of Cooperation  
A social system may be disrupted by exogenous or endogenous forces. We focus on the 
introduction of information about performance rank as a potential exogenous disruption. 
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Performance rankings are a form of social hierarchy—the implicit or explicit ranking of 
individuals on a valued social dimension (Magee and Galinsky 2008). There are many examples 
and contexts in which performance rankings are used to produce benefits for groups and 
organizations. Organizations, for example, often employ incentive systems based on 
performance rank, such as bonuses, promotions, or other rewards for higher levels of 
performance (Greenberg 1987). Rankings can help streamline decision-making, improve 
intragroup coordination, and heighten group performance (Anderson and Brown 2010). A 
contextually similar, yet controversial, example is the use of Forced Distribution Ratings 
Systems (FDRS)—colloquially known as “rank and yank”—in which those at the bottom are 
fired (Mulligan and Bull Schaefer 2011). However, FDRS can produce beneficial organizational 
outcomes, such as the cultivation of talent and more accurate, less biased evaluations (Moon et 
al. 2016). Rankings are common in informal settings as well. Observations of preschool age 
children engaged in free play (Charlesworth and La Freniere 1983, Strayer and Strayer 1976) and 
adolescent peer groups (Paikoff and Savin-Williams 1983, Savin-Williams 1976) reveal stable 
dominance relations and linear hierarchical structures. In general, there is a large body of work 
that demonstrates both the prevalence and benefits of rankings in social groups (Anderson and 
Brown 2010).  
Despite potential benefits, performance rank may impede cooperation. Performance 
rankings can intensify competition among group members. Competition raises the personal costs 
of cooperation (Alexander 1987, Axelrod 1997, Deutsch 1949). Evolutionary biologists argue 
that natural selection favors “cheaters,” or those that can benefit from a community without 
paying the personal costs of cooperation (West et al. 2007a,b). Factors that increase competition 
will increase the perceived benefits of defection and decrease the benefits of cooperation. For 
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example, individuals at upper levels of a ranking may experience loss aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991) and decrease cooperation to preserve the superior benefits associated with their 
high rank. Those in lower ranks may decrease cooperation if they perceive outcomes to be 
inequitable or unfair. Believing that some members of the system are experiencing unfair 
outcomes may undermine members’ trust that others will continue to cooperate in a system, 
thereby weakening the perceived strength of the norm of cooperation (Ring and van de Ven 
1994, Salvato et al. 2017). Indeed, economic experiments find that even small perceptions of 
inequity can trigger defections (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Further, low-rank individuals may 
experience relative deprivation and negative emotions, even when they receive benefits from the 
system (Greenberg 1987, Martin 1981). Ultimately, these lines of research suggest that the 
introduction of performance rankings with differential benefits will decrease cooperation and 
disrupt the continuation of these systems. Therefore, we expect:  
H1: The introduction of performance rankings tied to differential rewards reduces 
cooperation in systems of generalized reciprocity.  
Restoring Cooperation  
How might systems of generalized reciprocity withstand or recover from disruptions? An 
answer, we argue, lies in the principle of inequity aversion and the mechanism of rewarding 
reputation. Performance rankings can become problematic when they reveal differential benefits 
that are perceived to be inequitable or unfair. Rankings engender calculations of fairness. 
Individuals regularly reflect on whether their position in a ranking is commensurate with their 
contributions to a system (Thibault and Kelley 1959). When individual performance is affected 
by others’ cooperative behaviors, it may lead to a sense of inequity—a suspicion that some actors 
are paying the costs of cooperation, but are not receiving enough benefits to outweigh these 
costs. For example, sales representatives who advance in rankings due to their personal sales 
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totals may have higher levels of sales as a result of receiving leads from others. Performance is 
then affected by others’ cooperative behaviors (e.g., passing leads). Inequity aversion occurs 
when an individual resists instances of inequity—when someone receives too much or too little 
compared to someone else (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Walster et al. 1978). Inequity aversion 
appears to be an innate, universal behavioral norm (Blake and McAuliffe 2011, Fehr et al. 2008, 
Kahneman et al. 1991). Other primates (Brosnan et al. 2005, Brosnan and de Waal 2003) and 
even canines (Range et al. 2009) demonstrate a preference for fairness and equity. 
Compelled by inequity aversion, actors may adjust their behavior to reduce perceived 
inequity (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Walster et al. 1978). The willingness of actors to “sacrifice 
their own material well-being to help those who are being kind” is well documented (Rabin 
1993, p. 1283). Economic experiments show that participants in cooperative games will incur 
personal costs in order to adjust others’ incomes and this behavior is associated with enhanced 
levels of cooperation (Andreoni et al. 2003, Fehr and Gächter 2002). Actors often practice a form 
of “reciprocal fairness”—rewarding kindness with kindness and harm with harm (Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006, Rabin 1993). Dawes et al. (2007) find that this behavior is driven by 
egalitarian motives, whereby actors will punish or reward alters to reduce perceived inequity and 
restore fairness. In a series of laboratory experiments, they show that subjects experienced 
negative emotional reactions to top earners—even when earnings were randomly generated—and 
that these emotional reactions were associated with costly redistribution behaviors. 
Rewarding reputation (prosocial contributions) occurs when one actor makes costly 
decisions to give to another actor who has been generous in the past (or does not give to an actor 
who has been stingy). Reputation is an actor’s history of (un)cooperative behaviors, which actors 
could use to compensate for an inequitable system and reduce perceived inequity (Fehr and 
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Schmidt 1999, Rabin 1993). Hence, the presence of reputation information may reduce 
temptations to defect that arise from the presence of performance rankings because it permits 
actors to respond to perceptions of inequity. Instead of defecting in response to increased costs of 
cooperation and perceptions that a system of generalized reciprocity is unfair, actors may 
continue to cooperate to seize opportunities to reward the cooperative citizens of a system. 
Correspondingly, systems of generalized reciprocity that introduce reputation information 
alongside performance rank information should be more cooperative than those that only 
introduce performance rank information. Reputation information is therefore a potential recovery 
mechanism that can offset the disruptive effects of performance rankings, leading to more robust 
systems of cooperation. Hence, we expect:  
H2: The introduction of performance rank tied to differential rewards and reputation 
information increases cooperation compared to the introduction of just performance rank 
information. 
 
While all actors, regardless of their rank, could be at risk of experiencing inequity 
aversion and hence exhibit efforts to correct for inequity, this behavior may be more visible 
among actors for whom inequity is more salient. Inequity is more salient for actors that are on 
the disadvantageous end of inequity (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). For example, Tannenbaum (1962) 
shows that individuals in lower ranks disproportionately feel that they should be receiving more 
than actors in higher ranks. In contrast, actors on the advantageous end of inequity are more 
prone to attribution biases—causing them to view their ranking positions as legitimate, fair 
outcomes (Flynn 2003, Major 1994)—which may limit the salience of inequity. Therefore, we 
expect that inequity will be highly salient for actors that gave at high levels, but ended up in the 
bottom of the ranking. We anticipate that these actors will be even more likely to transfer to 
alters’ with higher reputations for transferring in order to reduce perceived inequity. 
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Accordingly, we expect: 
H3: The higher the salience of inequity, the higher an actors’ likelihood of rewarding 
participants with high reputations for cooperation.   
 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS  
We designed a laboratory experiment based on the “indirect helping game” (Engelmann 
and Fischbacher 2009, Wedekind and Milinski 2000). The indirect helping game is a no-
deception, repeated decision-making game programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007), which 
allows actors to participate in a closed system of “helping” opportunities (e.g., opportunities to 
give and receive valuable resources with the same group of anonymous actors). Consistent with 
other cooperative economic games that ask actors to make choices between allocations that 
benefit themselves or others, the indirect helping game asks actors to keep points or transfer 
points to another participant. Points convert to money at the end of the game. The indirect 
helping game simulates the classic social dilemma wherein actors incur a personal cost for 
helping the collective, but if all members of the collective pursued the same action, all would 
benefit from the collective’s success. This experimental design is well-suited to the analysis of 
systems of generalized reciprocity because it does not include deception and it allows groups of 
actors to interact regularly over multiple periods. Accordingly, each group (i.e., system) 
organically develops a norm of generalized reciprocity, generating its own, unique system-level 
dynamics that may not be as reliably manipulated in shorter-term experimental settings that 
include deception.  
Experimental Procedures  
A total sample of 592 actors consisting of students, staff, and community members was 
recruited at a large university in the American Midwest. Upon arrival at the laboratory, actors 
were randomly assigned to one of 16 cubicles with a laptop. The laptop was randomly assigned 
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to a networked group of eight laptops and one of four experimental conditions. The appearance 
of a larger group limits the perception of opportunities to engage in direct reciprocity. Actors 
were not permitted to communicate with each other during the experimental session. Before the 
experiment began, a laboratory instructor distributed and read aloud a set of instructions that 
included the decision-making roles and rules. It was also stated that the information on the 
actors’ screens reflected their own and others’ actual behaviors during the experiment. After the 
instructions were presented each participant took a comprehension test.  
The game consists of multiple decision-making rounds where actors can choose to 
transfer points to other actors in their group. At the start of the game, each actor receives an 
initial endowment of 33 points and is told that their final point balance, earned across all stages 
of the experiment, will be converted into a cash bonus of 2 cents per point.
4
 This cash bonus is 
on top of a base pay for participation. The experiment consisted of two stages of 40+ decision-
making rounds.
5
 During each decision-making round, actors are paired randomly and 
anonymously. Within each pair, actors are randomly assigned roles: Role A or Role B.  The 
participant in Role A makes the decision to “transfer” points (or not) to the participant in Role B.  
The participant in Role B does not make any decisions. Consistent with prior generalized 
reciprocity research in which benefits (b) received are greater than the cost (c) of providing 
benefits (b > c) (e.g., Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009; Greiner and Vittoria Levati 2005), if 
Role A decided to transfer, the participant’s balance decreased by two points and Role B’s 
balance increased by five points. A decision to not transfer results in no change to Role A’s 
                                                          
4
 Points were used instead of dollars and cents to avoid any biases associated with money. However, actors knew that points 
would be converted at the rate of 2 cents per point, which they would receive as a bonus in addition to their participation fee 
($10.00) at the end of the experiment. They were also told that their bonus amount may or may not change throughout the 
experiment. With 33 points, the initial endowment was equivalent to $0.66. This amount was set by considering rates used by 
past reciprocity studies and in consultation with the Institutional Review Board.  
5
 All actors participated in a minimum of 40 rounds of decision making in each stage. To avoid end-game effects, each 
participant faced a 10 percent probability that they would participate in additional decision making rounds. Participants were told 
of this probability in the instruction period and were asked about it during the comprehension test.   
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balance. While the roles were always referred to as Role A and Role B in the experiment to 
avoid a social desirability bias, for ease of interpretation we will henceforth refer to them as the 
“ego” (Role A—the person who is able to make the decision to transfer points) and the “alter” 
(Role B—the person who is not able to make a decision to transfer points).  
Experimental Conditions 
 In Stage 1, all actors, regardless of their experimental condition, experience the same 
decision-making game of 40+ rounds with no additional information (i.e., no information about 
performance rank or reputation). This allows groups to establish norms of generalized reciprocity 
that can then be affected by the introduction of new information. All manipulations occur at the 
start of the second set of 40+ rounds of decision-making (Stage 2) (see Figure 2.1 for an 
illustration). A 2 x 2 factorial design crossed access to information about ego’s performance rank 
for total performance in points earned across Stage 1 (no performance rank information vs. 
performance rank information) and access to an alter’s reputation for transferring in Stage 1 (no 
reputation information vs. reputation information) resulting in four conditions.  
The first condition, labeled the “No Additional Information condition,” repeats the same 
procedure that occurs in Stage 1 and does not provide any additional information. The second 
condition, labeled the “Reputation condition,” makes available information about the alter’s 
reputation for past cooperative behaviors: the percentage of times the alter transferred in Stage 1 
when in Role A. With this information, the donor can infer the receiver’s level of generosity 
(e.g., “the person I am randomly matched with in this round has been stingy in the past”). The 
third condition, labeled the “Rank condition” includes information about ego’s performance rank 
in the group. Before beginning Stage 2, all actors that receive rank information (those in the 
Rank condition and the Reputation and Rank condition) are told that the bonus structure will 
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change (e.g., actors are ranked by total points and those in the top third will receive a bonus of 7 
cents per point, whereas the middle and bottom thirds will receive the standard payment of 2 
cents per point). During each decision-making round, a reminder is displayed on the bottom of 
the screen that shows the ego’s rank at the end of Stage 1. From information about rank, egos can 
infer whether they are in general benefiting from this system as much as their peers (e.g., “I’m in 
the bottom third and most of the others are earning more than me”). The fourth condition, labeled 
the “Reputation and Rank condition,” includes both information about ego’s own performance 
rank in the system and the alter’s reputation for cooperation. This experimental design resulted in 
11,833 post-interruption decision-making observations by 592 individuals clustered into 74 
groups. 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Two-Stage Experimental Design  
 
Notes:  
1. Interruption (treatment) occurs after Stage 1, before Stage 2 begins.  
2. The Ego is the decision-maker in the current round (the participant with the ability to transfer points). The Alter 
is the receiver in the current round (cannot transfer points).  
3. All groups in Stage 1 follow the same procedure (40+ rounds of decision-making without any additional 
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information). In Stage 2 decision-makers have access to different types of information—depending on what 
condition they are in.  
4. The first condition, labeled the “No Additional Information Condition,” repeats the same procedure as in Stage 
1 without participants receiving any additional information.  
5. The second condition, labeled the “Reputation Information Condition” makes available information about the 
alter’s reputation for cooperative behaviors (the percent of times the alter transferred points when she was in 
Role A in Stage 1).  
6. The third condition, labeled the “Rank Information Condition” includes information about the ego’s 
performance rank in the group. Before beginning Stage 2 all actors in the Rank Information condition are told 
that the bonus structure is changing. Actors that rank in the top-third of total points receive a higher bonus of 7 
cents per point, whereas the middle and bottom-third receive the standard payment of 2 cents per point. During 
each decision-making round a reminder is displayed on the bottom of screen that shows the ego’s rank at the 
end of Stage 1.  
7. The Fourth condition, labeled the “Reputation and Rank Information Condition,” includes both information 
about the ego’s own performance rank and alters’ reputation for cooperative behaviors.  
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. Cooperative behavior is modeled as a binary variable, where 1 = 
ego transferred and 0 = ego did not transfer. All models examine transfer decisions in Stage 2 of 
the experiment only (post-interruption). All constructs, variables, and their operationalizations 
are included in Table 1.  
Independent Variables. The four experimental conditions were noted by indicator 
variables that reflected the type of information the actor received in Stage 2 (e.g., No Additional 
Information, Reputation Only, Rank Only, and Reputation and Rank). Each variable is 
dichotomous, where 1 = received the type of information specified, and 0 = did not receive the 
type of information specified. No additional information is the default comparison group.  
High salience of inequity is denoted by a dichotomous variable, where 1=the actor was 
one standard deviation above the mean rate of transferring in Stage 1 and was ranked in the 
bottom of the ranking in stage 1. In other words, high salience of inequity occurs when an actor 
has put the most inputs into a system, but received the least in outputs from the system relative to 
other actors.  
 Individual-Level Control Variables. Recent research shows that gratitude is a powerful 
mechanism of cooperation (Baker and Bulkley 2014). Actors feel positive affect after receiving 
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help, which motivates paying help forward to others. Consistent with past research (Baker and 
Bulkley 2014, Nowak and Roch 2007), we measure gratitude with a proxy variable: the percent 
of times an actor received points when they were in Role B prior to the current decision-making 
round.  
Prior giving may predict future giving. For instance, research on charitable giving shows 
that past donors are more likely to be donors in the future and in general tend to give more 
(Lindahl and Winship 1994, Sudhir et al. 2016). We measure generosity as the percent of times 
an actor gave when they were in Role A prior to the current decision-making round.  
We include demographic characteristics typically measured in studies of cooperative 
behavior: age, gender, and formal education. Prior research shows that age can be associated 
with decreases in levels of generosity (Murnighan and Saxon 1998). While levels of generosity 
often grow in childhood (Bryan and London 1970), adulthood is generally associated with more 
strategic and less generous behavior (Murnighan and Saxon 1998). Age is measured in years. In 
our sample, age varies from 18 to 75, with most participants (82 percent) between 18-22 years of 
age. 
Prior research finds inconsistent effects of gender on levels of generosity (Eckel and 
Grossman 1998, 2008, Grossman et al. 2008). In their review of economic experiments related to 
prosociality, Eckel and Grossman (2008) observed that exposure to risk of financial loss, 
exploitation, or the judgment of others was associated with no significant differences between 
men and women’s rates of generosity. It was only in studies where actors were not exposed to 
these pressures that women exhibited more prosocial tendencies than men. Therefore, gender is 
included as a control variable, where male=1 if the actor specifies male, and 0 if the actor 
specifies female. 
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 Education is a commonly measured control variable in studies that use cooperative games 
(Rand et al. 2014). Cooperative games include elements of strategy. Education could serve as a 
proxy for task performance ability in strategic games, such as problem solving and critical 
thinking. Education level is an indicator variable for levels of education, which includes high 
school, some college, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, and post-doctoral degree. High 
school is the default comparison category.  
Reflective and deliberative cognitive style may also impact cooperative decision-making. 
On average, actors that exhibit less reflective cognitive styles tend to engage in more automatic 
decision-making and higher rates of cooperation. Actors with higher reflective cognitive styles 
exhibit more calculated decision-making and higher rates of selfishness (Rand et al. 2014). We 
employ Frederick’s (2005) widely used cognitive reflection test (CRT) to create a measure of 
reflective cognitive style. The CRT includes three problem-solving tasks that appear to have 
obvious, simple answers that promote intuitive thinking and quick responses, but require more 
reflective thinking. We ask participants to answer these three questions in a questionnaire that 
follows the experiment. Results from the CRT are averaged to create a measure of reflective 
cognitive style. A higher value for the variable short-term thinking, indicates lower average 
performance on the CRT and a higher tendency towards short-term thinking.  
Group-Level Controls. An alternative explanation for the likelihood that an actor will 
exhibit cooperative behaviors in later stages of the experiment is that it depends on each actor’s 
unique normative climate. Specifically, if actors reside in a highly generous community they 
may be more likely to exhibit cooperative behaviors later on in the experiment than those that 
reside in stingy communities. We measure the group’s normative climate as the group’s average 
transfer rate in Stage 1 (before the interruption):  group percent transfers in Stage 1. Since actors 
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are nested in closed groups and others’ decisions may affect a focal actor’s decision-making 
climate, we included two measures that aggregate individual level controls at the group level: the 
session’s average short-term thinking level and the percentage of the group that is male. The 
Group’s Average Short-Term Thinking Tendency averages the group’s short-term thinking 
tendency. Percent of Group that is Male reflects the percent of group members that are male.  
 This experiment necessitated many decision-making rounds, both to establish a group 
norm of generalized reciprocity and judge responses to events that may disrupt this norm. In past 
studies with economic games, cooperation tends to decline over time in contexts with many 
repeated interactions (Ledyard 1995). The concern with these cases is that actors will expect that 
their defections will have less of an impact on others’ rates of cooperation because others have 
observed trends of behaviors over the prior time periods (Axelrod 1984). Similarly, because of 
the duration of the experiment (45 minutes) and the repeated nature of the task (80+ decision-
making rounds), concerns of decision-fatigue may exist. One’s decision-making capabilities may 
change as the experiment goes on. Vohs et al. (2009) report that multiple rounds of decision-
making may impair actors’ self-regulation abilities—the ability to substitute one action for 
another that better conforms to a norm or fits with a specific goal. While Vohs et al.’s (2009) 
study examines effects of more cognitively taxing choices (e.g., choosing college courses from a 
course catalogue), we anticipate that the nature of a repeated decision task may similarly affect 
actors’ rates of attention and cause some amount of decision-fatigue or disengagement. While we 
anticipate that these negative effects of the repeated measures design will be mitigated by the 
presence of a performance bonus, we include time as a control. Increasing time is modeled as a 
linear effect of increasing decision-making rounds. Table 2.1  reports descriptive statistics. 
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Table 2.1: Description of Constructs and Variables in Chapter 2 
Construct Variable Definition Level 
Cooperative 
Behavior (DV) 
Transferred points  When in the donor role, chose to transfer 
points  
Round   
Rank Information  Condition dummy 1=in condition with rank only information  Group  
Reputation 
Information  
Condition dummy  1=in condition with reputation only 
information  
Group 
Rank & Rep. Info.  Condition dummy 1=in condition with both rank and reputation 
information  
Group  
Social Hierarchy 
Position 
Rank  0=bottom, 1=middle, 2=top third Individual 
Alter’s rep. for 
cooperation  
Alter’s % times 
gave 
The percent of times an alter gave when they 
were in Role A, lagged  
Round  
Risk for inequity 
aversion  
Bottom rank & 
giving 
1=in bottom rank and above average level of 
generosity (see below)  
Individual 
Controls    
Decision Fatigue  Time  Modeled as a linear effect of increasing 
decision-making rounds 
Round 
Gratitude  % times Received  The percent of times an actor received when 
they were in Role B, lagged  
Round 
Generosity  % times Gave  The percent of times an actor gave when they 
were in Role A, lagged  
Round 
Age  Age  Mean centered  Individual 
Gender  Male 1=male  Individual 
Education Level  Education  Categorical variable with education buckets  Individual  
Short-term Thinking  CRT Score  Averaged score for questions from the 
cognitive reflection test (Frederick 2005), 
higher values indicate more tendency toward 
short-term thinking  
Individual  
Group’s composition 
of short-term 
thinking  
Group CRT  the percent of group members that are low on 
cognitive reflection style 
Group 
Generosity of Group  % transfer part 1 Group’s percent transferred in part 1  Group 
Group’s gender 
composition  
% male  Percentage of the group that is male  Group  
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Chapter 2 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
Level 1: Post-Interruption Decisions (N=11,833)                      
   Transferred  0.52 0.50 0 1 
   Ego’s Percent Gratitude  0.60 0.20 0.06 1 
   Ego’s Percent Generosity  0.60 0.32 0 1 
Level 2: Ego (N=592)     
   Gender  0.36 0.48 0 1 
   Age  21.82 6.58 18 75 
   Education  2.27 1.24 1 5 
   Short-term Thinking 0.53 0.37 0 1 
Level 3: Groups (N=74)     
   No Additional Information (Control) 0.25 0.43 0 1 
   Reputation Information Condition 0.24 0.42 0 1 
   Rank Information Condition  0.26 0.44 0 1 
   Reputation and Rank Information Condition 0.26 0.44 0 1 
   Group’s Percent of Short-term Thinkers 0.53 0.15 0.17 1 
   Percent of Group that is Male  0.36 0.23 0 1 
   Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1 0.63 0.23 0.28 0.93 
Notes:  
1. The Ego is the decision-maker in the current round (the participant with the ability to transfer points). 
The Alter is the receiver in the current round (cannot transfer points).  
 
Analytical Strategy 
 Two model specifications were used to explore the effect of various interruptions on 
systems of generalized reciprocity. First, given the nested structure of the data, we employed a 
multilevel mixed effects logistic regression model to assess the effect of various manipulations 
(interruptions). Multilevel models allow us to rule out alternative explanations at the decision-
making round, individual, and group levels of analysis. Second, an interrupted time series 
analysis allows us to account for the autocorrelated nature of the data, ensure that comparison 
groups are appropriate counterfactuals, and permits us to examine both the initial and long-term 
effects of interruptions.  
Multilevel Mixed Effects Logistic Regression. Our design yields clustered longitudinal 
data with a binary dependent variable. This design creates a three-level hierarchy: 11,833 binary 
transfer decisions in Stage 2 of the experiment (level 1), nested within 592 actors (level 2), 
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nested within 74 groups of eight actors (level 3). Given this nested structure, we used a 
multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression for longitudinal data (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008). Fixed effects are specified as regression parameters and random effects are specified for 
the individual and group levels, with a maximum likelihood estimation. This type of model 
allows us to assess the variation within individuals and between groups over time. Traditional 
methods for analysis of experimental data (e.g. an ANOVA or repeated measures MANOVA) 
are not able to control for multiple levels of analysis.  
Our first model includes the level one covariates of gratitude and generosity as controls, 
as well as the linear effect of increasing rounds of decision-making. The second model 
introduces the level two covariates age, gender, education, and propensity toward short-term 
thinking as controls
6
. The third model includes the level one, level two, and level three 
covariates: indicator variables for information conditions and group level controls for the group’s 
gender and short-term thinking composition and the group’s overall transfer rate in Stage 1. We 
include post-hoc analyses of the interaction between group’s transfer rates in Stage 1 and 
condition in Model 4.
7
 A final model tests whether highly salient inequity is associated with 
higher levels of cooperation in the presence of alters’ high reputations for transferring. The final 
multi-level mixed effects logistic regression model solely examines the Reputation and Rank 
condition as it is the only condition with both sets of information (see Table 2.4).  
  
                                                          
6 In models 2 and 3 the number of individuals decreases to 574 and the number of observations decreases to 11,496 due to 
missing values. Sixteen individuals did not report their age, one chose to not declare a gender, and one did not report an 
education level. Only one group featured more than one individual with missing data. As a robustness check we examined our 
results with and without this group. The elimination of this group does not have any material effect on our results or 
interpretations. We also examined our results with and without the covariates of age, gender, and education. The elimination of 
these covariates does not have a material effect on our results or interpretations.  
7 As a robustness check, we follow Heisig, Schaeffer, and Giesecke (2017) and include random slopes for level 2 (ego level) 
covariates in our Model 3 specifications to examine whether there are cross-cluster differences in the effects of controls. The 
inclusion of these random slopes does not have a material effect on our results or interpretations. These analyses are not shown 
here, but are available on request.   
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Interrupted Time Series Analysis. An interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) is appropriate for 
research designs that include interventions that are expected to “interrupt” a data trend (Glass et 
al. 2008, Shadish et al. 2002). Our research design explores how different interruptions (our 
experimental manipulations) can disrupt a system of cooperation. An ITSA model further 
permits us to examine both the immediate effects of an interruption (e.g., what happens in the 
first few rounds of Stage 2) as well as the long-term effects of the interruption (e.g., overall trend 
in Stage 2) (Linden and Adams 2011). The dependent variable is calculated as the percent of 
transfers for all individuals in a specified condition, in a given Stage 2 decision-making round. 
Our model uses OLS regression with Newey-West standard errors to account for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity (Linden 2015).  
 The models assess the impact of performance rank information on cooperative behaviors, 
using multiple-group comparisons. We examine both the immediate effect of the interruption and 
the overall post-interruption trend. We compare these interruption effects for the Rank 
Information condition with the Reputation and Rank condition to examine reputation as a 
recovery mechanism for the potentially disruptive effects of performance rankings.    
RESULTS  
 We begin our analysis by plotting group-level average transfer rates in Stage 1 against 
group-level average transfer rates in Stage 2 to visually assess the effect of interruptions (Figure 
2.2). We then report results from multilevel mixed effects logistic regressions that examine an 
actor’s likelihood of exhibiting cooperative behavior (transferring points) (Table 2.3). Last, we 
report results from an interrupted time series analysis (Table 2.4).  
 Interruptions may produce three main outcomes: 1) no effect, 2) decreased cooperation, 
or 3) increased cooperation. Each graph in Figure 2.2 plots group-level percent transfers for all 
 39 
 
rounds in Stage 1 versus all rounds in Stage 2 for all groups that experienced the same 
experimental condition. A point on a graph’s 45-degree line indicates that the percent transferred 
in Stage 2 was the same as the percent transferred in Stage 1. Points on or near the 45-degree line 
indicate that an interruption had no effect on transferring. Points above the 45-degree line show 
that transferring increased in Stage 2; points below show that transferring decreased in Stage 2. 
As expected, the level of cooperation in Stage 2 versus Stage 1 is not markedly different 
for groups in the No Additional Information condition (Figure 2.2, graph I).  Points are scattered 
around the 45-degree line, some on the line, some above, and some below. Adding reputation 
information shows a similar pattern, though more points are below than above the line (Figure 
2.2, graph II).  As hypothesized, groups in the Rank condition are less likely to transfer in Stage 
2 (Figure 2.2, graph III).  Regardless of the level of cooperation in Stage 1, all points in this 
graph are below the 45-degree line, indicating that the introduction of performance rank 
information disrupted every system of cooperation established in Stage 1. The introduction of 
both rank and reputation information yields patterns that are generally similar to the Reputation 
condition and No Additional Information condition (Figure 2.2, graph IV). This pattern is our 
first indication that reputation may be a recovery mechanism for the deleterious effects of 
performance rankings on cooperation. 
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Figure 2.2: Empirical Comparison of Group-Level Transfer Rates Before and After an Interruption  
 
Notes:  
1. Figure 2.2 plots the relationship between each group’s overall percent of transfers in Stage 1 (pre-interruption) 
and Stage 2 (post-interruption), separated by experimental conditions. A point of observation on the 45-degree 
line means that groups’ transfer rates in stages 1 and 2 were the same. Observations that are close to the 45-
degree line suggest that a group was unaffected by the interruption it experienced in between stages 1 and 2.  
2. The Ego is the decision-maker in the current round (the participant with the ability to transfer points). The Alter 
is the receiver in the current round (cannot transfer points).  
3. In the Ego’s Rank Information Condition (plot III) decision-makers could view where they stood in the 
performance ranking of total points earned after Stage 1 (e.g., top, middle, or bottom third of earners).   
4. In the Alter’s Reputation and Ego’s Rank Information Condition (plot IV) decision-makers could view their 
performance ranking information and information about alters’ levels of generosity in Stage 1(i.e., how 
generous the person they are randomly paired with in the current round was during the times that they were in 
the role of the decision-maker in Stage 1).  
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To determine if these effects are statistically significant in the presence of controls at the 
decision-round, actor, and group levels, we examine multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression 
models. Table 2.3 reports log odds coefficients from four models. Predicted probabilities and 
odds ratios are reported in the text. Model 1 introduces controls at the decision-round (level 1). 
Consistent with prior research (Baker and Bulkley 2014), gratitude and generosity were 
associated with an increased likelihood of transferring in Stage 2 (post-interruption). These 
findings confirm that both the act of receiving help and an ego’s prosocial tendencies are drivers 
of cooperation. We consider gratitude and generosity as control variables, but these findings add 
validity to our design and model because they are consistent with previous empirical work. 
Model 2 introduces controls at the individual-level (level 2). While gratitude and generosity 
remain strongly associated with the likelihood of exhibiting cooperative behavior, the individual-
level controls of age, gender, education level, and short-term thinking tendencies are not 
statistically associated with our outcome of interest. Model 3 introduces group-level controls 
(level 3) for the group’s percentage of transfers in Stage 1 (pre-interruption), the percentage of 
the group that is male, and the percentage of the group that exhibits short-term thinking 
tendencies. These controls are not significantly associated with the likelihood that an individual 
will transfer.  
Model 3 includes indicator variables for the experimental conditions with the No 
Additional Information condition as the (omitted) comparison group. Compared to groups that 
received no additional information, an interruption that revealed performance rank information 
was associated with a sharp decrease in the likelihood of a transfer, controlling for many factors. 
Given the estimated random effects for a unique individual and her respective group, and all 
other factors held at their means, the odds of transferring for an ego in the Rank condition are 
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only 0.360 times as great as those of an individual in the No Additional Information condition. 
This disruption is higher in generous groups. Post-hoc analyses (model 4) reveal a relationship 
between group generosity in Stage 1 and an individual’s predicted probability of a transfer in 
Stage 2. The higher a group’s generosity in Stage 1, the lower an individual’s predicted 
probability of a transfer in Stage 2 for groups in the Rank Information condition. For all other 
conditions, a participant’s likelihood of transferring is not influenced by the group’s level of 
generosity in Stage 1 (see Figure 2.3).
8
 We theorized that this disruption would be due to either 
concerns about losing one’s rank position (i.e., loss aversion), or perceptions of unfairness. 
Participants open-ended responses to questions about their strategies in the experiment were 
consistent with these two themes. For example, those in the Rank Condition said they transferred 
less in Stage 2 because they wanted to preserve their position. As one put it, “[A]fter I was 
ranked in the top third, I transferred only a couple of times because I was not sure if I was 
helping someone else achieve the top third ranking and extra bonus or if I was helping someone 
already in the top third and possible [sic] booting myself out.” Similarly, another participant 
said, “After I saw that I was in the top third of the activity, I started to give less points away. I 
would still give points away but it would [be] less often because I wanted to secure my spot in 
the top third." 
 Other participants in the Rank condition perceived unfairness and adjusted their strategies 
—that their transferring behaviors declined in Stage 2 because they were not receiving benefits 
in proportion to their levels of generosity: “[Stage] 2 showed me I was in the bottom third. As 
[stage] 2 started I noticed I was rarely gaining points when I was [in] role B and I realized most 
                                                          
8 Reputation is typically associated with an increase in cooperative behavior (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b), but we did not find 
a statistically significant difference between the Reputation Information condition and the No Additional Information condition. 
However, supplemental analyses reveal that there are significant reputation effects, that vary with the group’s level of generosity 
in Stage 1 (see Model 3 in Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
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people were clicking no, so I started clicking no every time because I knew having faith in others 
was pointless at this point and I was just going to be losing money by clicking yes." Similarly, 
another participant said, "I tried to maximize total economic surplus in the first part of the 
activity but then when I found out I was in the middle third I became more selfish and stopped 
transferring points."  
 
Figure 2.3: Predicted Probability of a Transfer in Stage 2 by Condition and Group’s Level of Generosity 
in Stage 1  
 
Note:  All groups experienced the same decision-making conditions in Stage 1 (no additional information), 
regardless of the conditions in which they were placed in Stage 2.  
  
These results provide strong support of H1. Transferring declines in systems that are 
interrupted by the introduction of information about performance rank. Further, this decline is 
heightened by the strength of the norm of reciprocity established in Stage 1. This suggests that 
participants in highly generous groups may react more negatively to the introduction of 
performance rankings, compared to participants in groups with lower levels of cooperation.  
To test our hypothesis that reputation information can act as a recovery mechanism in the 
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presence of disruptions (H2), we examined the effects of simultaneously introducing both 
reputation and performance rank information. We find that the disruptive effect of performance 
rank is substantially reduced when reputation information is also provided (Model 3, Table 2.3). 
Given the estimated random effects for a unique individual and his respective group, and all 
other factors held at their means, the odds of transferring for an individual in the Reputation and 
Rank Information condition are 1.865 times that of an individual in the Rank Information 
condition.
9
 Consistent with H2, these results suggest that reputation information can offset the 
negative effects of performance rankings.   
  
                                                          
9 See Table A.2 in the Appendix 
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Table 2.3: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: The Likelihood of Transferring in Stage 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed Effects     
Level 1: Decision Rounds Post-Interruption      
   Ego’s Percent Gratitude  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
   Ego’s Percent Generosity 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
   Increasing Decision Rounds 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Level 2: Individual (Ego)      
   Male  -0.075 -0.059 -0.059 
  (0.116) (0.121) (0.121) 
   Age (mean-centered)  -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
   Education: Some College (dummy)   -0.045 0.008 0.006 
  (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) 
   Education: Associate’s Degree (dummy)  0.180 0.357 0.289 
  (0.573) (0.567) (0.564) 
   Education: Bachelor’s Degree (dummy)  -0.122 -0.085 -0.128 
  (0.167) (0.165) (0.164) 
   Education: Post-Doc (dummy)  0.173 0.270 0.204 
  (0.284) (0.279) (0.278) 
   Short-term Thinking Tendency (CRT)  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.116) (0.002) (0.002) 
Level 3: Groups      
   Group’s Average Short-Term Thinking Tendency   -0.004 -0.005 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
   Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1   -0.010 -0.004 
   (0.006) (0.009) 
   Percent of Group that is Male    -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
   Reputation Information Condition   -0.171 -0.190 
   (0.180) (0.656) 
   Rank Information Condition   -1.020*** 0.392 
   (0.181) (0.602) 
   Reputation and Rank Information Condition   -0.396* -0.734 
   (0.178) (0.710) 
   Reputation Cond. x Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1    0.000 
    (0.010) 
   Rank Cond. x Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1    -0.023* 
    (0.009) 
   Reputation and Rank Cond. x Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 
1  
   0.006 
    (0.011) 
Random Effects     
   Standard Deviation Individual 0.505*** 0.507*** 0.303*** 0.240*** 
 (0.073) (0.076) (0.083) (0.091) 
   Standard Deviation Group 0.951*** 0.959*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) 
Intraclass Correlation  
 
0.264 0.264 0.233 0.227 
Number of Observations (Post-Interruption Decisions) 11,833 11,496 11,496 11,496 
Number of Individuals (Ego) 592 574 574 574 
Number of Groups  74 74 74 74 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
1. Omitted categories for comparison: High school degree (level 2), No Additional Information Condition (level 3) 
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 To further explore the restorative effect of reputation information, we considered the 
short-term and long-term effects of an interruption. Figure 2.4 presents a line graph of the 
average transfer rate by condition for each decision-making round. Recall that in Stage 1, all 
participants experience the same decision-making conditions (the absence of any additional 
information), regardless of the condition they would experience in Stage 2. The patterns in Stage 
1 are similar for each condition. Clear differences appear in Stage 2. Both the Rank Information 
and the Reputation and Rank Information conditions show immediate drops in average transfer 
rates; however, the Reputation and Rank Information condition eventually recovers, returning to 
transfer rates on par with the No Additional Information and Reputation only conditions. 
 
Figure 2.4: Percent Transfers for Conditions at Each Round, Pre- and Post-Interruption  
 
Notes:  
1. In Stage 2, decision-makers (those in Role A in the current round—participants who can transfer points) that are 
in the Reputation Information Condition have access to alters’ (those in Role B in the current round—
participants who cannot transfer points) reputations for generosity (percent of times they transferred when they 
were in Role A in Stage 1).  
2. In Stage 2, decision-makers (those in Role A) that are in the Rank Information Condition have access to 
information about their own performance rank after Stage 1 (relative rank is derived from the total points they 
earned in Stage 1).  
3. Before beginning Stage 2 all actors in the Rank Information Condition and the Reputation and Rank 
Information Condition are told that the bonus structure is changing. Actors that rank in the top-third of  
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Notes Figure 2.4 Continued:  
total points receive a higher bonus of 7 cents per point, whereas the middle and bottom-third receive the 
standard payment of 2 cents per point. During each decision-making round a reminder is displayed on the 
bottom of screen that shows the ego’s rank at the end of Stage 1.  
4. In Stage 2, decision-makers in the Reputation and Rank Information Condition have access to both information 
about alters’ past transferring behaviors and their own performance rank after Stage 1. 
 
An interrupted time series analysis (Linden 2015) adds statistical support to our visual 
interpretation of the patterns in Figure 2.4. In this analysis, we compare the Rank condition and 
the Reputation and Rank condition to assess how having access to reputation information affects 
individuals who also have access to rank information. As shown in Table 2.4, pre-interruption 
intercepts and trends are not significant, supporting our interpretation of Figure 2.4 that there are 
no significant differences between the Rank condition and the Reputation and Rank condition in 
Stage 1 (pre-interruption). There is no statistically significant difference in the intercepts for 
these two conditions in the period immediately after the interruption, suggesting that groups in 
both conditions experienced the same initial negative impact of the interruption. However, there 
is a significant overall post-interruption trend. For every additional 10 rounds, the model predicts 
a difference of 8.7 points between the conditions’ average transfer rates (see Figure 2.5). Both 
conditions exhibited the same initial negative impact, but then transfer rates in the Reputation 
and Rank condition increase steadily over time while transfer rates in the Rank condition steadily 
decrease over time. These results support H2, demonstrating the restorative effect of reputation 
information in the presence of performance rankings.   
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Table 2.4: Interrupted Time Series Analysis of Post-Interruption Effects on Transfer Rates 
 Model 1: 
Rank Information Condition vs. 
Reputation and 
Rank Information Condition 
Pre-Interruption Difference in Intercepts -0.065 
 (0.043) 
Pre-Interruption Difference in Trends -0.001 
 (0.002) 
Post-Interruption Difference in Intercepts 0.0167 
 (0.063) 
Post-Interruption Difference in Trends -0.009*** 
 (0.003) 
Post-Interruption Rank Condition Trend  -0.004*** 
 (0.002) 
Post-Interruption Rep. and Rank Cond. 
Trend  
0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Observations 158 
Notes:  
1. Standard Errors in parentheses, *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
2. Non-significance in the pre-interruption difference in intercepts and trends (i.e., slopes), indicates that the 
control group (Rank Information Condition), and treatment group (Reputation and Rank Information Condition) 
are appropriate counterfactuals (Linden 2015).     
  
Figure 2.5: Illustration of Interrupted Time Series Analysis Comparing Rank Information and Reputation 
and Rank Information Conditions before and after an Interruption 
 
 
Notes:  
1. All groups experience the same decision-making context in Stage 1 (no additional information), regardless of 
the conditions in which they were placed in Stage 2. 
2. The first round of decision-making after the interruption is the beginning of Stage 2. 
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We theorized that a system’s ability to withstand or recover from the potentially 
disruptive effects of performance rankings would occur because actors reduce inequity by 
rewarding prosocial contributions. Correspondingly, we hypothesized that this behavior would 
be most pronounced in individuals for whom inequity was more salient (i.e., those who gave the 
most to others in Stage 1, but received the least—placing them in the bottom of the ranking) 
(H3). We find that the higher an alter’s reputation for transferring, the more likely an individual 
will transfer. This effect is even higher when inequity is salient. Table 2.5 reports coefficients in 
log odds. Given the estimated random effects for a unique individual and her respective group, 
and all other factors held at their means, when an individual is paired with an alter that has a 90% 
transfer rate the predicted probability of transferring is 0.92 for individuals with highly salient 
inequity and 0.71 for all other individuals (see Table 2.5 & Figure 2.6). 
Participants’ open-ended responses to questions about their strategies in the experiment 
reflected sentiments in line with inequity aversion. For example, many participants in the 
Reputation and Rank condition viewed their rank positions as a consequence of others’ behaviors 
and sought to reward and punish reputations accordingly.  As one said, "During [stage] two of 
the experiment I changed my strategy so that I could try to punish those who were not liberal 
enough in their transferring of points in the first [stage] because I was in the bottom third of the 
group and I felt that my actions in [stage] one were not reciprocated by my fellow participants." 
Another participant put it this way:  "When I knew that others had not transferred, I did not 
transfer to them, especially knowing that I was in the bottom third. However, even if I was 
worried about the amount of money I had left, I continued to give to those who had transferred, 
as I wanted to in a way reward them.” Jointly, these results suggest that reputation information 
can offset the negative effects of rankings because it permits actors to respond to inequity.  
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Table 2.5: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: The Likelihood of Transferring in Stage 2  
(Reputation and Rank Condition Only) 
 Model 1 
Fixed Effects  
Level 1: Decision Rounds Post-Interruption (n=2,942)  
   Alter’s Reputation for Transferring  0.045*** 
 (0.002) 
   High Salience of Inequity x Alter’s Reputation  0.040*** 
 (0.010) 
   Ego’s Percent Gratitude  0.032*** 
 (0.010) 
   Ego’s Percent Generosity 0.056*** 
 (0.005) 
   Increasing Decision Rounds 0.015** 
 (0.005) 
Level 2: Individual (Ego) (n=147)  
   High Salience of Inequity -1.181* 
 (0.518) 
   Male -0.194 
 (0.259) 
   Age (mean-centered) 0.440 
 (0.029) 
   Education: Some College (dummy)  -0.181 
 (0.272) 
   Education: Associate’s Degree (dummy) 0.244 
 (0.831) 
   Education: Bachelor’s Degree (dummy) -0.423 
 (0.404) 
   Education: Post-Doc (dummy) -0.459 
 
 
 (0.709) 
   Short-term Thinking Tendency (CRT) -0.006 
 (0.029) 
Level 3: Groups (n=19)  
   Group’s Average Short-Term Thinking Tendency 0.002 
 (0.013) 
   Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1 -0.056*** 
 (0.015) 
   Percent of Group that is Male  0.005 
 (0.007) 
Random Effects  
   Standard Deviation Individual 1.081*** 
 (0.124) 
   Standard Deviation Group 0.300*** 
 (0.195) 
Intraclass Correlation  
 
0.277 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
2. Omitted categories for comparison: High school degree (level 2) 
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Probability of a Transfer in Stage 2 by Salience of Inequity & Alter’s Reputation  
 
Notes:  
1. Analysis of observations in the Reputation and Rank Condition only.  
2. High Salience of Inequity is indicated by an actor being among the system’s highest givers (e.g., one 
standard deviation above others in transferring in Stage 1) and the among the system’s lowest receivers 
(e.g., in the bottom rank in Stage 1).  
 
DISCUSSION 
Generalized reciprocity is a powerful form of cooperation. By relaxing the need for 
immediate reciprocity, these systems can sustain cooperation among self-interested actors, 
making complex, higher-level organization possible (Nowak 2006). Systems of generalized 
reciprocity are thought to be inherently stable due to inertial, self-generating properties that 
attract new participants and encourage costly contributions without immediate benefits in return 
(Lévi-Strauss 1969, Molm 1997, Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b). However, systems of 
generalized reciprocity are also considered to be fragile because return benefits are not 
guaranteed and the system relies on continual contributions from multiple members (Molm 
1997). Consequently, small lapses in contributions can trigger mass defections and collapse the 
entire system. We explored the apparent contradiction of stability versus fragility by examining 
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how robust these systems are in the presence of a potentially disruptive force that is 
commonplace in organizational contexts: performance rankings.  
Performance rankings can impede cooperation by intensifying competition among 
members, revealing inequities in valued outcomes, and reducing motivations to cooperate. Social 
scientists have not explicitly examined how systems of generalized reciprocity interact with 
performance rankings. Determining when and under what conditions a system of generalized 
reciprocity can withstand potentially disruptive forces, such as performance rankings, can make 
significant contributions to theories of cooperation and may provide guidelines to specific 
practices that promote continued cooperation over time.  
We find that performance rankings are highly disruptive for systems of cooperation. 
Despite the establishment of strong norms of generalized reciprocity, the introduction of 
performance rankings tied to differential rewards dramatically reduced rates of cooperation. Not 
one group that received performance rank information reached the level of cooperation it had 
attained prior to the interruption. The observed deleterious effect of performance rankings on 
cooperation is consistent with the findings of research on shifting rates of cooperation associated 
with perceived resource asymmetries among actors and notions of fairness (Messick and Sentis 
1983, Van Lange et al. 2013, Wade-Benzoni et al. 1996).  
In particular, groups that were generous prior to the introduction of performance rank 
experienced large reductions of cooperation after the interruption. This finding is consistent with 
equity theory (e.g., Adams 1965) and strong reciprocity (Fehr et al. 2002), which assert that the 
higher the perceived imbalance between contributions and benefits, the higher the perceived 
unfairness of the system and the stronger an individual’s need to correct this imbalance. 
Members of generous groups may have especially strong feelings about differences in outcomes. 
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Without other options, their only choice may be to decline to cooperate (Fehr and Gintis 2007). 
The negative impact of performance rankings, especially for the most generous groups, 
may serve as a warning to organizations that rely on performance rankings as a management 
strategy. Performance ranking systems are controversial (Rock and Jones 2015) yet 
commonplace in many different types of organizations, including for-profit corporations, 
educational institutions, and governmental organizations (Cappelli and Tavis 2016, Dooren et al. 
2015). Our findings imply that performance rankings could impair the ability to build social 
capital (Baker and Dutton 2007) or establish prosocial organizational cultures (Penner et al. 
2005). Belmi and Pfeffer’s (2015) argument that norms of reciprocity are weaker in 
organizational contexts lends credence to our findings. They found that individuals were less 
inclined to cooperate when they visualized themselves in organizational versus personal 
contexts. Organizational contexts elicited more self-interested, calculative decision-making 
frames, which reduced willingness to cooperate. If true, then the introduction of performance 
rankings would exacerbate the tendency for self-interested, calculative action that is already 
present in organizations. 
Our key finding is that displaying prosocial contributions (reputation) is a recovery 
mechanism that restores systems of cooperation disrupted by performance rankings. Participants 
who received either rank information or who received reputation and rank information 
experienced a similar initial drop in cooperation.  However, cooperation continued to fall for 
those with rank information, while the trajectory reversed for those with reputation and rank 
information and cooperation continued to rise until it reached pre-interruption rates. We attribute 
this recovery in part to actors having the ability to correct for inequity aversion and find evidence 
that actors that are at high risk of experiencing inequity aversion are indeed more likely than 
 54 
 
other actors to cooperate in the presence of highly cooperative alters. The availability of 
reputation information makes actors more inclined to cooperate in the presence of performance 
rankings because it provides opportunities to resolve inequity aversion and restore fairness to the 
system. Participants can reward those who have been generous in the past and punish those who 
have been stingy by refusing to help them.  Findings from case studies of real organizations are 
consistent with our interpretation of reputation as a mechanism that offsets the harmful effects of 
performance rankings. For example, IDEO—the design firm lauded for its robust “culture of 
helping” (Amabile et al. 2014)—combines performance rankings with informal reputations for 
helpfulness and formal peer reviews (Hargadon and Sutton 1997). 
At one level, our key finding underscores the importance of reputation for systems of 
generalized reciprocity, adding to the stream of research and theory about the positive effects of 
reputational incentives on cooperation (Alexander 1987, Baker and Bulkley 2014, Fehr and 
Gächter 2002, Fehr and Gintis 2007, Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b, Seinen and Schram 2006, 
Wedekind and Milinski 2000). At a deeper level, however, our key finding implies that 
reputation is a source of system robustness. In contrast, the mechanism of gratitude—cooperating 
due to gratefulness for help received—may not be. Prior empirical work (Baker and Bulkley 
2014) found that the gratitude effect was stronger than the reputation effect in a system that did 
not include performance rankings. While we found significant gratitude effects in all four 
conditions, the gratitude mechanism was unable to withstand the negative impact of the 
introduction of performance rankings (see Table 2). The introduction of reputation information 
did not prevent an immediate drop in cooperation (see Figure 2.4), but in the Reputation and 
Rank condition the system eventually recovered and cooperation returned to pre-interruption 
levels. Reputation enables a system of cooperation to withstand forces that would otherwise 
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destroy it.   
Our study makes several contributions. Broadly, we contribute to theory on the 
maintenance of systems of cooperation (Baker and Bulkley 2014, Boyd et al. 2010, Marwell and 
Ames 1979, 1980, Nowak 2006, Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b, Penner et al. 2005). Most work 
in this area assumes that once a system is up and running, its inertial properties will perpetuate it 
over time. We depart from this research by problematizing the assumption that inertial properties 
are enough to sustain an established system of cooperation. We introduce a robustness lens (Jen 
2003, 2005) to the discussion of systems of cooperation by explicitly examining how these 
systems are maintained in the presence of perturbations. Here, we focused on the introduction of 
performance rankings as an exogenous perturbation. However, perturbations can be 
endogenous—disruptions can emerge from the everyday actions that on their face should 
maintain these systems. For example, acts that increase the mutual benefits associated with 
cooperation may unintentionally pave the way for a system’s collapse by making the payouts 
associated with defection larger (Stewart and Plotkin 2014). A robustness lens turns the focus 
toward understanding the role that mechanisms of disruption and recovery play in the 
maintenance of systems of cooperation. It shifts the conversation from “system maintenance” to 
“system maintenance in the presence of disruptive forces.” In so doing, it provides insights into 
how and when systems of cooperation are robust to anticipated and unanticipated perturbations.   
In examining the effects of performance rankings on cooperative systems we contribute 
to research that examines the use of rankings (e.g., forced distribution ratings systems) to 
manage the performance of organizational members (Anderson and Brown 2010, Moon et al. 
2016, Rock and Jones 2015). Evidence is mixed regarding whether rankings are beneficial or 
harmful for organizations (Anderson and Brown 2010). While there is some evidence that 
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rankings help to attract and retain high performers, performance rankings may reduce 
employees’ motivations to perform cooperative, prosocial behaviors (Moon et al. 2016). Since 
citizenship behaviors directly affect the ability of an organization to catalyze task activities and 
processes (Borman and Motowidlo 1993), performance rankings may ultimately undercut their 
expected performance gains (Moon et al. 2016). Our findings provide empirical support for these 
concerns. We find that performance rankings negatively impact actors’ willingness to cooperate 
over time—even in the presence of strong norms of cooperation.  
Finally, we contribute to research on prosocial behavior at the macro-level (Baker and 
Bulkley 2014, Baker and Dutton 2007, Cross and Parker 2004, Penner et al. 2005). To date, this 
research has focused on the benefits that systems of generalized reciprocity create in 
organizations (Bolino and Grant 2016). Because of these perceived benefits, practitioners often 
recommend these systems to leaders (Cross and Parker 2004). Our research suggests that these 
systems may be more difficult to implement and maintain than previously thought, especially in 
the presence of performance rankings, but that recognizing and rewarding the prosocial 
contributions of organizational members might reduce the negative effects of performance 
rankings. We find evidence that reputation information helps restore disrupted systems of 
cooperation, permitting actors to respond to perceptions of inequity by rewarding the cooperative 
behaviors of others.    
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
 One clear implication of our findings is that if managers seek to develop a pay-it-forward 
culture of helping or other types of cooperative systems they must pay careful attention to the 
potentially disruptive effects of performance rankings. Despite their inertial properties, these 
systems are likely to collapse in the presence of performance rankings and other conditions that 
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result in an increase in competition or perceived inequity (e.g., gamification programs and 
ratings systems). To motivate more geographically dispersed workforces managers are enlisting 
performance rankings, gamification tools, and ratings systems at increasing rates (Cappelli 2009, 
Mollick and Rothbard 2014, Webster and Wing-Fai 2017). Relatedly, increased availability of 
information technology is enabling organizations to continuously monitor employees’ activities 
and report back transparent performance data that is often in the form of a ranking (Bernstein and 
Li 2017). Together with this research, our findings suggest that systems of cooperation will 
likely be subject to increasing amounts of potentially disruptive forces and that the maintenance 
of prosocial organizational cultures may become more difficult in the near future. 
However, our findings also point to a way that managers can offset these potentially 
disruptive forces. Our findings suggest that managers can maintain or restore cooperation, 
without changing the underlying performance appraisal system, by displaying employees’ 
prosocial contributions and offering recognition for prosocial activities. For example, so-called 
peer-to-peer bonus systems enable employees to recognize and reward other employees’ 
cooperative behaviors (Erez et al. 2015). Other examples include organizational routines in 
which members publicly express appreciations of helpfulness, acknowledgements in company 
newsletters of those who go the “extra mile,” service awards, and formal performance reviews 
that explicitly include measures of cooperation (Weinzweig 2010, p. 2012–2014). Employing 
these strategies may permit organizations to retain the benefits of using comparative performance 
appraisal systems such as enhanced employee effort, task performance (Moon et al. 2016) and 
self-policing to avoid unproductive behaviors (Bernstein and Li 2017), without undercutting 
cooperation.  
Two key boundary conditions influence the range of these managerial implications. First, 
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our study invokes a specific type of performance appraisal system. Similar to the types of 
performance rankings that are commonly employed to manage sales forces (Zoltners et al. 2008, 
2011) and the widely-used forced distribution ratings (FDRS) performance appraisal system 
(Moon et al. 2016), we use a type of zero-sum ranking in our experiment. A zero-sum ranking 
dictates that actors that are higher in the rankings will have access to benefits at the expense of 
actors that are lower in the rankings. We used this type of ranking because it maps on to 
performance comparison pressures that are prevalent in organizational contexts. Even 
organizations that do not explicitly use a zero-sum performance ranking system often feature 
some zero-sum competitive elements. For example, if we assume that an organization has a pool 
of equally talented employees, it is likely that only a select few will be promoted to leadership 
positions. Further, in the absence of explicit performance rankings, individuals will often infer 
implicit rankings, which may elicit similar dynamics (Magee and Galinsky 2008, Willer 2009). 
In our experiment, a zero-sum ranking encapsulates these competitive pressures. Yet, 
organizations may actively seek to avoid zero-sum performance structures. For example, a 
hybrid type of performance appraisal system, which combines individual and team performance 
metrics, may produce less competitive dynamics and hence attenuate the potentially disruptive 
effects of rankings.  
Second, in our experimental design actors had access to perfect information about others’ 
cooperative behaviors (i.e., reputations were accurate and complete). While prior research shows 
that group members often create accurate evaluations of others’ prosocial contributions (Willer 
2009), actors could conceivably have access to more or less accurate information about others’ 
cooperative behavior. The larger the group, the more difficult it is to keep track of accurate 
assessments of others’ reputations (Baker and Bulkley 2014, Tennie et al. 2010). Additionally, 
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other biases related to prosocial behaviors and gender dynamics that are prevalent in 
organizational contexts may affect the accuracy of these assessments. For example, compared to 
men women may receive less credit for prosocial behaviors because they are assumed to be 
altruistic in nature (Flynn 2005). Inaccurate reputations may mean that more deserving 
employees (highly prosocial employees) will not be on the receiving end of efforts to reward 
reputation and reduce inequity. Future research should explore whether high givers continue to 
exhibit efforts to reward cooperative others when they themselves are not recognized for their 
prosocial contributions.   
CONCLUSION 
Cooperation is essential for social systems ranging from small groups to organizations to 
international relations. Indeed, complex society would be impossible without it. As (Nowak 
2006, p. 1560) put it “[h]umans are the champions of cooperation: From hunter-gather societies 
to nation-states, cooperation is the decisive organizing principle of human society.” Accordingly, 
identifying how cooperation is maintained among self-interested actors is “one of the 
fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences” (Egas and Riedl 2008, p. 871). We 
contribute to research and theory on cooperation by explicitly examining how systems of 
cooperation fare in the presence of a potentially disruptive force commonly found in 
organizational contexts: performance rankings. 
Using a longitudinal between-groups experimental design that included more than 80 
rounds of decision-making, we analyzed how introducing performance rankings affected 
cooperation. We found that established systems of cooperation could not withstand the 
introduction of performance rankings. Despite the development of a group norm of generalized 
reciprocity during a lengthy period of decision-making prior to the interruption, participants who 
received information about performance rankings were much less likely to cooperate than 
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individuals who did not receive any additional information. In contrast, participants who also 
received reputation information—information about the relative generosity (stinginess) of others 
in the past—were more likely to cooperate despite the presence of performance rankings. Our 
research opens a new avenue of inquiry: the robustness of systems of cooperation. We 
considered robustness in the presence of one common potentially disruptive force (rankings) but 
other exogenous and endogenous forces or “shocks” can imperil a system of cooperation. We 
analyzed the effects of one recovery mechanism (reputation) but other recovery mechanisms 
likely exist. Future research may identify additional disruptive forces and recovery mechanisms, 
broadening and deepening our understanding of robust systems of cooperation. Finally, our 
research supports a growing chorus of concern regarding rankings as performance appraisal 
systems and suggests that organizations should find ways to recognize and reward the prosocial 
contributions of their members. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
With Cheaters We all Prosper?:  
Micro-Movements through Rankings and their Implications for System Robustness 
 
Cooperation is essential for effective organizing (Arrow 1974). Yet, cooperation is 
challenging to maintain over time because it requires individuals to forego opportunities to 
maximize their self-interests in favor of the collective. As such, understanding how to achieve 
cooperation inside groups and organizations has long been considered a central area of inquiry in 
the social sciences (Salvato et al. 2017). Toward this end, scholars have focused on individual 
characteristics that identify members who are more likely to cooperate, situational characteristics 
that are likely to provoke prosocial emotions that inspire cooperative behaviors, and the presence 
of social structures that set and enforce either formal or informal obligations to cooperate (e.g., 
norms, regulations, and social hierarchy). Of these social structures, social hierarchy and more 
specifically reputation has received the most attention (Simpson and Willer 2015).   
Reputation has long captured the attention of scholars studying cooperation because it 
serves as a powerful incentive for performing cooperative behaviors. In the context of 
cooperation, reputation is an individual’s record of performing expected levels of cooperative 
behaviors. This information tends to be comparative in nature (e.g., has a particular individual 
contributed as much as other members of an organization?). Reputations signal which members 
of a group are more deserving of the group’s scarce resources (Wedekind and Milinski 2000). 
Groups and organizations naturally seek to reward members who are key contributors and 
identify and sanction members who free-ride off the cooperative contributions of others (e.g., 
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Rabin 1993; Willer 2009). Reputation rankings display comparative records of cooperative 
behavior. Therefore, they can serve as cognitive shortcuts, from which group members can 
determine who is most deserving of scarce resources (Baker and Bulkley 2014) and from which 
individuals can self-monitor their behavior (Bernstein and Li 2017). Yet, reputation rankings and 
other hierarchically-based mechanisms for eliciting cooperation may contain a dark side (Pettit et 
al. 2016). Reputation rankings provide performance comparison information, which can create a 
unidirectional drive for increased performance vis-à-vis other individuals in the ranking 
(Festinger 1954). Recent research has demonstrated links between opportunities for reputation 
gains and losses and the performance of uncooperative behaviors such as cheating and acts of 
deception (e.g., Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit et al. 2016; Vriend et al. 2017). This work portends that 
reputation rankings may ultimately be counterproductive for the maintenance of cooperation 
inside organizations.  
Given these mixed findings for the effects of social hierarchy on cooperative behavior, 
one avenue forward is to examine which factors make rankings as a whole more likely to 
produce cooperative behaviors and which will produce uncooperative behaviors. A next step 
would then be to either limit these factors or remove rankings all together. However, this path 
forward and the recent research that warns of rankings’ negative externalities both share a 
common assumption. They assume that uncooperative behaviors are uniformly harmful for 
organizations. This paper relaxes this assumption. It asks if individuals that exhibit 
uncooperative behaviors will also be more likely to exhibit higher levels of cooperative 
behaviors in response to pressures stemming from rankings. Evidence that this is the case may 
indicate that organizations can tolerate the uncooperative behaviors that arise from rankings 
because they are associated with a concomitant rise in cooperative behaviors.  
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Answering the question of whether rankings are helpful or harmful for maintaining 
cooperation inside organizations may be more important now than ever before. The new world of 
work presents unique challenges for organizations that can make achieving cooperation more 
difficult. Traditional mechanisms for ensuring cooperation and employee performance may be 
irrelevant or outdated with non-traditional work arrangements (e.g., virtual teams) as they have 
the potential to make monitoring, socialization, organizational identification, and face-to-face 
connections more difficult to achieve. It is important to understand how these changes alter how 
employees experience work and correspondingly how systems achieve social order amid these 
transforming experiences (Barley, Bechky, and Milliken 2017).  
The new world of work was made possible by a rapid rise in technology. This rise in 
technology also allows employers to continually monitor employees’ activities and report back 
transparent performance data that employees can use to monitor and adjust their own behaviors 
(Bernstein and Li 2017). Rankings may be improved by the greater availability and transparency 
of data. Rankings are traditional mechanisms used to elicit cooperation, but they may take on 
more relevance in this new world of work as they may be naturally positioned to leverage these 
advances in technology.  
In the present study, I examine one organization’s use of rankings to promote voluntary 
cooperation from its members. Using data from the online community Stack Overflow—a 
question and answer site for programmers, I examine over 16,000 actors’ reputation lifecycles—
entire histories moving through a reputation ranking—and their corresponding rates of 
cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. Prior studies that demonstrate the link between 
movements in rankings and uncooperative behaviors are typically based in a laboratory, 
primarily present cooperative and uncooperative behaviors as tradeoffs, and examine this 
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tradeoff at one single point in time (e.g., Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit et al. 2016; Vriend et al. 2016). 
Examining actors’ reputation lifecycles allows for the occurrence of contemporaneous 
behaviors—actors can be both cooperative and uncooperative. In contrast to prior research, I do 
not find that either incremental increases in ranking positions or the nearness to gains in rank are 
associated with increases in cooperative behavior. I do find that incremental increases in rank are 
associated with a higher likelihood of exhibiting uncooperative behavior. However, I find that 
actors that exhibit uncooperative behavior also exhibit slightly higher rates of cooperation in 
response to both potential gains and losses in rank. Last, contrary to work on moral licensing 
(e.g., cleansing), I find that rates of cooperative behavior decrease dramatically after actors are 
sanctioned for uncooperative behaviors. Jointly these findings suggest that organizations can 
tolerate negative externalities associated with rankings (uncooperative behaviors) as the 
members that perform them are also more likely to cooperate, but that sanctioning uncooperative 
behaviors may limit future rates of cooperation.  
This study offers several contributions to the study of organizations. First, it makes two 
contributions to the expanding literature on the dynamic nature of social hierarchy (e.g., Brion 
and Anderson 2013; Pettit et al. 2013; Pettit et al. 2016). By using longitudinal data this study 
repeatedly assesses individuals’ responses to potential gains and losses in rank. Extant research 
tends to examine decision-making at one single point in time and in laboratory settings. In 
contrast, this study examines actors’ cooperative and uncooperative behaviors in a natural 
organizational setting, allowing this study to capture cumulative social pressures that may not be 
reliably produced in a laboratory setting. Cumulative pressures, such as repeatedly missing an 
opportunity for a reputation gain, may elicit different dynamics than one-shot examinations of 
behavior. Additionally, this study allows for contemporaneous opportunities for cooperative and 
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uncooperative behaviors. Prior studies that show a link between movements in rankings and 
uncooperative behavior present these behaviors as tradeoffs (e.g., Pettit et al. 2016, Vriend et al. 
2016). However, organizations present simultaneous opportunities for cooperative and 
uncooperative behaviors. By relaxing the assumption that these behaviors produce mutually 
exclusive options of behavior, this study takes a step toward understanding the system-level net 
effects of rankings. 
Second, this study contributes to research that examines the functionality of social 
hierarchy in organizations (e.g., Anderson and Brown 2010; Simpson and Willer 2015). As a 
form of social hierarchy, rankings have been linked with both functional and dysfunctional 
outcomes for organizations. While they have been associated with benefits such as increased task 
coordination and improved decision-making, there is growing evidence that rankings may be 
problematic for achieving cooperation (Anderson and Brown 2010). Accordingly, scholars have 
called for more research into when reputation rankings are harmful and helpful for organizations 
(Simpson and Willer 2015). By examining a virtual organization that exists solely because of the 
voluntary contributions of its members, this study presents a conservative test for the ability of 
social hierarchy to enhance cooperation.  
Last, this study broadly contributes to our understanding of how tools of social order 
meet challenges associated with the changing nature of work (Barley, Bechky, and Milliken 
2017). Rankings have traditionally been used to enhance cooperation inside organizations, but 
studies show that they create mixed outcomes for organizations. By examining an online 
community that explicitly uses rankings to motivate cooperative behavior, this study examines 
how individuals engage with the type of rankings that may be a standing feature of the new 
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world of work—highly transparent rankings that contain perfect information about actors’ past 
performance.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The importance of maintaining cooperation in organizations cannot be overstated. 
Cooperation has been described as an essential component of effective organizing and labeled as 
the ultimate antecedent to organizational life (Axelrod 1984; Kogut and Zander 1992). This 
importance is due in large part to the many performance outcomes that are associated with high 
levels of cooperation. Myriad empirical studies have recorded the link between high levels of 
cooperation and successful group and organizational-level outcomes such as enhanced 
productivity, better problem-solving, greater levels of innovation and creativity, enhanced work 
environments, higher levels of job satisfaction, better work relationships, and improved 
organizational performance (Salvato, Reur, and Battiglani 2017; Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 
1995; Tjosvold 1984). Several definitions of cooperation have been put forth while examining 
this phenomenon. I define cooperation here as the continual enactment of an individual behavior 
that benefits a group. Embedded within this definition is the realization that there are naturally 
occurring obstacles to cooperation (e.g., social dilemmas) that can undermine actors’ willingness 
to cooperation and that collective action cannot be achieved without the continuation of this 
willingness to cooperate over time (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Simpson and Willer 2015). 
Cooperation is costly for individual actors because it requires them to expend personal 
resources to advance collective interests (Axelrod 1984). Costs may expand with repeated 
cooperation events. While cooperative behaviors enable collective action, they also introduce a 
collective action problem or social dilemma: individuals can maximize their self-interests by 
receiving benefits from group membership while free-riding on the cooperative behaviors of 
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others, but this maximization of self-interests leads to suboptimal collective outcomes (e.g., 
Hardin 1982). A group can only flourish when a critical proportion of its members forego 
opportunities to maximize their self-interests in favor of the collective’s interests. How do groups 
inspire their members to forego the maximization of their self-interests? How is this inspiration 
maintained over time?   
One explanation can be found in the type of individuals that make up a group and the 
psychological state in which they are situated. A growing body of work has begun to examine 
the link between individual characteristics and cooperative behavior. Scholars have emphasized 
the role of social value orientation and stable preferences in enabling cooperation (e.g., Balliet et 
al. 2009; van Lange et al. 2013). Prosocial emotions have also been used to explain increasing 
cooperative behaviors (e.g., Caprara et al. 2012). For example, the emotion of gratitude is linked 
with higher reports of cooperative behaviors (Emmons and McCullough 2002). Individuals may 
possess more prosocial personalities (Penner et al. 2005) or prosocial values (Grant 2008; Rioux 
and Penner 2001).  Due to personality differences or stable preferences, individuals may have a 
baseline proclivity for experiencing prosocial emotions (Grant and Bolino 2016). In this case, the 
extent to which individuals are likely to experience positive emotions will tend to shape their 
rates of cooperative behaviors. Alternatively, the situational state—the climate and time 
surrounding a given situation—may be more or less likely to give rise to positive emotions. For 
example, providing information about how others will benefit from a cooperative act can create a 
state that increases prosocial emotions. Grant (2007) shows that fundraising call center 
employees, whose job it is to secure donations, contribute more efforts to the collective goal 
when they are provided information about scholarship beneficiaries who directly benefit from 
their efforts. The bottom line being that this perspective focuses on individual traits and how they 
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affect rates of cooperation.  
Another explanation can be found in social forces that help elicit cooperation. These 
forces can be either informally or formally created by interactions among the members of a 
group or collective (e.g., Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 1995). Informal cooperation emphasizes 
the role of socialization through norms and the spontaneous development of voluntary 
participation that arises from cultural forces that are not due to explicit contractual obligations 
(e.g., a culture of generalized reciprocity creates a social pressure to pay-forward help when it is 
received). Norms can be classified as either descriptive (e.g., what most people do in a given 
situation), or injunctive (e.g., behavioral expectations that are enforced by sanctions) (Cialdini et 
al. 1990). The threat of punishment for the violation of a norm is a strong predictor of 
cooperative behavior (Fehr and Gintis 2002), but even the mere perception of what is typical 
behavior for a group can be enough to invoke cooperative behavior (Simpson and Willer 2015). 
Conversely, formal cooperation emphasizes the role of social structures such as 
hierarchy, rules, and regulations (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 1995). These social structures are 
more explicit forms of social control that create and enforce contractual obligations to cooperate. 
For example, organizations can design team structures that force individuals to work together 
(Ouichi 1980), and international protocols for climate change can require countries to adhere to 
emissions regulations (Wijen and Ansari 2007). These more explicit social structures are 
designed in such a way that the standards for cooperation are made explicit. Members are aware 
of their responsibilities. Rewards or sanctions for rates of cooperation are more transparent. As 
opposed to the perspective that focuses on individual characteristics, this perspective emphasizes 
the role of social factors external to an individual.  
A related view combines aspects of both the individualistic and social explanations of 
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cooperation. Known as cooperation theory, Deutch (1949) proposes that individuals who are 
faced with a simultaneously competitive and cooperative environment (e.g., group membership 
or another form of collective action) will cooperate to the degree that their individual interests 
are aligned with the group’s interest (Tjosvold 1984). The alignment of self and group interests 
can occur both informally (e.g., because of cognitive dissonance a person reframes the cost 
associated with cooperation to that of a gain) and formally (e.g., managers structure an incentive 
program that actively rewards individuals for group level performance, therein better aligning the 
individual’s interests with that of the collective). This theory asserts that individuals possess 
diverse individual characteristics that shape baseline preferences and interests and emphasizes 
that cooperation occurs when these baseline interests are aligned with those of the collective.  
This study focuses on the formal force of a social hierarchy (i.e., a ranking) as a control 
mechanism that is in place to elicit cooperation. I chose this focus for two reasons: 1) the 
presence of transparent social structures designed to elicit cooperation is on the rise (Bernstein 
and Li 2017), and 2) debate exists about whether they are helpful or harmful for organizations 
(Anderson and Brown 2010). With the rise in technological capabilities that reduce the need for 
in-person interaction, we are arguably in an era of the new world of work, where traditional 
organizations are giving way to more geographically dispersed, and temporary teams (Barley, 
Bechky, and Milliken 2017). With geographically distributed teams, more informal methods for 
ensuring cooperation such as normative pressures achieved through socialization may not be as 
easy to create. Further, without in-person interaction, it may be more difficult to elicit the 
positive emotions that create spontaneous cooperation. Instead, managers are turning to more 
formal types of cooperation-inducing mechanisms such as rankings, badge and ratings systems, 
and gamification tools to ensure the presence of cooperation (Bernstein and Li 2017). The 
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increase of these methods of social control, and specifically rankings, may be problematic if they 
give rise to counterproductive externalities that undermine future rates of cooperation. For 
example, Kitts (2006) shows that rankings provide benefits that are sufficiently valuable, which 
in turn created the negative externality of rivalry. As a result of this rivalry, actors began 
sanctioning cooperative behaviors, which undermined future rates of cooperation. Accordingly, 
understanding when reputation rankings are helpful and harmful for the collective’s success is an 
important avenue for future research (Anderson and Willer 2014; Simpson and Willer 2015). 
Reputation Rankings and Cooperative Behavior  
Social hierarchy is a common way to maintain social order and thereby promotes 
cooperation inside groups and organizations. A social hierarchy is the explicit or implicit 
ordering of individuals along a valued social dimension (Magee and Galinsky 2008).
10
 A 
position in a social hierarchy confers material, psychological, and social benefits, wherein 
individuals in higher positions within the hierarchy receiving a greater portion of benefits. 
Explicit hierarchies involve some form of transparency whereby actors within these hierarchies 
can understand their position without the aid of others. Implicit hierarchies involve some form of 
opacity whereby actors within these hierarchies must seek out others’ impressions to understand 
where they stand in relation to others. Social hierarchy is often studied in one of two forms: 
status or reputation. Reputation rankings reflect an actor’s relative past performance in a specific 
capacity (Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Benjamin and Podolny 1999). More specifically, 
reputation rankings order individuals along a valued social dimension based upon their past 
performance, whereas status orderings arise with collective judgments of an individual’s relative 
                                                          
10 While scholars widely recognize that social hierarchy is a ubiquitous feature of social life (Anderson and Brown 2010), the 
construct of social hierarchy lacks sufficient clarity (Bunderson et al. 2016). Social hierarchy has referred to individuals’ varying 
levels of prestige, power, and status within a social group, as well as the overall rate of inequality between group members (e.g., 
in steep hierarchies a small set of actors control most of the resources) (see Bunderson et al. 2016 for a review). I have narrowed 
the focus of this study to one type of social hierarchy—a reputation ranking.  
 71 
 
standing in terms of prestige, honor, and deference (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Vriend et 
al. 2016). This study focuses on reputation rankings as public, transparent records of observable 
cooperative behaviors.
11,12
  
In the context of systems of cooperation, reputation is an assessment of members’ relative 
contributions to the group’s goals. Group members are incentivized to cooperate because groups 
tend to keep track of, reward, and punish individuals according to their rates of cooperative 
behaviors. For example, Willer (2009) showed that even without the aid of any scorekeeping 
devices groups were able to accurately keep track of members’ rates of cooperation, group 
members felt pressure to cooperate because they were aware that they were being tracked, and 
members received social and material rewards in proportion to their rates of cooperation. 
Numerous economic experiments document groups using reputation information to allocate 
resources toward more cooperative members (Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck 2002; Seinen 
and Schram 2006; Wedekind and Milinski 2000). Actors, aware of this contingent access to 
benefits, manage their reputations to gain these rewards. While reputation often acts as an 
incentive to cooperate because it provides justification of benefits from the group, an explicit 
reward structure does not need to be in place for reputation to induce cooperation. Even without 
explicit material reward structures, individuals tend to cooperate more in the presence of 
reputation information (Barclay and Willer 2007; Wedekind and Milinski 2000).  
While tracking reputation becomes more difficult in larger groups (Baker and Bulkley 
2014), the link between the presence of reputation information and higher cooperative behaviors 
                                                          
11 While distinct in degree of transparency and point of evaluation, the study of cooperation in relation to reputation and status 
has given rise to overlapping streams of research, which have demonstrated similar underlying dynamics (Simpson and Willer 
2015). Therefore, the theoretical arguments found within this manuscript will be informed by both the status and reputation 
literatures. 
12 Rankings are a macro-level structure—an ordering of all relevant members on a valued social dimension. In research on the 
effects of rankings, we are often concerned with individuals’ experiences at a specific rank, or their movements to and from a 
specific ranking position. A single individual’s position within a ranking is similar to the concepts of social standing (Doreian 
1986) or social rank (Garcia et al. 2006) found in sociology and psychology.  
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is still present in large groups. For example, this link has been observed in largescale online 
market places and open-source projects (Anthony et al. 2009; Smith and Kollock 1999). 
Regardless of the setting, the public nature of reputation information is likely to enhance 
cooperative behaviors (Lacetera and Macis 2010).  Jointly, these studies suggest that the link 
between reputation information and cooperation is an entrenched phenomenon in society and that 
individuals will be motivated to cooperate by the potential of a gain in rank and concerns about a 
loss in rank.  
Reputation Rankings and Uncooperative Behavior  
While the cooperative-enhancing benefits of social hierarchies are well documented (e.g., 
Thibault and Kelley 1959; Blau 1968; Hardy and Van Vugt 2006; Magee and Galinsky 2008; 
Willer 2009; Tai, Narayanan, and McAllister 2012), a growing body of research is highlighting 
unintended consequences of rankings. Rankings may incentivize uncooperative behaviors (e.g., 
Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit et al. 2016; Vriend, Jordan, and Janssen 2016). Uncooperative 
behaviors such as cheating, dishonesty, and sabotoge allow individuals to obtain hierarchical 
rewards without having to play by “the rules of the game” (Schweitzer et al. 2004; Ordonez et al. 
2009). These negative behaviors may arise with reputation rankings because rankings by design 
create performance comparisons—actors assess their performance vis-à-vis others’ performance. 
Social comparison theory notes that performance comparisons can create a unique form of 
pressure that leads to a unidirectional drive to perform better and better (Festinger, 1954). These 
pressures tend to intensify near qualitatively meaningful standards that hold intrinsic and 
extrinsic value, such as the top of a ranking (Garcia et al. 2006). Scholars have long been 
concerned that rankings may create temptations for cheating and other forms of uncooperative 
behaviors (e.g., Krakel 2007; Lazear 1989). Recent work finds empirical support for these 
 73 
 
concerns. Vriend, Jordan, and Janssen (2016) find that actors are more likely to hold unethical 
intentions (e.g., a willingness to sabotage competitors and overstate performance) and exhibit 
uncooperative behaviors (e.g., deception) when they are in a top rank or close to achieving a top 
rank.   
These pressures may also be pronounced in cases where actors are at risk of losing 
privileges that come with higher positions in the rankings. Prospect theories of motivation 
highlight the role of losses and potential losses in inciting behaviors that may undermine 
cooperation. Dubbed as loss aversion, this theory posits that actors will behave in a risk-adverse 
manner to preserve gains and a risk-seeking manner to avoid losses (Kahneman and Tversky 
1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Cheating and other forms of cooperative behaviors often 
come with the risk of being caught and punishment. Loss aversion that comes from the threat of 
losing a position in a ranking may cause actors to become more willing to assume this risk. For 
example, in a recent study, Pettit et al. (2016) found evidence that actors are more likely to cheat 
in response to a threat of loss in rank than they are with an opportunity to achieve a gain. Hence, 
we have evidence that both potential gains and losses in rank can lead to uncooperative 
behaviors. Consequently, I hypothesize that the closer an actor is to gaining or losing a position 
in a reputation ranking that is associated with a meaningful privilege, the higher their amount of 
(un)cooperative behaviors.   
 
H1a: The closer an actor is to gaining a position in a ranking that is associated with a 
privilege, the higher their amount of cooperative behaviors.  
 
H1b: The closer an actor is to gaining a position in a ranking that is associated with a 
privilege, the higher their amount of uncooperative behaviors.  
 
H2a: The closer an actor is to losing a position in a ranking that is associated with a 
privilege, the higher the likelihood that they will exhibit cooperative behaviors.  
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H2b: The closer an actor is to losing a position in a ranking that is associated with a 
privilege, the higher the likelihood that they will exhibit uncooperative behaviors.  
 
Systemic Implications of Reputation Rankings  
Why might we expect that actors may be likely to exhibit both cooperative and 
uncooperative behaviors in response to a potential reputation gain or loss? Extant research has 
thus far been focused on the presence of one effect at the expense of the other, but this research 
typically examines cooperative and uncooperative behaviors as mutually exclusive options and 
examines this tradeoff at one single point in time (e.g., Garcia et al. 2006; Vriend et al. 2016; 
Pettit et al. 2016).
13
 This could lead to the assumption that if someone is likely to exhibit 
uncooperative behaviors then they are equally unlikely to exhibit cooperative behaviors. Yet, it is 
conceivable that actors inside organizations may have multiple opportunities to exhibit both 
cooperative and uncooperative behaviors.  
The ability to track both types of behaviors may change what we know about the 
relationship between movements through rankings and (un)cooperative behaviors. Research in 
moral licensing shows that individuals tend to keep track of their “balance” of uncooperative and 
cooperative behaviors and act in ways to maintain this balance. Specifically, past practices 
provide a license to act in ways that contradict prior behavior (Miller and Effron 2010). 
Accordingly, cooperative behaviors may provide a license to exhibit uncooperative behaviors 
(Monin and Miller 2001; Sachdeva, Illiev, and Medin 2009; Kouchaki 2011). For example, 
studies show that people who were asked to recall their past moral acts were more likely to cheat 
to get higher payoffs in later time periods (e.g., Clot, Grolleau, and Ibanez 2014; Jordan et al. 
2011). Correspondingly, actors that exhibit uncooperative behaviors may exercise a form of 
                                                          
13 Edelman and Larkin’s (2015) study, which examines the likelihood that actors will attempt to get ahead in SSRN’s most 
downloaded paper rankings through self-downloads (i.e., cheating), shows actors behaviors over time. However, this setting does 
not feature ways to track cooperative behaviors.   
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reverse moral licensing to offset these behaviors. For instance, actors may exhibit cooperative 
behavior as a way to engage in moral cleansing—committing cooperative acts to boost self-
worth after one’s moral self-worth has been threatened—to counteract past uncooperative 
behaviors (Sachdeva, Illiev, and Medin 2009). Ultimately, we may expect that actors will be 
attuned to the ratio of their past cooperative and uncooperative behaviors and that they will be 
likely to act in ways that offset imbalances between the two. Further, a willingness to engage in 
uncooperative behaviors, especially ones that harbor the threat of punishment, suggests that 
actors that engage in these behaviors may be even more sensitive to the pressures associated with 
a proximity to a meaningful standard of achievement. Paradoxically, this could lead these actors 
to engage in more cooperative behaviors than actors that do not eventually exhibit uncooperative 
behaviors.  
This could be consequential for organizations because it suggests that the link between 
reputation rankings and uncooperative behaviors may not be detrimental for a system of 
cooperation. Actors’ cooperative behaviors may outweigh their uncooperative behaviors. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that actors that are more prone to uncooperative behaviors will 
exhibit more cooperative behaviors than actors that never exhibit uncooperative behaviors. 
Heightened susceptibility to ranking pressures is the mechanism that underlies this expectation. 
Last, I hypothesize that actors that exhibit uncooperative behaviors will be more likely to exhibit 
greater rates of cooperative behaviors in future time periods to make up for their uncooperative 
behavior.   
H3a: Actors that are prone to uncooperative behaviors will cooperate more in response to 
pressures associated with potential gains in rakings than actors that never exhibit 
uncooperative behaviors.  
 
H3b: Actors that are prone to uncooperative behavior will cooperate more in response to 
pressures associated with potential losses in rankings than actors that never exhibit 
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uncooperative behaviors.   
 
H4: Actors that are sanctioned for uncooperative behavior will exhibit higher rates of 
cooperation after they are sanctioned.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS  
I test these hypothesize in the context of an online community that is built from the 
voluntary, cooperative contributions of its members. The empirical context is the cooperative and 
uncooperative behaviors of 3,260,187 members of the Stack Overflow online knowledge sharing 
community from April 2009 to June 2017.  An online community is defined as an aggregation of 
individuals who share a common interest and interface through an online platform or other 
computer-mediated mechanism (Hagel and Armstrong 1997; Williams and Cothrel 2000). Stack 
Overflow is the flagship online community in Stack Exchange—an overarching company that 
includes over 150 online communities (ranging from topics such as parenting and conspiracy 
theories to mathematics and biology). Stack Overflow is a question and answering site for 
professional and enthusiast programmers using multiple programming languages (e.g. C++, java, 
python, etc.). The site was created in 2008 by founders Jeff Atwood and Joel Spolsky and is the 
most popular online technological community on the internet with over 5 million active users as 
of January 2016 (Atwood, 2008). The site is entirely dependent on members’ contributions. 
Knowledge exchange occurs through the posting of questions and other members’ responses in 
the form of answers and edits. The type of knowledge exchange fostered on Stack Overflow is 
typically of high quality and based in fact rather than advice or opinion—a unique capability that 
differentiates Stack Overflow from other online communities such as Yahoo Answers, Facebook, 
and LinkedIn that are focused on networking or other forms of connectivity (e.g., “friending” or 
“following” members) (Funk 2014).   
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To maintain the high quality of the site’s content, Stack Overflow enlists the help of 
democratically elected site moderators and a reputation ranking system.
 14
 Site moderators are 
members that are elected for life to act as liaisons between the community and the Stack 
Exchange Company. Their main tasks consist of responding to alerts that a post might need to be 
removed or altered because it is a form of spam, is offensive, or is in need of other forms of 
moderator attention.
15
 The reputation ranking system is meant to signal the amount that the 
community trusts a specific community member. According to the founders, the reputation 
system’s explicit purpose is to keep track of members’ past contributions and motivate their 
continued cooperation, so that the site is itself self-sustaining and self-monitoring (Atwood, 
2009). Members’ reputation points are posted in a public ranking and alongside their user ID for 
each question, answer, and editing activity. Hence, members’ reputation points are consistently 
visible to the participants and other community members. Reputation points are tied to site-
specific privileges (see Table 3.1). Privileges are both a source of power over site content and a 
source of responsibility for maintaining the site’s functioning (e.g., ability to edit content, close 
and open posts, tag posts as inappropriate, etc.).  
Members earn reputation points based on the quality of their contributions to the site, as 
judged by other members (e.g., by receiving upvotes for high quality contributions and 
downvotes for low quality contributions). The bulk of reputation points are awarded for an 
upvoted question (+5), upvoted answer (+10), and an answer that is accepted by the question 
originator as the best answer (+15) (see Table 3.2 for a breakdown of the Stack Overflow 
Reputation System). Reputation points can also be lost for low quality contributions. The bulk of 
reputation points that are lost are for downvoted questions (-2) and answers (-2). It is important 
                                                          
14 Each of the Stack Exchange online communities uses a version of this reputation ranking system.  
15 A lengthy description of site moderator’s duties can be found at https://stackoverflow.com/help/site-moderators. This includes 
a full list of current site moderators and the site’s Theory of Moderation, which all moderators must agree to abide by.  
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to note that downvoting behaviors cost the member that is downvoting 1 reputation point. 
Reputations cannot drop below 0. Members do not earn reputation points for accepting their own 
answers. Finally, point allocations due to the combination of upvoting, downvoting, and 
suggested edits are capped at 200 points per day for each member.  
 
Table 3.1: Stack Overflow Privileges Based on Reputation Level  
Reputation Point Total  Site Privileges (Milestones Bolded) 
1 Create Posts (questions and answers) 
5 Participate in media (discuss site improvements) 
10 Create wiki posts/Remove new user restrictions 
15 Flag posts for moderator attention /Vote on site documentation 
20 Talk in chat rooms 
50 Comment on other people’s posts and topic requests 
75 Create bounties from your reputation 
100 Approve documentation / Create new chat rooms / Collaborate on editing of 
Wiki Posts 
125 Vote Down: Indicate whether questions and answers are not useful 
200 Reduce ads visible on SO to user  
250 View and cast close and reopen votes 
500 Access review queues 
1,000 Established User: See vote counts / Create gallery chat rooms only 
available to some 
1,500 Create tags for site 
2,000 Edits to any question and answer are applied immediately (without moderator 
approval) 
2,500 Create tag synonyms to reduce tag proliferation 
3,000 Help decide which posts are off-topic or duplicates 
5,000 Approve tag wikis made by regular users 
10,000 Access moderator tools (e.g., reports, delete questions, reviews) 
15,000 Mark questions as protected 
20,000 Trusted User: expanded editing, deleting and undeleting privileges 
25,000 Access to internal and Google site analytics 
Note: The table is populated from information found at https://stackoverflow.com/help/privileges?tab=all. 
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Table 3.2: Description of Stack Overflow’s Reputation System  
Reputation Gains Reputation Losses 
Question is voted up: +5 Question is voted down: -2 
Answer is voted up: +10 Answer is voted down: -2 
Answer is marked as “accepted”: +15 (+2 to acceptor) Downvoting: -1 
Suggested edit is accepted: +2 (up to +1,000 per user) Placing a bounty on a question: - bounty amount  
Awarded a bounty: + full bounty amount Post receives 6 spam or offensive flags: -100 
Site association bonus: +100 (one time for each site)   
Notes:  
1. Chart adapted from information provided at https://stackoverflow.com/help/whats-reputation. 
2. Members can earn a maximum of 200 reputation points per day through upvotes, downvotes, and suggested 
edits. Other types of activities (e.g., bounties) are not subject to this reputation cap.  
3. Reversal of votes reverse reputation points (e.g., if a member de-selects an upvote, the points the other 
member earned will be deducted at the end of the day).  
4. Members do not earn points from accepting their own answers to their questions.  
5. Bounties are tools used by members to draw attention to their questions. A bounty is a non-refundable 
amount of a member’s reputation points that they offer for an answer to their question. A bounty period last 
for a minimum of one day and a maximum of seven days. After the seventh day if an answer is not selected 
as the accepted answer, then the answer with the highest votes will be awarded the bounty. More 
information on bounties can be found at https://stackoverflow.com/help/bounty.  
6. Different levels of reputation points unlock site privileges. See Table 1 for a full list of privileges that are 
tied to reputation points.  
 
Although Stack Exchange reputation rankings are not associated with any traditional 
material gains (e.g., monetary compensation), some companies report stack overflow reputation 
as being a helpful criterion for job selection (Johnson 2013), and reputations arguably hold 
psychological value for members. Stack Exchange Meta Community message boards (sites 
where members post and answer questions about the functionality and rules of the Stack 
Overflow site) reveal that these reputations are important and well attended-to by community 
members. The reputation tag is one of the most popular tags on the Stack exchange Meta site, 
with over 3,800 questions devoted to the topic. One of the subtopics of interest is how to prevent 
community members from “cheating” to gain undeserved reputation points. For example, 
community members express concern for behaviors such as strategically downvoting all answers 
on a thread that compete with a participant’s own answer. Other behaviors that are of concern 
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include repeatedly posting low quality answers as first posts to a thread to increase the likelihood 
that they are viewed and rudely answering and commenting on answers to gain attention and 
receive upvotes. The community labels these practices as “rep-farming.” These practices are 
viewed with great disdain by the site’s members and several threads on the meta sites are 
devoted to ameliorating these practices.  
Rep-farming is an example of behaviors that are uncooperative for the site’s functioning 
and ultimate goal (to maintain a high caliber, open-source knowledge community). To limit 
uncooperative behaviors and maintain high levels of quality, the site’s founders introduced a 
“penalty box” to sanction members for performing uncooperative behaviors (Atwood, 2009).  
The penalty box on Stack Exchange operates in a manner similar to a penalty box in hockey. 
Members are “put on a time out” for an amount of time that is commensurate with their level of 
violations (determined by the site’s moderators). Offenses that can put users in the penalty box 
include: disruptive behavior such as voting irregularities, intentionally spamming the community 
on repeated occasions, repeatedly disregarding community norms, trolling, and generally bad 
community behavior (Atwood 2009). Stack Overflow refers to penalty box events as periods of 
suspension. While suspended, users’ reputations are set to 1. They cannot post questions, 
answers, or comments and they do not have the ability to gain reputation. Although Stack 
Exchange does not have a “hall of shame” where information on who is suspended is easily 
accessible and publicly displayed, it is possible to see this information by querying a public 
sequel database that records which individuals are suspended at any given moment.  
Several features of this context make Stack Overflow an attractive dataset to test 
hypotheses surrounding the effects of reputation rankings in systems of cooperation. First, Stack 
Overflow explicitly uses the reputation ranking system to motivate cooperative behavior form its 
 81 
 
site members (Atwood 2008). Similar to sales rankings, leader boards, badge and reputation 
systems used in many organizations to motivate higher levels of productivity and other forms of 
cooperative behavior in organizations (Cappelli 2009, Mollick and Rothbard 2014, Webster and 
Wing-Fai 2017), Stack Overflow created the reputation ranking system to recognize members for 
their cooperative contributions to the site. Furthermore, the digitized nature of the Stack 
Overflow setting provides complete and accurate records of members’ daily changes in 
reputation. The completeness of reputation assessments and members’ cooperative behaviors are 
less reliably inferred from non-digitized contexts, which may rely on biased or inaccurate 
assessments made by supervisors or other organizational members (Moon et al. 2016). Jointly, 
these two features allow me to reliably examine how individuals’ movements in a reputation 
ranking affect the amount of cooperative contributions they make on the site. Put simply, with 
these complete records I am able to more accurately assess whether reputation rankings 
accomplish what they intend to—motivate continued cooperative contributions over time.  
Second, Stack Overflow systematically records and penalizes uncooperative behaviors. 
Uncooperative and or unethical behaviors tend to be difficult to record or infer in field research 
and therefore tend to be assessed through anonymous surveys and or experiments—both of 
which have their limitations. Surveys may suffer from the underreporting of uncooperative 
behaviors and laboratory experiments are often devoid of the consequences that occur in actual 
organizations. Accordingly, this context is advantageous for examining whether and how 
reputation rankings incite uncooperative behaviors because it features accurate and complete 
records of individuals’ actual uncooperative behaviors inside an organization.  
Third, the longitudinal nature of the dataset facilitates the examination of members’ 
behaviors over time. Hence, it permits me to examine trends in individuals’ contributions in 
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response to periodic movements through a reputation ranking. As opposed to other studies of 
cheating and deceptive behavior in response to a change in rank position which examine one 
single decision that is in the form of a tradeoff—enacting either cooperative or uncooperative 
behaviors (e.g., Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit et al. 2016, Vriend et al. 2016) the nature of this data 
permits me to both examine simultaneous and repeated opportunities for cooperative and 
uncooperative behaviors. An analysis of which can offer additional insights into the joint effects 
of rankings on both cooperative and uncooperative behaviors over time.   
Sampling Procedure  
 The sampling frame for this study includes all Stack Overflow members whose data 
appeared in Stack Overflow’s public release of data in June 2017. The data for these users spans 
the time frame of August 1, 2008 through June 15, 2017. This data was then matched with non-
public data received from the Stack Exchange Company that included daily changes in 
reputation and information about suspension events. All data was de-identified prior to analysis. 
The public data release contained records of 3,454,985 unique individuals who had contributed 
at least one question or answer during their tenure.
16
 These individuals were matched with 64 
million records of reputation changes. Of these individuals, 2,520,088 were excluded because 
they had less than two reputation changes during their tenure, leaving a total of 934,897 
individuals. These individuals were matched with 10,164 records of suspension. Ten percent of 
individuals were suspended more than once, with a maximum of 24 entries.  
The nature of these data creates two problems for analysis that must be addressed. First, 
relative to the number of members in a community, suspension constitutes a “rare” event. In 
cases where the positive outcomes (ones) are significantly fewer than the negative case (zeros), 
                                                          
16 Stack Overflow has a much larger number of community members who are registered to use the site (e.g., over 5 million 
registered users as of January 2017). However, a large portion of these registered members do not post questions or answers to 
the site. This study is confined to active users.  
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logistic regression coefficients can be biased (King and Zeng 2001). Second, the size of the data 
makes computation costly. Even collapsing these individuals’ behaviors at the week level 
(compared to daily accounts) significantly increases the computational power required for 
variable construction. Both of these potential problems can be addressed by adopting a choice-
based or case-control based sampling procedure (King and Zeng 2001). This procedure preserves 
all positive outcomes (ones) and randomly draws from all non-positive outcomes (zeros) to fill in 
the sample. Using this method, I formed a sample that included all individuals who entered the 
penalty box at least one time (n=6,301), and then randomly sampled from individuals who never 
entered the penalty box to fill in the sample (n=6,301). Individuals’ behaviors are examined at 
the level of the week. I am concerned with measuring how changes in reputation affect 
cooperative and uncooperative behaviors over time. Therefore, I constructed a panel dataset with 
individual-week as the unit of analysis. The panel is unbalanced. Individuals enter the dataset 
with their first record of a change in reputation. Tables 3.3-3.7 show the distributions of 
observations based on milestone rank. Actors are in a milestone rank category if they are at risk 
of achieving that milestone rank. For example, category M1 consists of all observations where an 
actor has not yet reached milestone rank M1.  
Examining the distribution of observations of actors occupying different ranks, one 
outlier rank is highly visible (10% of the way to the first milestone). When actors first enter the 
dataset they start at one reputation point, which is 10% toward the first milestone. Since this 
point likely reflects actors’ beginning reputation points, I drop this category from the analysis 
(n=702,935). Similarly, I drop observations that are at the very top of the ranking—those who 
have exceeded the final milestone because these actors are not at risk of gaining a milestone rank 
(n=20,190). For a comparison of the distribution of observations by percent of milestone rank 
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achieved see Figures 3.1 and 3.2. This resulted in a final sample of 8,514 individuals and 
1,281,811 individual-week observations. On average, there are 225 observations (weeks) per 
individual. 
Figure 3.1: Frequency of Observations at Percent of the Way to the Next Milestone on Original Sample  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of Observations at Percent of the Way to the Next Milestone after Removing 
Bottom and Top Milestones Categories  
 
Notes for Figures 3.1 & 3.2:  
1. “M” Stands for Ranking Milestone Level. Actors receive significant new privileges at each milestone.  
2. All observations of actors at risk of achieving rank milestone 1 were eliminated due to an outlier of observations 
clustered at a reputation of 1 (10% of the way to the first milestone). This is the reputation people start with.  
3. All observations of actors that exceeded the final rank milestone 5 were eliminated because there is no more 
ranking milestone to achieve.  
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Table 3.3: Number of Observations in Each Milestone  
Milestone Category M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Reputation <10 >=10  
 <200 
>=200  
<1,000 
>=1,000  
< 20,000 
>=20,000  
<25,000 
>25,000 
Number of 
Observations 
702,935 476,523 413,896 384,787 6,605 20,190 
 
 
Table 3.4: Number of Observations of Suspensions in Each Milestone Rank 
Milestone Category M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Reputation <10 >=10  
 <200 
>=200 
<1,000 
>=1,000  
< 20,000 
>=20,000 
<25,000 
>25,000 
Number of 
Observations 
703 1,898 2,695 1,527 15 76 
 
 
Table 3.5: Number of Observations with High Risk of Proximity Gain (10%) in Each Milestone Rank  
Milestone Category M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Reputation <10 >=10  
 <200 
>=200 
<1,000 
>=1,000  
< 20,000 
>=20,000 
<25,000 
>25,000 
Number of 
Observations 90-100% 
of Next Milestone 
43,307 117,711 116,651 26,989 2,393 --- 
Number of 
Observations 50-89% 
6,805 20,131 19,213 3,062 567 --- 
 
 
Table 3.6: Number of Observations with High Risk of Proximity Loss (10%) in Each Milestone Rank  
Milestone Category M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Reputation <10 >=10  
<200 
>=200 
<1,000 
>=1,000  
< 20,000 
>=20,000 
<25,000 
>25,000 
Number of 
Observations 
0%-10% of Next 
Milestone 
--- 204,521 223,190 132,089 2,863 --- 
Number of 
Observations 11%-
49% of Next 
Milestone 
--- 134,160 54,842 222,647 782 --- 
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Table 3.7: Number of Observations with Reputation Changes (From Week to Week) 
Milestone Category M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Number of 
Observations Same 
700,415 470,554 402,286 338,539 3,315  
Number of 
Observations Gain 
2,382 5,470 10,687 44,889 3,246  
Number of 
Observations Loss 
138 499 923 1,359 44  
 
MEASURES 
Dependent Variables. There are two main dependent variables in my dataset: 1) count of 
cooperative behaviors, and 2) count of uncooperative behaviors. Both are calculated at the level 
of a week. Cooperative behavior is defined as any behavior that the group under study defines as 
appropriate, group-enhancing behavior. At Stack Overflow, cooperative behavior is defined as 
the posting of genuine questions and answers to the website. Accordingly, I operationalize 
Cooperative behavior as the total number of question and answer posts for a given individual in 
week t. To examine whether changes in reputation lead to uncooperative behaviors, I defined my 
second dependent variable, Uncooperative behaviors, as a binary variable that took the value of 
1 if an individual was suspended for a negative reason in week t.  In my data, individuals were 
suspended for one of 6 reasons: 1) Failure to learn over time (e.g., continually asking 
programming specific questions in a meta forum site, the purpose of which is to discuss 
community improvements), 2) Voting irregularities (e.g., strategically downvoting a 
competitor’s answer), 3) Promoting oneself (e.g., spamming the site with promotional ads), 4) 
Plagiarism (e.g., stealing someone else’s answer and posting it as one’s own to answer a similar 
question), 5) A need to cool down (e.g., individual often posts negative, disruptive comments 
that spark anger and discontent), and 6) Network-wide suspension (e.g., as determined by site 
moderators when behavior is bad enough to warrant a suspension across all Stack Exchange 
communities). I count all but the first reason (failure to learn over time), as a negative reason for 
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suspension. Of the 10,614 suspension events, 93.13% qualify as negative reasons, and 3.32% 
were missing a reason. This resulted in a final set of 9,539 suspension events. Figure 3.3 displays 
the percent of suspension events by reason. Figure 3.4 displays the distribution of these events 
over the years 2009-2017 (by quarter-year). Table 3.8 lists all constructs, variables, and their 
operationalizations.    
 
 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Reasons for Suspension  
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Figure 3.4: Number of Suspension Events by Quarter-Year (Q1-2009-Q2-2017) 
 
Independent Variables. In this study, I am interested in capturing how movements through a 
ranking affect rates of cooperative and uncooperative behavior. I operationalize the pressures 
associated with these movements in three ways. First, I calculate a continuous measure of the 
percent of the way the actor is to achieving the next milestone rank. Percent of next milestone 
rank achieved, is calculated as the percent of reputation points that are needed to achieve the 
next milestone ranking that an actor has earned. This measure restarts at 0% once the actor is in a 
new milestone rank category. Second, I created a measure that reflects whether an actor is close 
to achieving the next milestone rank. Proximity to gain is a dichotomous variable where 1=the 
individual is 90% or more of the way to achieving the next milestone rank and 0=the individual 
is less than 90%, but more than 50% of the way there. Third, I created a measure that reflects 
when an actor is close to losing their current milestone rank. Proximity to loss is a dichotomous 
variable where 1=the individual is only 10% or less above a milestone rank and 0=the individual 
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is greater than 10%, but less than 50% of the way to the next milestone.
17
 In operationalizing 
these variables I made the assumption that individuals are more focused on a potential gain in 
rank when they are above 50% of the way toward the next ranking threshold and are more 
focused on a potential loss when they are below 50% of the way to the next ranking threshold 
(see Figure 3.5 for a visualization of the measures).   
 
Figure 3.5: Visualization of Measures that Calculate Proximity to Rank Gains and Losses  
 
 
 Hypothesis 3 compares individuals who are more prone to uncooperative behavior (i.e., 
individuals who are more susceptible to ranking threshold pressures) with individuals who never 
exhibit uncooperative behaviors. Individuals who had an inclination toward uncooperative 
behavior were represented by an indicator variable: 1=was suspended at some point during their 
tenure.  
I include controls that may influence the rate of cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. 
Amount of recognition from peers, Count of upvotes received during a given week, could be 
associated with increases in both cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. Recognition could 
increase confidence, which could lead to increases in cooperative behaviors or overconfidence, 
which could lead to increases in uncooperative behaviors. Similarly, both constructs could be 
                                                          
17
 As robustness checks I examined proximity to a gain at 20% and 30% proximity to the rankings. I also examined 
the predictors of logged reputation point total and a “gain mindset” (>=50%) vs. “loss mindset” (<50%). Results are 
mixed, suggesting that the effect is not uniform within categories (see appendix for these additional models).  
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associated with being called out by peers for low quality, Count of downvotes received during a 
given week. Lack of recognition could increase rates of both cooperative and uncooperative 
behaviors. Individuals could increase cooperative behaviors to prove others wrong, or turn to 
uncooperative behaviors out of frustration when they have not been recognized. More recent 
posting activity could indicate higher motivations to move up in the ranking, which could in turn 
be associated with increases in both cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. Days Since Last 
Activity is measured as the number of days since the last post, calculated during the final day for 
week t-1.  Last, I include a control for the amount of time an individual has been a member on 
the site, which could be associated with familiarity with community norms and experience with 
posting. Tenure on Site is measured as the number of days between the individual’s account 
origination date and the last date in week t-1.  
Analytical Strategy 
 Two model specifications were used to explore how movements through rankings are 
associated with rates of cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. Given the longitudinal nature 
of the date and the fact that cooperative behavior is measured as a count of posts which takes 
only non-negative integer values, I first used a panel poisson regression model (xtpoisson) with 
fixed effects for the individual. The number of cooperative behaviors is highly skewed. Count 
data is often highly skewed, making poission models the standard approach for analyzing panel 
count data (Allison 2009; Ferguson et al. 2016; Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008).  For 
hypotheses that examined the occurrence of uncooperative behavior I used a panel logistic 
regression model (xtlogit). All models used actor fixed effects, which accounts for any 
unobserved heterogeneity between actors by calculating within-actor estimates for the 
coefficients (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984).    
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Table 3.8: Description of Constructs and Variables in Chapter 3 
Construct Variable Definition Level 
Cooperative Behavior 
(DV)  
Count of posts  Count of questions and answers in week t Week 
Uncooperative 
Behavior (DV)  
Suspension occurred in 
week  
1=suspension started in week t Week 
Proximity to Gain Percent of next 
milestone rank achieved 
Calculates the percent of the way the actor 
is to their next ranking milestone. This 
continuous measure restarts at 0% when 
the actor is at a new milestone. The 
measure varies from 0 to 99.99 and is 
calculated for week t-1.  
Week  
Proximity to Gain-2    Proximity to gain  1=10% or less to go to ranking threshold 
(i.e., earned 90% or more of the points 
needed to get to next ranking threshold) in 
week t-1   
Week  
Proximity to Loss  Proximity to loss  1=10% or less to go to dip below last 
earned ranking threshold (i.e., at max 10% 
of the way to the next ranking threshold) 
in week t-1   
Week 
Inclination Toward 
Uncooperative 
Behavior 
Will eventually exhibit 
uncooperative behavior  
1=exhibits uncooperative behavior at least 
once during tenure on the site 
Individual 
Severity of Offense  Days suspended Number of days listed for suspension at 
time suspension began 
Week 
Time Period After 
Sanction  
Time period occurs 
after suspension ends 
1=observation occurred after suspension 
ends 
Week  
Controls    
Total Activity  Total activity  Count of total cooperative and 
uncooperative events in week t-1 
Week 
Recency of Activity   Days since last active  Count of days since last posted on the site 
based on the last date in week t-1 
Week 
Experience with Site Tenure on site Count of days since joining the site based 
on the last date in week t-1 
Week 
Recognized for High 
Quality Contributions  
Count of Upvotes 
Received 
Count of upvotes received from other site 
members in week t-1  
Week 
Called Out for Low 
Quality Contributions  
Count of Downvotes 
Received  
Count of downvotes received from other 
site members in week t-1 
Week  
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RESULTS  
Table 3.9 displays descriptive statistics separated by whether the actor was eventually 
suspended. On average actors across the two sub-samples had the same level of site tenure 
(around 2.45 years), but actors who were at some point suspended in their tenure were on 
average more active and had higher reputations. To offset this discrepancy, models that examine 
the likelihood of uncooperative behavior (suspension) control for total activity in the prior week. 
I operationalized pressures associated with a potential gain in rank in two ways: 1) as the percent 
of the next rank that has been earned (0-100%) and 2) whether the actor is at least 90% of the 
way to the next rank. I will first discuss the effects associated with potential gains in rank and 
then will discuss the effects associated with potential losses in rank.  
Table 3.10 displays results for models that examine ranking pressures as the percent of 
the next milestone rank that is achieved (a continuous measure from 0 to 99.9%). Table 3.11 
displays results for models that examine ranking pressures as being at least 90% of the way to a 
gain in rank (referred to as “proximity to gain”). As would be expected, receiving upvotes—
public recognition of a job well done—is positively associated with more future cooperative 
behaviors and negatively associated with uncooperative behaviors (suspension). Interestingly, 
receiving downvotes is positively associated with both cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. 
Across all models, longer stretches of inactivity are associated with lower rates of both 
cooperative and uncooperative behaviors, suggesting that total activity influences both 
cooperative and uncooperative behavior. In fact, Model 2 (Table 3.10) and Model 6a (Table 
3.11) both show that total activity in the prior week is associated with a higher likelihood of 
suspension.  
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Table 3.9: Summary Statistics for Chapter 3 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Actors who were never suspended  981,214     
   Count of Cooperative Behaviors   987,750 0.156 1.297 0 154 
   Reputation  986,677 584.763 4651.352 0 >25,000
*
 
   Percent of Next Milestone Earned  977,949 20.356 21.864 0 99.995 
   Proximity to Rank Gain   131,510 0.132 0.334 0 1 
   Proximity to Rank Loss  345,344 0.423 0.494 0 1 
   Count of Upvotes Received    981,214 0.397 2.779 0 302 
   Count of Downvotes Received   981,214 0.018 0.2016 0 31 
   Days Since Last Active    981,214 381.116 452.552 0 3134 
   Tenure on Site (days) 981,214 897.940 640.408 0 >2,000
*
 
   Total Activity  981,214 0.153 1.298 0 154 
      
Actors who were suspended at some 
point in their tenure                
1,011,214     
   Count of Cooperative Behaviors   1,017,186 0.856 4.111 0 234 
   Suspension event in a given week  1,017,186 0.007 0.082 0 1 
   Reputation  1,016,331 2591.775 13,308.09 0 >25,000
*
 
   Percent of Next Milestone Earned  994,431 28.165 26.919 0 99.989 
   Proximity to Rank Gain   222,883 0.144 0.351 0 1 
   Proximity to Rank Loss  623,415 0.314 0.464 0 1 
   Count of Upvotes Received     1,011,214 1.797 9.672 0 677 
   Count of Downvotes Received   1,011,214 0.114 0.606 0 67 
   Days Since Last Active    1,011,214 190.769 299.658 0 2423 
   Tenure on Site (days) 1,011,214 867.676 599.562 0 >2,000
*
 
   Total Activity 1,011,214 0.864 4.125 0 234 
   Obs. Occurred Suspension Finished 1,017,186 0.630 0.483 0 1 
Notes:  
1. (*) To preserve the anonymity of Stack Overflow’s members, the maximum values for reputation and tenure on 
the site are not reported.  
2. Summary statistics are for the full sample (before milestone categories M1 and M6 were eliminated).  
3. Unit of analysis is actor-week  
4. All independent variables are lagged  
5. Proximity to Rank Gain values are only calculated for rank percentages above 49%--when it is assumed that 
this pressure will be more pronounced than a pressure of a loss, 1=90% or more of the way to the next ranking 
threshold.  
6. Proximity to Rank Loss values are only calculated for rank percentages below 50%--when it is assumed that 
this pressure will be more pronounced than a pressure of a gain, 1=10% or less of the way to the next ranking 
threshold. 
 
  
Hypothesis 1a predicts that potential rank gains will be associated with increases in 
cooperative behavior. I do not find support for this hypothesis with either operationalization of 
potential rank gains. There is no significant effect of percent of the next milestone rank that is 
achieved on cooperative behavior (Model 1, Table 3.10) and proximity to a rank gain (being at 
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least 90% of the way to the next rank) is associated with a slight decrease in cooperative 
behavior (Model 5a, Table 3.11). Given all other variables are held constant, actors that are close 
to a rank gain are expected to have an incident rate of only 0.892 times as great as actors that are 
not close. From these results it would appear as if rankings do not positively influence rates of 
cooperation. Supplemental analyses reveal that there are significant positive effects associated 
with movements through the ranking, but that these depend on how high actors are in the overall 
ranking (across all milestone categories). Figure 3.6 displays a descriptive plot of the frequency 
of cooperative behaviors by the percent of next milestone rank that is achieved. From a visual 
assessment of the relationship between ranking category and cooperation it appears that actors at 
risk of achieving the 2
rd
 and 3
rd
 milestones cooperate more in response to increases in the percent 
of rank achieved toward the next milestone.  
Figure 3.6: Frequency of Cooperative Behaviors by the Percent of Next Milestone Rank Achieved  
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Supplemental analyses find some support for this impression (see Appendix). Controlling 
for all other factors, the negative effect of percent of rank achieved on cooperative behavior is 
less pronounced in higher areas of the ranking (e.g., milestones 3-5), compared with lower 
categories in the ranking (milestone 2). Additional supplemental analyses show that a gain 
mindset (e.g., being at least 50% of the way toward the next threshold) as compared to a loss 
mindset is associated with both higher rates of cooperative and uncooperative behavior (see 
Appendix). Ultimately, this shows that while actors are in different subsets of the ranking, they 
may experience different pressures and react differently than they did in other subsets of the 
ranking. 
Figure 3.7: Marginal Effects of Category Membership and the Effect of Percent of Next Milestone 
Achieved on Rates of Cooperative Behavior 
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Figure 3.8: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Logged Reputation Points for All Milestone Ranks 
 
 
Hypothesis 1b predicts that potential rank gains will be associated with increases in 
uncooperative behavior.  I find support for this hypothesis with the operationalization of ranking 
pressures as the percent of next rank that is earned (Model 2, Table 3.10).  If an actor were to 
increase his rank by one percentage point, his incident rate ratio for suspension would increase 
by a factor of 1.004, with everything else held constant. However, there is no significant 
relationship between an actor being at least 90% of the way to the nearest rank and suspension 
(Model 6a, Table 3.11). Jointly this may suggest that more incremental movements forward in a 
ranking create pressures that lead to increases in uncooperative behaviors, rather than just 
nearness to a gain in rank.  
Hypothesis 2a predicts that proximity to a loss in rank will be associated with increases in 
cooperative behaviors. Compared with actors that are higher than 10% of the way from the most 
recently earned rank, actors that are at risk of a loss in rank are expected to have an incident rate 
1.21 times greater for cooperative behavior, all other factors held constant. Hence, I find strong 
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support for hypothesis 2a; threats of loss in rank are associated with higher rates of cooperative 
behavior. Interestingly, I do not find support for hypothesis 2b. I find that the proximity to a loss 
in rank is associated with a decrease in the likelihood that an actor will be suspended. Compared 
with actors that are further than 10% of the way from the most recently earned rank, actors that 
are closer to a loss in rank are 18% less likely to be suspended (Model 6b, Table 3.11). This 
result is inconsistent with prior research, which reports that actors will be likely to cheat to avoid 
a status loss even when they are provided with an alternative, legitimate option to increase their 
position (e.g., Pettit et al. 2016). My findings suggest the opposite effect—that actors would be 
more likely to exhibit cooperative behaviors to avoid a loss.  
To test hypothesis 3a, I compare the effect of potential rank gains on the rates of 
cooperation for actors that are never suspended to those who are at some point suspended in their 
tenure (i.e., they are more prone to uncooperative behavior)
18
. Hypothesis 3a predicts that actors 
who are more prone to uncooperative behavior will display higher average rates of cooperative 
behavior in response to potential gains in rank. I find support for this hypothesis across both 
operationalizations of potential gains in rank. The percent earned to the nearest rank is associated 
with a slight decrease in cooperative behaviors for those who do not enter the penalty box        
(β= -0.001, p<0.001), but is associated with a slight increase in cooperative behaviors for those 
who eventually enter the penalty box (β= 0.001, p<0.001) (Model 3a, Table 3.10).19 The 
operationalization of potential rank gains as at least 90% of the way toward a rank gain shows a 
similar trend. Although both proximity to a gain is negatively associated with cooperative 
behaviors for both actors that are eventually suspended and actors that are never suspended,   this 
effect is lower in degree for actors that are more prone to uncooperative behavior (β= -0.098, 
                                                          
18 Models that examine hypotheses 3a&3b only examine actors’ behavior before their first suspension period.  
19 While these differences are small, coefficients from these models are statistically significantly different (X2= 76.882, p<0.001).  
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p<0.001 vs. β= -0.142, p<0.001)  (Models 7a and 7b, Table 3.11). These findings suggest that 
actors that are more prone to uncooperative behaviors are on average just as cooperative, if not 
slightly more cooperative than actors that are never suspended.  
 
Table 3.10: Likelihood of Behavior by Percent of Milestone Rank Achieved   
 Model 1:  
Count of 
cooperative 
behaviors 
Model 2: 
Likelihood of 
suspension 
Model 3a:  
Count of coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 3b:  
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who 
are eventually 
suspended 
Perc. of Milestone Rank Achieved 0.000 0.004** -0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.00) 
Milestone Category 3 0.320*** 0.821*** 0.145*** 0.547*** 
 (0.007) (0.066) (0.012) (0.012) 
Milestone Category 4 0.343*** 1.144*** 0.018 0.641*** 
 (0.009) (0.105) (0.019) (0.017) 
Milestone Category 5 0.304*** 0.639 0.019 0.669*** 
 (0.014) (0.463) (0.033) (0.030) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.021*** -0.023*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Received 0.080*** 0.156*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) 
Days Since Last Active -0.013*** -0.0133*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) 
Tenure on Site -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000) 
Total Activity  0.089***   
  (0.004)   
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,083,199 670,559 418,298 98,811 
Number of Actors 7,718 5,149 2,610 2,562 
Notes:  
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. Model 1 reports results from a Panel Poisson Regression model with actor fixed effects. Model 2 reports results 
from a Panel Logistic Regression model with actor fixed effects.  
4. All independent variables are lagged (calculated at week t-1).  
5. All observations that occurred before the first milestone was reached were eliminated from the sample due to an 
outlier rank (see Figure 3.1 Percent of Way to Next Milestone).  
6. All observations that occurred after the final milestone was reached were eliminated from the sample. A 
plausible denominator to construct the percent ranking measure could not be determined.   
7. All observations in which individuals were suspended in week t-1 were dropped because individuals cannot 
accrue reputation points while they are suspended box (n=145,041). 
8. The comparison category for milestone rank category is milestone category 2.   
9. Model 3b examines the behavior of actors that were suspended in the time period before their first entry.  
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Hypothesis 3b predicts that actors who are more prone to uncooperative behavior will 
cooperate more in response to potential losses in rankings than actors who never exhibit 
uncooperative behaviors.  I do not find support for this hypothesis. Instead, I find that actors that 
are never suspended are much more likely to cooperate in response to potential losses in rank 
than those who are more prone to uncooperative behaviors (β=0.256, p<0.001 vs. β=0.066, 
p<0.001) (Models 7c and 7d, Table 3.11).   
Last, hypothesis 4 predicts that actors that were suspended will be exhibit higher rates of 
cooperation after their suspension to make up for their past uncooperative behaviors. I find the 
opposite to be the case (see Table 3.12). Suspension is associated with an incident rate of 
cooperating that is 33% lower than rates of cooperation prior to the suspension.  
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Table 3.11: Effects of High Proximity to Gaining or Losing Milestone Ranks  
 Model 5a: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
Model 5b: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
Model 6a: 
Likelihood 
of 
suspension 
Model 6b: 
Likelihood 
of 
suspension 
Model 7a: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 7b: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
eventually 
suspended 
Model 7c: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 7d: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
eventually 
suspended 
Proximity to Gain  -0.114***  0.142  -0.142*** -0.098***   
 (0.009)  (0.113)  (0.022) (0.021)   
Proximity to Loss   0.187***  -0.187***   0.256*** 0.066*** 
  (0.005)  (0.061)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Milestone Category 3 0.996*** 0.353*** 1.090*** 0.760*** 0.982*** 1.046*** 0.095*** 0.664*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.134) (0.090) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.003) 
Milestone Category 4 1.859*** 0.067*** 1.113*** 1.011*** 1.863*** 1.732*** -0.338*** 0.431*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.224) (0.139) (0.040) (0.036) (0.024) (0.022) 
Milestone Category 5 1.923*** -0.209*** 0.313 -0.183 1.892*** 1.909*** -0.424*** 0.150*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.777) (0.732) (0.058) (0.053) (0.044) (0.045) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.013*** 0.026*** -0.021* -0.022*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Rec. 0.0449*** 0.0821*** 0.129*** 0.161*** 0.0483*** 0.032*** 0.056*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) 
Days Since Last Active -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.00) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Tenure on Site -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Activity   0.095*** 0.087***     
   (0.011) (0.005)     
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 242,710 792,011 79,382 398,069 82,931 23,597 308,160 72,793 
Number of Actors  4,254 6,945 1,400 3,616 1,093 1,199 2,301 2,137 
 
Notes:  
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Notes Continued from Table 3.11:  
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. All models use Panel Poisson Regression with actor fixed effects.  
4. All independent variables are lagged (calculated at week t-1).  
5. Proximity to Rank Loss does not have any values in before the first milestone is achieved because there is 
no risk of losing any privileges once actors are in the lowest stage of rank.  
6. All observations in which individuals were suspended in week t-1 were dropped because individuals cannot 
accrue reputation points while in the penalty box.  
7. Proximity to Rank Loss does not have any values in before the first milestone is achieved because there is 
no risk of losing any privileges once actors are in the lowest stage of rank.  
8. Models 3b and 3d examine the behavior of actors that were more prone to uncooperative behavior in the 
time period before their first suspension.   
9. Wald tests confirm that the coefficients across models are statistically significantly different.  
 
 
 
Table 3.12: Comparing Rates of Cooperation Pre and Post Suspension   
 Model 4: 
Count of coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who are 
eventually 
suspended 
Post Suspension  -0.400*** 
 (0.006) 
Milestone Category 3 0.460*** 
 (0.008) 
Milestone Category 4 0.565*** 
 (0.010) 
Milestone Category 5 0.518*** 
 (0.014) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.020*** 
 (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Received 0.077*** 
 (0.001) 
Days Since Last Active -0.015*** 
 (0.00) 
Tenure on Site -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes 
Number of Observations 664,903 
Number of Actors 5,108 
 
Notes for Table 3.12:  
 
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. Model uses Panel Poisson Regression with actor fixed effects.  
4. All observations in which individuals were in the penalty box in week t-1 were dropped because 
individuals cannot accrue reputation points while they are suspended.   
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DISCUSSION 
 Scholars have long considered rankings to be powerful drivers of cooperative behavior 
(e.g., Thibault and Kelley 1959; Blau 1968; Tai, Narayanan, and McAllister 2012). Rankings and 
other forms of social hierarchy act as cognitive shortcuts, which allow groups to reward 
cooperative behavior and sanction uncooperative behavior (Baker and Bulkley 2014). However, 
rankings may also have a dark side. Recent research shows that pressures associated with 
potential gains or losses in rank can lead to increases in uncooperative behaviors such as 
cheating and deception (Pettit et al. 2016; Vriend et al. 2016). Negative behaviors such as these 
may undermine the legitimacy of rankings and trigger negative behaviors in others. Hence, 
multiple scholars have called for more research that helps determine when rankings are 
beneficial or harmful for efforts to achieve cooperation (Anderson and Brown 2010; Anderson 
and Willer 2014; Pettit et al. 2016; Simpson and Willer 2015).  
This study seeks to answer this call by relaxing the assumption that actors are making 
tradeoffs between cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. This allows me to explore whether 
actors that exhibit uncooperative behaviors also exhibit higher rates of cooperative behaviors 
than actors who always “play by the rules”. In other words, it explores whether rankings produce 
a “net-positive” effect for systems. A finding to this effect may suggest that organizations could 
tolerate the dark side of rankings to realize the full measure of their cooperation-enhancing 
effects. By exploring how everyday movements through a ranking create psychological pressures 
that sometimes trigger uncooperative behavior, this study examines reputation rankings as an 
endogenous perturbation to the system of cooperation. By examining a large sample of actors 
over extended periods of time in their actual organization, it seeks to identify how pervasive 
uncooperative behaviors are and whether they may be offset by the cooperation enhancing 
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effects of rankings. Ultimately, it seeks to understand whether uncooperative behaviors may be a 
tolerable byproduct of a robust system of cooperation, or one that managers must actively seek to 
eliminate.  
Determining whether uncooperative behaviors such as cheating can be a symptom of a 
robust system of cooperation can make contributions to both theory and practice. Theoretically it 
advances our understanding of whether rankings are ultimately helpful or harmful for 
maintaining cooperation. In practice it helps inform debate surrounding the use of rankings as 
performance appraisal systems inside organizations. Some organizations (e.g., Amazon and GE) 
are actively working to eliminate rankings systems in an effort to improve organizational 
cultures (Cappelli and Tavis 2016). This study helps us better understand whether active effort to 
remove rankings is an effective strategy or a case of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”   
Are movements in rankings associated with increases in uncooperative behavior? I find 
evidence that this may be the case. The higher an actor’s percent achieved toward the next 
milestone ranking, the higher the likelihood that they will be suspended. This is consistent with 
prior research that theorizes that rankings create a unidirectional drive upward (Festinger 1954), 
which increases pressures associated with performance (Garcia et al. 2006). Inconsistent with 
this same research, I do not find that this effect is heightened by the proximity to a gain or loss in 
rankings. High proximity to a gain in rank was not associated with increases in the likelihood of 
suspension and surprisingly proximity to a loss was associated with a decrease in the likelihood 
of suspension. This finding runs counter to recent findings that report higher rates of cheating in 
response to threats of status loss (e.g., Pettit et al. 2016). Contrary to Pettit et al.’s (2016) finding 
that actors prefer to cheat to avoid status loss, even when presented with an opportunity to avoid 
this loss by cooperating, I find that not only are actors less likely to enact uncooperative behavior 
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to preserve their ranking position, they are more likely to cooperate. I find that on average actors 
who have high proximity to a loss (less than 10% away from the most recently earned ranking), 
are more likely to cooperate than actors who are further ahead in the ranking. Jointly, these 
findings suggest that the potentially problematic outcomes associated with rankings are only 
associated with upward movements through the ranking.   
Uncooperative behaviors primarily become problematic for systems of cooperation when 
they detract from rates of cooperation. For example, the tragedy of the commons effect 
highlights how the absence of voluntary cooperative behaviors can erode a system of cooperation 
(Hardin 1982). Similarly, in the context of online communities and other organizations that 
subsist off voluntary contributions, a rise in uncooperative behaviors becomes problematic when 
it is at the expense of cooperative behaviors. If instead actors who respond to movements in 
ranking with uncooperative behaviors are also more likely to respond with cooperative 
behaviors, this may suggest that systems of cooperation can be robust to the negative 
externalities of ranking systems because actors’ cooperative behaviors outweigh their 
uncooperative behaviors. My findings find support for this line of theorizing. I find that actors 
who are more prone to uncooperative behaviors exhibited slightly higher rates of cooperation 
than actors who never exhibited uncooperative behaviors. Contrary to prior research that frames 
cooperative and uncooperative behaviors as tradeoffs (e.g., Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit et al. 2016; 
Vriend et al. 2016); this finding implies that actors do not necessarily think of cooperative and 
uncooperative behaviors as mutually exclusive options. Instead, actors may be inclined to exhibit 
both. From a system-level perspective this matters. Single acts can trigger a cascade of similar 
behaviors in others. Consequently, every cooperative act has the potential to matter a great deal 
for the maintenance of the system as a whole.  
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In this vein, it is interesting to think of the role sanctions play in the maintenance of 
cooperation. One of the mechanisms through which rankings help enhance cooperation is by 
facilitating the punishment of uncooperative behavior. Indeed, when group members have the 
opportunity to impose sanctions on non-cooperators the group often converges to perfect rates of 
cooperation (Fehr and Gachter 2000). Hence, some scholars describe punishment as the ultimate 
mechanism for sustaining cooperation (e.g., Boyd et al. 2010; Fehr and Gintis 2007; Putterman 
2010). However, these same scholars also recognize that it is often costly (either materially or 
socially) to punish other actors. Further, without coordinated efforts among punishers, 
punishment often fails as a mechanism to ensure cooperation (Janssen et al. 2010). The advent of 
more transparent rankings systems offers one way to counteract this problem—actors can police 
themselves. For example, in a field experiment Bernstein and Li (2017:13) find that employees 
who received transparent data about their performance were more likely to adjust their behavior 
on their own, which suggests that a transparent ranking can “act as a surrogate for managers.” 
Rankings that reflect past cooperative acts may produce similar results. Research in moral 
cleansing (e.g., Sachdeva, Illiev, and Medin 2009) suggests that actors that exercise 
uncooperative behaviors will perform cooperative behaviors to atone for these uncooperative 
behaviors and preserve their self-concept as a productive member of the community. I do not 
find evidence of moral cleansing in this context. On average actors that are more prone to 
uncooperative behaviors have much lower rates of cooperation once they re-enter the system 
after their suspension. This suggests that punishment may harbor an unforeseen consequence for 
the system—it could reduce the likelihood that these members return to their previously high 
levels of cooperation.         
Last, I examined the overall potential for a ranking to act as a cooperation-enhancing 
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mechanism. I do not find a general trend between gains in rank and increases in cooperative 
behaviors. Instead, I find that threats of loss in rank are the only strong predictors of cooperative 
behavior. At first glance, this appears to be inconsistent with prior research that extolls the 
cooperation-enhancing effects of rankings (e.g., Thibault and Kelly 1959; Tai, Narayanan, and 
McAllister 2012; Willer 2009). However, supplemental analyses revealed that this effect is 
present, but that it varies based on the overall ranking category. Overall, actors tended to exhibit 
higher rates of cooperation in response to increases in reputation when they are in the middle of 
the full ranking system, compared to the bottom and top of the rankings. This finding is 
consistent with the theory of middle-status-conformity (e.g., Phillips and Zuckerman 2001), 
which posits that actors in the middle of rankings are more likely to conform to standards of 
behavior to advance their positions within a hierarchy.  
In summary, these finding suggest that upward movements through rankings create 
pressures that increase the likelihood that actors will perform uncooperative behaviors, but that 
these pressures also increase the likelihood that these actors will perform cooperative behaviors. 
At the level of an individual this suggests that certain types of trajectories through rankings may 
make some actors more susceptible to the performance pressures associated with rankings. At the 
level of a system this suggests that systems of cooperation can be maintained even though 
rankings produce pressures that can perturb systems of cooperation. Ultimately uncooperative 
behaviors are not harbingers of failing systems of cooperation, but instead may be symptoms of 
robust cooperation.  
This study offers several contributions. First, it contributes to dynamic perspectives of 
rankings (e.g,, Brion and Anderson, 2013; Pettit et al. 2010; Pettit et al. 2016) by examining 
actors’ lifecycles in a ranking system. To date, most of the research that examines rankings from 
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a dynamic perspective occurs in a laboratory setting and examines behaviors for limited periods 
of time. In contrast, this study examines repeated observations of actors in their actual 
organizational setting, where pressures that arise from movements in the ranking may 
accumulate over time. This study focused on how the direction of movements (upward and 
downward) in rankings affected rates of cooperative and uncooperative behavior. Future research 
could focus on other types of movements and their implications for actors and systems of 
cooperation. For example, high frequency in movements may change how the direction of 
movement affects actors within rankings. This study showed that movements upward in a 
ranking may lead to increases in uncooperative behaviors. However, it is possible that frequent 
movements upward might provide actors with confidence that they will reach higher ranks and 
therein reduce performance comparison pressures and rates of uncooperative behavior.  
This study further contributes to dynamic perspectives of rankings by relaxing the 
assumption that actors face a tradeoff between cooperative and uncooperative behaviors (e.g., 
Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit et al. 2016; Vriend et al. 2016). Relaxing this assumption permits the 
examination of how movements through a ranking affect the likelihood that actors will 
simultaneously exhibit both types of behaviors
20
. In so doing, it offers insights into the net 
effects of rankings for systems of cooperation. It shows that the pressures that rankings produce 
may increase the likelihood of uncooperative behavior, but that they also increase the likelihood 
that actors will behave in ways that counteract this uncooperative behavior. With an eye toward 
                                                          
20 Discarding the tradeoff framework also illuminates another antecedent related to cooperation. Prior research often assumes that 
the inverse of cooperation is choosing to not cooperate (e.g., defecting from the norm of cooperation). This may limit the scope 
of studies of cooperation. A focus on cooperation as a tradeoff between cooperation and defection assumes that actors are aware 
of potential opportunities to cooperate. As a result of this assumption, the absence of cooperation may be interpreted as a choice 
to defect from norms of cooperation. However, it is conceivable that the absence of cooperation may instead be due to a lack of 
awareness of potential opportunities to cooperate. Under these conditions interventions to restore cooperation could vary greatly 
(e.g., creating awareness of opportunities versus reshaping responses to norms). Future research may benefit from examining 
cooperation as a two-stage model, wherein the first stage reflects an antecedent process that triggers a decision about cooperation 
(e.g., awareness of an opportunity or actively searching out an opportunity to cooperate).  
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system level dynamics (e.g., aggregation, diffusion, and behavioral cascades), this study 
identifies micro-movements in rankings that have implications for systems of cooperation. Our 
understanding of how these micro-movements impact systems of cooperation would be greatly 
enhanced by simulations that show how these dynamics play out at the system level. Such an 
approach would help us understand whether actors’ cooperative behaviors truly offset their 
uncooperative behaviors.  
Second, this study adds to our understanding of the functional benefits of hierarchy in 
organizations (e.g., Anderson and Brown 2010; Anderson and Willer 2014). Extant research 
presents mixed results and has called for more research that explains what determines whether a 
ranking system is helpful or harmful. By examining a virtual organization that exists solely 
because of the voluntary contributions of its members, this study presents a conservative test for 
the ability of social hierarchy to enhance cooperation. In this study I found evidence of both 
helpful and potentially harmful effects of rankings. This work shows how different types of 
movements within rankings can switch whether a ranking is helpful or harmful for organizations. 
In addition to asking which conditions make the hierarchy as a whole more likely to be helpful or 
harmful for organizations, this study suggests that it may be helpful to explicitly examine factors 
that alter individuals’ experiences inside rankings. Additionally, it suggests that rankings will 
naturally produce negative externalities that should be explicitly managed.   
Last, this study offers insights into how rankings may fit into the changing nature of work 
(e.g., Barley, Bechky, and Milliken 2017). Online communities are examples of new 
organizational structures that comprise the New World of Work. Online communities allow 
actors to connect virtually to share knowledge, exchange ideas, collaborate and learn (Hagel and 
Armstrong 1997). They display several characteristics that are concomitant with the changing 
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nature of work: an increase in technologically mediated work, reduced face-to-face interaction, 
geographically dispersed community members, and lower barriers for entering and exiting the 
organization. Each of these characteristics may negatively impact the maintenance of systems of 
cooperation because they can decrease the power of normative pressures to cooperate, reduce 
actors’ identification with organizational goals, and decrease the power of social relations (e.g., 
social closure) for enforcing cooperation. This study examined how movements through rankings 
affected the likelihood that individuals would continue to cooperate despite these characteristics. 
As a next step, it would be interesting to explicitly examine the relative power of these 
interpersonal mechanisms for maintaining cooperation in the new world of work.  
 While this study offers several contributions, it also features some limitations that shape 
the expanse of these contributions. Consistent with ranking theory (e.g., Garcia et al. 2006; Pettit 
et al. 2016), I measure threats to rank as an actor being only 10% or less above a ranking 
position. In so doing, I assume that actors will be concerned with a loss in rank when they are in 
this position. This is a reasonable assumption because actors do lose the privileges that are 
associated with a rank position if they dip back below the milestone threshold. However, the 
archival nature of this data does not permit me to confirm whether or not actors actually 
experience threats associated with a loss in rank. It is conceivable that they could be focused on 
their most recent achievement and therefore may be cooperating more because they feel that they 
are a valued member of the community. Future work could explicitly survey members of these 
communities to determine how they experience different ranking positions, therein confirming or 
transforming the nature of the insights found in this study.  
 Additionally, the scope of this study is defined in part by the type of uncooperative 
behaviors that arise in rankings. I examine whether uncooperative behaviors can be offset by 
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increases in cooperative behaviors, arguing that this may produce a net positive effect for the 
system as a whole. Embedded in this argument is the assumption that these behaviors are rather 
benign—that they won’t negatively impact other actors to a degree that would decrease their 
future rates of cooperation. With the new world of work, this may very well be the case. The size 
of the online community (millions of members) and the fact that information about 
uncooperative behaviors is not easily accessible makes it less likely that other actors will know 
enough about uncooperative behaviors to be negatively impacted by them. This may not be the 
case in other contexts. In other contexts actors may have easy access to information about others’ 
uncooperative behaviors. More malicious forms of uncooperative behavior may affect others 
more negatively. For example, performance comparison pressures have been tied to the sabotage 
of other actors’ performance (Tesser and Smith 1980; Poortvliet 2013). In surveys of sales teams 
at a Chinese telecommunications company, Lam et al. (2011) found that lower performing 
employees harmed higher performing employees (e.g., interfered with their performance and 
treated them with disrespect) and this adversely affected their team’s overall performance. It is 
conceivable that due to the availability of information about uncooperative behaviors or the level 
of harm they cause others increases in cooperative behaviors may not be able to offset 
uncooperative behaviors.  
CONCLUSION 
 Prior research shows that rankings can be helpful and harmful for maintaining 
cooperation. Rankings can incentivize cooperation by facilitating the reward of cooperative 
behaviors and the punishment of uncooperative behaviors. However, rankings may also heighten 
performance comparison pressures, which in turn may incite uncooperative behaviors such as 
cheating to get ahead in the rankings. By relaxing the assumption that actors view cooperative 
and uncooperative behaviors as tradeoffs, this study allows for the possibility that actors may 
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exercise higher rates of cooperative behaviors to offset their cooperative behaviors. I find 
evidence to this effect, suggesting that organizations may be able to tolerate the negative 
externalities rankings produce because they produce a net-positive affect on cooperation.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Understanding How Rankings Affect Systems of Cooperation 
 
 This dissertation began with the observation that the changing nature of work may be 
altering how employees experience and interact with mechanisms that are meant to achieve 
social order. Social order is achieved when a group sets and maintains standards of behavior that 
benefit the group. Society as a whole can be thought of as an exercise in achieving social order—
a composite set of individuals solidified around common goals (Durkheim 2005). At its roots, 
maintaining social order is fundamentally a question about how to achieve cooperation among 
self-interested individuals. Scholars have long been occupied by this question.  
Beginning with Hobbe’s (1998) description of mankind’s pure state of nature as “every 
man against every man”, multiple efforts have been made to identify mechanisms that suppress 
self-interests and encourage cooperation. In contrast to perspectives that emphasize individual-
level predictors such as prosocial personalities, emotions, motivations, and value orientations, 
sociological perspectives view cooperation as being heavily influenced by forces outside of the 
individual such as norms, social hierarchy, and the structure of relations between individuals 
(Simpson and Willer 2015). This dissertation proceeds along similar lines by examining how 
norms (generalized reciprocity) and social hierarchy (reputation rankings) maintain levels of 
cooperation inside organizations. I add to this conversation on social order by examining these 
mechanisms with a robustness lens (Jen 2005). A robustness lens seeks to understand how social 
systems maintain performance in the face of exogenous and endogenous perturbations (i.e., 
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potentially disruptive forces). I seek to understand how these mechanisms maintain systems of 
cooperation in the presence of one potentially disruptive force: rankings. Rankings can create 
performance comparison pressures that have the potential to undercut motivations to cooperate 
(Garcia et al. 2013). While it is widely recognized that rankings and other forms of social 
hierarchy are a standard feature of organizational life (Anderson and Brown 2010), scholars have 
yet to explicitly examine whether and how these mechanisms sustain cooperation in the presence 
of rankings.  
This dissertation begins to fill this gap by examining rankings as exogenous and 
endogenous perturbations to systems of cooperation. First, I examined rankings as an exogenous 
perturbation to systems of cooperation by exploring how established systems of cooperation fare 
after the introduction of rankings. A sudden introduction of social hierarchy can occur in several 
contexts—for example, when an entrepreneurial venture begins to scale up by hiring employees, 
or an organization switches from a flatter organizational structure (e.g., holocracy) to a steeper 
hierarchical structure. Chapter 2 asks whether systems of generalized reciprocity are naturally 
able to withstand the potentially disruptive forces that rankings produce, or if they are likely to 
be disrupted. And, if they become disrupted, which mechanisms can restore cooperation. I find 
that systems of cooperation are in fact disrupted by the introduction of rankings, but that the 
simultaneous introduction of information about actors’ prosocial contributions can restore 
disrupted systems. Robust cooperation can be achieved in the presence of rankings, but only if 
information about actors’ prosocial reputations is also a feature of the system’s design.  
Second, I examined rankings as an endogenous perturbation to systems of cooperation by 
exploring how rankings can produce pressures that may unintentionally undermine cooperation 
when they are used to maintain systems of cooperation. Rankings have long been used by groups 
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(both formally and informally) to maintain cooperation. Knowledge of an implicit ranking of 
contributions keeps people cooperating (Willer 2009). The use of rankings as a formal 
mechanism to elicit cooperation is growing. It is a standing feature of many large, geographically 
dispersed, virtual organizations such as online communities, open-source collaboration projects, 
and electronically based markets. For example, Restivo and van de Rijt (2012) show that the 
reputation badge system used by Wikipedia helps elicit higher amounts of cooperative actions 
such as posting and editing. Chapter 3 asks what it is about actors’ experiences in rankings that 
increases the likelihood that they produce potentially disruptive pressures (i.e., uncooperative 
behaviors) and whether the presence of these uncooperative behaviors has the power to 
undermine the maintenance of the system of cooperation as a whole. I find that upward 
movements in a ranking are more likely to produce uncooperative behavior, but actors that 
exhibit this behavior cooperate more than actors that do not exhibit this behavior. This suggests 
that rankings can be used to achieve robust cooperation because there is a net-positive effect of 
rankings at the system-level.  
Together, these studies show that rankings do in fact perturb systems of cooperation. As 
exogenous perturbations, rankings may be especially problematic for systems of cooperation that 
are maintained by normative social structures. Generalized reciprocity is a strong norm that has 
been described as the most effective mechanism for creating stable systems of cooperation (e.g., 
Nowak 2006). I found that the introduction of rankings was highly disruptive for systems of 
cooperation, but that as endogenous perturbations rankings did not appear to be as problematic 
for systems of cooperation. Future work on systems of generalized reciprocity may benefit from 
examining systems of generalized reciprocity that originate alongside rankings, making rankings 
endogenous perturbations. The presence of rankings may impair the ability of systems of 
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generalized reciprocity to take off. Conversely, systems of generalized reciprocity may coevolve 
with rankings—adjusting for social comparison pressures by mindfully steering help in the 
direction of non-competitive others.  Prior research provides evidence to this effect. Doyle et al. 
(2017) show that the higher the status distance between an ego and an alter (with the ego holding 
the more favorable position), the more help the ego will provide an alter. At the system level this 
may result in tightly connected clusters of helping, rather than a wider, more circular system that 
connects more diverse actors. It is unclear which type of system of cooperation would be more 
robust over time. Future research can disentangle whether rankings are more disruptive to 
systems of cooperation when they are exogenous or endogenous and explore how each of the 
interpersonal mechanisms for maintaining cooperation (norms and social relations) interact with 
each type.  
Additionally, these studies confirmed that robustness can be achieved through different 
system-level features and dynamics. Systems of cooperation are robust when they maintain 
levels of cooperation despite the presence of perturbations. Systems of cooperation can be robust 
to reputation rankings when they include mechanisms that feature recovery mechanisms. In 
Chapter 2, systems of generalized reciprocity were robust to ranking pressures when they 
supplied actors with information about others’ contributions to the system. This information has 
the potential to restore systems of cooperation because it permits actors to restore equity and 
increase the perceived fairness of a system. With this information actors can reward cooperators 
and punish non-cooperators. Systems of cooperation are also robust when they are unaffected by 
perturbations. Chapter 3 showed that systems of cooperation can be robust to ranking pressures 
because the negative externalities they create do not necessarily undermine actors’ future rates of 
cooperation. At the aggregate this should produce a net-positive effect for systems of 
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cooperation. In this case, a separate recovery mechanism is unnecessary and may in fact be 
counterproductive. Despite extensive research documenting the cooperation-enhancing effects of 
punishment (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Fehr and Gintis 2007), I found that the sanctioning of 
actors’ uncooperative behaviors negatively affected their future rates of cooperation. As a 
system-level characteristic, the punishment of uncooperative behavior may only enhance 
robustness when actors within systems of cooperation are aware of others’ uncooperative 
behaviors, otherwise it may detract from it. Therefore, some system-level features may enhance 
robustness in certain contexts, but not others. Future research should examine how other system-
level characteristics shape the effectiveness of mechanisms that maintain cooperation. 
Characteristics such as the tenure and diversity of the systems’ members, size of the system, and 
the ambiguity surrounding performance measures (e.g., the accuracy of the information that 
places people in rankings) may alter rates of cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. For 
example, in the context of Stack Overflow (which is home to over 150 content-specific 
communities), sites with higher ambiguity (e.g., the parenting advice and conspiracy theory 
communities) may feature higher rates of uncooperative behaviors than sites with lower 
ambiguity (e.g., mathematics). Due to the higher ambiguity about what characterizes a good 
contribution on these sites (by nature of their content), actors may be more likely to feel that their 
ranking does not accurately reflect their true performance levels. Under these conditions actors 
may be more likely to perform uncooperative behaviors to get ahead in the rankings. Although 
each of these communities features an identical ranking system to motivate cooperative 
contributions, their unique system-level characteristics may alter the dynamics they engender.   
This dissertation makes three overarching contributions to the study of organizations. 
First, it examines cooperation as a social system. A social systems perspective examines the 
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interrelations between actions—how past actions shape future actions. In understanding how past 
actions condition future actions, a social systems view necessitates an investigation of both 
interpersonal mechanisms that carry social forces between actors (e.g., norms), and intrapersonal 
mechanisms that shape how actors respond to these forces (e.g., personal motivations) (Asch 
1959). Examining cooperation as a social system contributes to research on cooperation by 
merging research that focuses on intrapersonal mechanisms that explain cooperation such as 
individual characteristics, prosocial values, and motivations (for a review see Smith, Carroll, and 
Ashford 1995), with research that focuses on interpersonal mechanisms that explain cooperation 
such as norms, hierarchy, and relations (for a review see Simpson and Willer 2015). These 
research streams primarily operate in parallel, with little in the way of active, explicit exchange 
(Simpson and Willer 2015). By merging the two, a systems view has the potential to provide new 
insights at the cross-section of these perspectives. For instance, social relations are known to be 
highly effective interpersonal mechanisms for eliciting cooperation. Actors that are more central 
in a social network tend to contribute more to the collective (Baldassarri 2014). But, it is still 
unclear why this is the case. Intrapersonal mechanisms such as prosocial orientation, or the 
experience of prosocial emotions such as levels of commitment could help explain this effect 
(Simpson and Willer 2015).  
Second, this dissertation adopts a dynamic perspective of rankings to further our 
understanding of how systems of cooperation are maintained alongside rankings. Static views of 
rankings assume stable psychological experiences of rankings. Dynamic views of rankings 
explore how actors’ movements through rankings trigger different psychological experiences of 
rankings, revealing different pressures that may elicit new behaviors from the same set of actors 
over time. For example, middle-status conformity theory posits that actors within the middle of a 
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ranking will be more likely to conform to standards of behavior (e.g., expectations for 
cooperation toward a collective goal) in the hopes of achieving a higher rank (Phillips and 
Zuckerman 2001). Rapid movements upward in a ranking may heighten the impression that 
higher rank is achievable, thereby engendering more cooperation from these actors relative to 
actors that move more slowly through a ranking.  
Last, by explicitly focusing on the maintenance of cooperation in the presence of 
potentially disruptive forces, this dissertation imports a robustness lens from the study of 
complex systems in the natural and engineering sciences. A robustness lens focuses on the 
maintenance of performance and functionality in the face of exogenous and endogenous 
perturbations (Jen 2003). Such an approach has the power to differentiate between mechanisms 
that maintain levels of cooperation under stable, predictable, and ideal conditions, from those 
that maintain cooperation in the presence of potentially disruptive pressures. For example, norms 
of generalized reciprocity encourage actors to pay forward help they have received under the 
guise that if they need help in the future it will be available to them. This can trigger a cascade of 
help among the members of an organization. The removal of large portion of a system’s 
members (e.g., through high turnover), could halt these cascades of helping behaviors. Turnover 
replaces actors that have received help—actors that feel grateful and experience an urge to help 
others—with actors that have yet received help. Consequently, the original actors that remain 
may continually inject help into a system, but may ultimately not receive benefits from the 
system. Such a system is likely to deteriorate over time (Molm 1997). Understanding how 
systems of cooperation interact with perturbations such as high rates of turnover has the potential 
to illuminate a new set of mechanisms that can produce longer-lasting cooperation.  
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CONCLUSION  
There is perhaps no line of inquiry that is more fundamental for the study of 
organizations, and social life more broadly, than understanding how cooperation is maintained 
over time among self-interested actors. Cooperation is not only a key element for building 
effective organizations, but is also the substrate from which society as a whole has emerged. This 
dissertation focuses on how systems of cooperation are maintained in the presence of rankings. 
Rankings and other forms of social hierarchy are arguably ubiquitous features of social life. As 
such, they are potentially unavoidable sources of perturbations for systems of cooperation.  By 
focusing on how to maintain systems of cooperation in the presence of rankings, this dissertation 
highlights mechanisms that make systems of cooperation more robust to pressures associated 
with rankings. Robustness has critical implications for both theory and practice as this lens 
illuminates strategies that position organizations to achieve long-term performance despite the 
occurrence of failure, environmental uncertainty, rapid change, and increasing complexity.  
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APPENDIX 
Supplemental Tables and Figures 
Table A.1: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: (Reputation Condition Only) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects    
Level 1: Decision Rounds Post-Interruption (n=2,740)    
   Ego’s Percent Gratitude  0.065*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 
 (0.012) (0.0123) (0.012) 
   Ego’s Percent Generosity 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
   Increasing Decision Rounds -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
   Alter’s Reputation for Transferring in Stage 1 0.054*** -0.017 0.059*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
Level 2: Individual (Ego) (n=136)    
   Short-term Thinking Tendency (CRT) -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
   Male -0.480 -0.574 -0.505 
 (0.361) (0.415) (0.445) 
   Age (mean-centered) -0.065 -0.070 -0.096 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.051) 
   Education: Some College (dummy)  0.329 0.498 0.409 
 (0.352) (0.405) (0.436) 
   Education: Bachelor’s Degree (dummy) 0.212 0.076 0.343 
 (0.503) (0.569) (0.625) 
   Education: Post-Doc (dummy) 0.104 0.012 -0.319 
 (0.839) (0.946) (1.032) 
Level 3: Groups (n=18)    
   Group’s Average Short-Term Thinking Tendency 0.0086 0.011 0.048 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) 
   Percent of Group that is Male  0.0068 0.012 0.019 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) 
   Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1 -0.092*** -0.172***  
 (0.016) (0.021)  
   Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1 x Alter’s Rep.   0.001***  
  (0.000)  
   Group was Stingy in Stage 1   3.874*** 
   (0.784) 
   Group was Generous in Stage 1   -4.337*** 
   (0.915) 
   Group was Stingy in Stage 1 x Alter’s Rep.    -0.025*** 
   (0.006) 
   Group was Generous in Stage 1 x Alter’s Rep.    0.044*** 
   (0.001) 
Random Effects    
   Standard Deviation Individual 0.027*** 0.052 0.634*** 
 (0.037) (1.712) (0.270) 
   Standard Deviation Group 1.396*** 1.634*** 1.751*** 
 (0.165) (0.196) (0.226) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Omitted category: Group with average transferring  
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Table A.2: Chp. 2 Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: Table 2 with Rank as the Omitted Category for 
Comparison (All Conditions represented as Odds Ratios)  
 Model 3 
Fixed Effects  
Level 1: Decision Rounds Post-Interruption   
   Ego’s Percent Gratitude  1.019*** 
 (0.005) 
   Ego’s Percent Generosity 1.050*** 
 (0.002) 
   Increasing Decision Rounds 0.999 
 (0.002) 
Level 2: Individual (Ego)   
   Male 0.943 
 (0.114) 
   Age (mean-centered) 0.991 
 (0.011) 
   Education: Some College (dummy)  1.008 
 (0.124) 
   Education: Associate’s Degree (dummy) 1.429 
 (0.809) 
   Education: Bachelor’s Degree (dummy) 0.918 
 (0.151) 
   Education: Post-Doc (dummy) 1.311 
 (0.366) 
   Short-term Thinking Tendency (CRT) 0.999 
 (0.002) 
Level 3: Groups   
   Group’s Average Short-Term Thinking Tendency 0.996 
 (0.005) 
   Group’s Percent Transfers in Stage 1 0.990 
 (0.006) 
   Percent of Group that is Male  0.998 
 (0.003) 
   No Additional Information Condition 2.772*** 
 (0.502) 
   Reputation Information Condition 2.337*** 
 (0.422) 
   Reputation and Rank Information Condition 1.865*** 
 (0.322) 
Random Effects  
   Standard Deviation Individual 0.303*** 
 (0.083) 
   Standard Deviation Group 0.954*** 
 (0.056) 
Intraclass Correlation  
 
0.233 
Number of Observations (Post-Interruption Decisions) 11,496 
Number of Individuals (Ego) 574 
Number of Groups  74 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Omitted category: Rank Condition   
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Table A.3: Chp.3 Effects of High Proximity to Gaining the Next Milestone Rank (20% Away from change in rank) 
 Model 5a: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
 
Model 5b: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
Model 6a: 
Likelihood 
of 
suspension 
Model 6b: 
Likelihood 
of 
suspension 
Model 7a: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 7b: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
eventually 
suspended  
Model 7c: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 7d: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
of actors 
who are 
eventually 
suspended 
Proximity to Gain  -0.084**  -0.005  -0.090** -0.061***   
 (0.007)  (0.089)  (0.016) (0.016)   
Proximity to Loss   0.132**  -0.079   0.244** -0.022* 
  (0.005)  (0.056)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Milestone Category 3 0.989** 0.347** 1.094** 0.753** 0.974** 1.045*** 0.091** 0.663*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.134) (0.090) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) 
Milestone Category 4 1.842** 0.115** 1.178** 0.896** 1.838** 1.725*** -0.308** 0.495*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.222) (0.134) (0.040) (0.036) (0.023) (0.022) 
Milestone Category 5 1.893** -0.151** 0.368 -0.318 1.855** 1.888*** -0.411** 0.240*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.787) (0.730) (0.057) (0.052) (0.044) (0.045) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.013** 0.023** -0.021* -0.021** 0.017** 0.014*** 0.032** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Rec. 0.045** 0.082** 0.129** 0.161** 0.049** 0.031*** 0.053** 0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Days Since Last Active -0.010** -0.013** -0.011** -0.012** -0.005** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.00) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure on Site -0.001** -0.002** -0.005** -0.003** -0.002** -0.000 -0.001** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000) 
Total Activity   0.094** 0.086**     
   (0.011) (0.005)     
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 242,710 792,011 79,382 398,069 82,931 159,779 308,160 72,793 
Number of Actors 4,254 6,945 1,400 3,616 1,093 3,161 2,301 2,137 
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Table A.4: Chp.3 Effects of High Proximity to Gaining the Next Milestone Rank (30% Away from change in rank) 
 Model 5a: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
 
Model 5b: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
Model 6a: 
Likelihood 
of 
suspension 
Model 6b: 
Likelihood 
of 
suspension 
Model 7a: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who 
are never 
suspended 
Model 7b: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who 
are 
eventually 
suspended 
Model 7c: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who 
are never 
suspended 
Model 7d: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who 
are 
eventually 
suspended 
Proximity to Gain  -0.076***  0.083  -0.010 -0.138***   
 (0.006)  (0.084)  (0.015) (0.015)   
Proximity to Loss   0.112***  -0.060   0.140*** 0.040*** 
  (0.005)  (0.060)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Milestone Category 3 1.023*** 0.332*** 1.093*** 0.764*** 1.000*** 1.083*** 0.100*** 0.656*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.135) (0.092) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) 
Milestone Category 4 1.870*** 0.140*** 1.187*** 0.896*** 1.852*** 1.783*** -0.176*** 0.457*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.220) (0.132) (0.040) (0.036) (0.023) (0.022) 
Milestone Category 5 1.912*** -0.114*** 0.404 -0.312 1.851*** 1.923*** -0.228*** 0.187*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.783) (0.731) (0.057) (0.053) (0.044) (0.045) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.013*** 0.025*** -0.019* -0.020*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Rec. 0.046*** 0.082*** 0.128*** 0.161*** 0.070*** 0.031*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Days Since Last Active -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure on Site -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Activity   0.094*** 0.086***     
   (0.011) (0.005)     
Actor Fixed Effects          
Number of Observations 242,193 774,490 78,641 394,735 82,632 23,479 293,005 71,840 
Number of Actors 4,233 6,830 1,387 3,587 1,087 1,178 2,201 2,126 
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Notes for Tables A.3 & A.4 
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. All models except for Model 2 use Panel Poisson Regression with actor fixed effects. Model 2 uses Panel 
Logistic Regression with actor fixed effects.  
4. All independent variables are lagged (calculated at week t-1).  
5. All observations in which individuals were in the suspended in week t-1 were dropped because individuals 
cannot accrue reputation points while they are suspended.  
6. Models 3b and 3d examine the behavior of actors that are more prone to uncooperative behavior in the time 
period before their first suspension.   
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Table A.5: Chp.3 Effects of Reputation Value (logged) on Cooperative Behavior  
 Model 1: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
 
Model 2: 
Likelihood of 
suspension 
Model 3a: 
Count of coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 3b: 
Count of coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who are 
eventually 
suspended 
Reputation Points Logged  -0.421** -0.266** -0.512** -0.404*** 
 (0.002) (0.021) (0.003) (0.004) 
Milestone Category 3 1.082** 1.124** 1.097** 1.303*** 
 (0.008) (0.071) (0.014) (0.014) 
Milestone Category 4 1.607** 1.475** 1.716** 1.867*** 
 (0.010) (0.105) (0.020) (0.012) 
Milestone Category 5 1.809** 0.925* 2.173** 2.083*** 
 (0.015) (0.470) (0.035) (0.032) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.0236** -0.019** 0.033** 0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Rec. 0.076** 0.156** 0.047** 0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.0120) (0.004) (0.001) 
Days Since Last Active -0.013** -0.013** -0.008** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure on Site -0.001** -0.00358** -0.001** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Activity  0.0856**   
  (0.004)   
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,083,201 670,752 418,298 98,812 
Number of Actors 7,718 5,150 2,610 2,562 
Notes:  
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0012. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. Models 1 and 3 use Panel Poisson Regression with actor fixed effects. Model 2 uses Panel Logistic 
Regression with actor fixed effects.   
4. All independent variables are lagged (calculated at week t-1).  
5. All observations in which individuals were suspended in week t-1 were dropped because individuals cannot 
accrue reputation points while they are suspended  
6. Model 3b examines the behavior of actors that are prone to uncooperative behavior in the time 
period before their first suspension.  
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Table A.6: Chp.3 Models Showing Effect of Interaction Between Ranking Milestone Category and 
Percent of Milestone Rank Achieved on Cooperative Behavior  
 Model 1: 
Count of coop. 
behaviors 
Percent of Rank Achieved   -0.005** 
 (0.000) 
Milestone Category 3 0.249** 
 (0.012) 
Milestone Category 4 0.314** 
 (0.012) 
Milestone Category 5 0.341** 
 (0.021) 
M3*Percent Rank Achieved 0.006** 
 (0.000) 
M4*Percent Rank Achieved 0.007** 
 (0.000) 
M5*Percent Rank Achieved  0.007** 
 (0.000) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.021** 
 (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Rec. 0.080** 
 (0.001) 
Days Since Last Active -0.014** 
 (0.00) 
Tenure on Site -0.001** 
 (0.000) 
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes 
Number of Observations 1,039,895 
Number of Actors 7,347 
Notes:  
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0012. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. Models 1 uses a Poisson Regression with actor fixed effects.  
4. All independent variables are lagged (calculated at week t-1).  
5. All observations in which individuals were suspended in week t-1 were dropped because individuals cannot 
accrue reputation points while they are suspended.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
 
Table A.7: Chp.3 Models Showing Effect on Cooperative Behavior  
 Model 1: 
Count of 
coop. 
behaviors 
Model 2: 
Likelihood of 
suspension 
Model 3a: 
Count of coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who are 
never 
suspended 
Model 3b: 
Count of coop. 
behaviors of 
actors who are 
eventually 
suspended 
Gain Mindset  0.050** 0.325** 0.110** 0.132** 
 (0.004) (0.046) (0.009) (0.009) 
Milestone Category 3 0.522** 1.024** 0.386** 0.778** 
 (0.008) (0.072) (0.014) (0.014) 
Milestone Category 4 0.608** 1.368** 0.405** 0.939** 
 (0.010) (0.107) (0.020) (0.018) 
Milestone Category 5 0.571** 0.365 0.377** 0.981** 
 (0.014) (0.478) (0.034) (0.031) 
Count of Upvotes Received 0.021** 0.031** 0.030** 0.021** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Count of Downvotes Rec. 0.078** 0.202** 0.057** 0.050** 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) 
Days Since Last Active -0.014** -0.013** -0.008** -0.012** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure on Site -0.001** -0.004** -0.001** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Actor Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  1,030,523 630,144 378,548 95,303 
Number of Actors  7,267 4,765 2,285 2,358 
Notes:  
1. *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0012. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. Models 1 and 3 use Panel Poisson Regression with actor fixed effects. Model 2 uses Panel Logistic 
Regression with actor fixed effects.   
4. Gain mindset = 1 if percent of next rank achieved is >=50% 
5. All independent variables are lagged (calculated at week t-1).  
6. All observations in which individuals were suspended in week t-1 were dropped because individuals cannot 
accrue reputation points while they are suspended.  
7. Model 3b examines the behavior of actors that are prone to uncooperative behavior in the time 
period before their first suspension.  
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Figure A.1: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 2 
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Figure A.2: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 3 
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Figure A.3: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 4 
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Figure A.4: Count of Cooperative Behaviors by Reputation Points for Milestone Rank Category 5 
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